Sunday, October 27, 2019

Butina’s release seen as US weakness


October 27, 2019

On October 26 media reported that Maria Butina, a Russian citizen convicted for working for the Russian government, was released from an US jail, deported and returned to Russia.[1] She walked out smiling, escorted by the Spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was met with flowers from the interviewing Russian media. She came home as a martyr, hence, in Russian thinking, as a hero.

‘Innocent because of the term’
The presence of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson is logical in Russian perception, since they have been long advocating for Butina’s release, showing her as an unsuspecting young woman, who simply wanted to help her country.[2] Her photos with an AK[3], which would not be given to her, unless authorized by the State, as well as the clear contacts revealed in the investigation and her direct confession in a clandestine influence scheme working for the Russian Government[4], are disregarded as forced confessions.[5] Yet torture is understandable in Russia, where it is used in some cases that, however, involve important money, such as Magnitsky case[6].

Hence, letting Butina go after what in Russia is considered, as a country where prison slang penetrates regular day to day language[7], a too short of a term for an actual spying activity. One of the shortest publicly known prison terms for spies was given to Sergei Skripal, due to him being exchanged for a Russian spy. Despite the exchange he was never forgiven and an assassination attempt was carried by the Russian Military Intelligence GRU in UK, where he lived in retirement.[8]

‘Foreign agent vs Foreign agent’
USA provisions on lobbying also assume that foreigners lobbying in US should register as foreign agents[9]. There is only one perception in the former USSR to the notions of “agent” and especially “foreign agent”. It will be inevitably perceived as a secret service operative, hence the idea to reciprocate in Russia had a different meaning.[10] So, from the Russian perspective Butina was not a foreign agent and her punishment was unjust to her and directed against Russia exclusively, regardless of the administration that runs the US Government.

‘Butina is no Chapman, she is to be depicted as a rightful example to follow and… recruit’
Another element is that Butina is most probably not going to be seen as a clone of Anna Chapman. Chapman was what would probably amount to a “sparrow” as depicted by in US spy movies.[11] Chapman would not necessarily strike Eastern Europeans as a particularly beautiful lady, yet she probably would be considered at least well appointed, and therefore indeed attractive, while Butina would not. Butina would probably be perceived as a young righteous geek, which is confirmed exactly by the remarks of the Russian MFA Spokesperson Zaharova “She really did no harm to anybody. She’s just a girl, she’s just a young woman. She tried to invest her youth, if you wish, her gift, her talent, into people-to-people contacts.”[12]

Releasing Butina after a very short term will result in the Russian public perception that she was not spying and she was punished “unjustly.” Butina, therefore, returns as a martyr and, in Russian perception, as a hero. The release of Butina under these circumstances created another almost spy personality in Russia, not quite Anna Chapman, to follow and be an example, just like communist children heroes[13] of old.[14] Butina has the potential to become the correct and righteous young martyr-hero for the Russian youth for further heroization and recruitment, adding to the internal narrative that the US is battling Russian in the world. This will continue to motivate Russians to believe that public US narratives are fake and they will continue to believe that they have to stave off USA, just like the Russian private military contractor commander of the infamous Vagner group that attacked US troops in Syria said.[15]

‘Russia thinks it won the info warfare’
The release will also add to the Russian reasoning that they should continue the “information warfare” against USA. EUvsDisinfo reported in 2018 that Margarita Simonyan, the Chief Editor of RT (formerly Russia Today), openly recognized that RT is needed “for about the same reason as why the country needs a Defense Ministry.” RT is capable of “conducting information war against the whole Western world,” using “the information weapon” Simonyan has explained.” [16]

Russians, including their leaders, would not care about President Trump that much, as Moscow’s media depicts him negatively as well, depending on circumstances, as one can gather from Julia Davis reports on Russian media on Twitter.[17] It does not mean that they lack interest. It means that in the long run, USA is an enemy for them, as they depict it in their media, dedicating to USA several negative or implicitly negative daily news, regardless of the President, as can be seen on their online pages.[18] They will therefore continue their war by other means.

Even with Kremlin public narrative advocating for Butina’s innocence, the public in Russia might very well choose the believe that even if Butina was an agent, which would not be disclosed in suh a case, she still managed to “fool the US” thus ensuring a victory for the US, for a small price, boosting the morale of the Russian structures and public, strengthening the confidence in their ‘master spy’, President Putin.

Such a negative trend is unfortunate and cannot inspire optimism for the future of Russia, US and particularly Europe. Butina’s case, and release without at least another round of questioning known to public, is an instance that supports the idea that Russian perceptions will continue to differ drastically from US ones, and that Russia will most probably see USA as a weak state that could not ‘properly’ punish a declared foreign agent, unlike they do via GRU poisonings, thus releasing Butina very soon, leaving Washington DC with an image of ‘US shame due to their actions’ and as a result of Kremlin’s pressure in her case and, most importantly, globally. This means that Moscow might have perceived that there still are no incentives to change, least stop, its belligerent approach towards the US and actually supplied ammunition for Kremlin’s information warfare and strengthened the internal coagulation around Putin as a current ‘right leader at the right moment’ for some time. This immediate  time span will cover the period when US will be practically disfunctional for the  next years, due to objective internal political developments, and present other international player more opportunities in the foreign policy.

V. Lupan
Independent expert





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