Moldovan pro-Russian President secret plan
for
Transnistrian conflict settlement - leaked
by Vlad Lupan,
New York, February 20, 2019
According to a number of private discussions with Moldovan
experts, we knew that the pro-Russian President Dododn was preparing a set of documents
for Transnistrian conflict settlement. Moldovan media reported about my
previous information on his plan for a neutrality resolution at UN, a document that
was brought to my attention before the Moldovan authorities even considered to prepare
a UN resolution for Russian troops withdrawal (Independent.md, June 5, 2017).[i]
According to another private discussion this fall with one of the
Moldovan experts from IDIS-Viitorul, an attempt to pitch a plan for Transnistrian
conflict settlement was done by President Dodon’s team, during a visit to USA
and possible to other Western governments. There was no confirmation that they
had meetings with the US State Department, though such a rumor did circulate.
Several days ago, one of the Russian language news portals from
Moldova denied that President Dodon was invited to Munich Security Conference. He
travelled there nonetheless to use the opportunity to have some meetings on the
margin of the MSC2019 to pitch his plan again (OMG Media Group, February 15,
2019)[ii]
The situation somewhat resembles the 2003 developments with Kozak
Memorandum, when the Moldovan (Communist) President Voronin asked Moscow to
step in and facilitated a “shuttle diplomacy” effort by President Putin’s Chief
of Staff, Special Envoy Dmitri Kozak. The plan was supposed to ensure the
s-called federalization of the Republic of Moldova, however, via separatists’
veto powers against any foreign policy decisions of Moldova, a veto in
Constitutional Court, as well as a Russian military base to stay until 2020
with the possibility of unlimited extension (Maria Levchenko, OpenDemocracy, February 25, 2016). [iii] As such provisions prove,
such a plan would not mean federalization. It was rather a form of Russian protectorate,
via proxies, over the rest of the Republic of Moldova, and the Moldovan experts
called it the “Transnistrization of the Republic of Moldova.”
Current President Dodon and the current leader of governing
Democrats were the Minister of Economy in Voronin’s Government and one of the
financiers of the Communist party respectively, at the time of 2003, when the
so-called Kozak Memorandum was prevented.
A “Transnistrization” of
Moldova in the works again
The new “plan” comes after repeated visits to Russia of the
President Dodon, the opening of the so-called Transnistrian representation in Moscow
without an adequate response form the Government, and after a set of international
transportation and export concession by the Moldovan governing Democrats to
Russian businesses in Transnistrian region.
After these actions Russia nominated again the same Dmitry Kozak,
of 2003 Memorandum, to lead Moscow’s efforts in Transnistrian conflict
settlement. Such a nomination presumes an “opportunity to resurrect the issue of
federalization” in exchange
for the Russian, possibly indirect, support to both President Dodon and
governing Democrats (Dumitru Minzarari,
Jamestown Foundation, July 23, 2018).[iv] We have indicated that the
nomination of Mr. Kozak would presume another attempt of Tranistrization.
Despite the facy that the plan is speaking about the post-settlement
Moldovan having one international status, several provisions in the preamble
contradict that- the plan presumes a split of the Republic of Moldova in two
legal subjects, with separate armies, coin and, foreign ministries. Moreover, as
per previous negotiations on Transnistrian conflict settlement, any
negotiations on the so-called federalization of Moldova usually evolve in discussions
about a trilateral or quadrilateral “federation” and later “confederation” etc.
Opening this Pandora box, the President Dodon, who has a previous Chief
Negotiator of the Transnistrian problem on his team, knows very well that the already
existing Gagauz Autonomy will require an identical status, possibly with
external support from Turkey and Russia, while the last would be expected to
foment the somewhat mixed North of the Republic of Moldova, politically sympathetic
to Moscow.
The old problem of linguistic
dependency and the myth of “multi-nationalism”
The struggle for independence in the Republic of Moldova also
meant the return to Latin alphabet at the end of USSR, in 1989, since Soviet “Moldovan”
was in fact Romanian language written in Cyrillic alphabet. For many Moldovans
the language was a sign of their independence. One of the first laws the new
multi-party Parliament inacted in 1989 was to return the Moldovan schooling
system returned to Latin script. As of 1992, the Ministry of Education curricula,
compulsory for all the schools, confirmed the declaration of independence on
Romanian language and decreed that pupils in schools only studied Romanian
language and literature, not Moldovan. From 1992 till 2019 this provision is still
in force. Therefore, another return to Cyrillic after 28 years of Latin script despite
being a nuisance, it in an important symbolic gesture towards the Soviet past and
loyalties to Russia. Such a step would also ground the populace linguistically
into the Russian space (Русский Мир).
The USSR experience of a dominant Russian language
and the functioning of the Transnistrian separatist “republic” showed that
while Russian, “Moldovan” and Ukrainian languages were declared as “official”
in Moldovan SSR and in that “separatist” region after 1992, the Russian language
dominated and its users undermined others, suffocating other two. Therefore,
the existing body of experience shows that the linguistic dependency would lead
to another round of russification.
The past USSR and current Transnistrian linguistic
practices are indicators as to how the so-called multi-national state would be
constructed in the Russian World.
Dangerous provisions
The document is fraught with conflicting and interpretable provisions.
Since the provisions are prepared and presented to the Western actors since
September 2018, these do not seem to be mistakes. Such points may indicate
contradictions stemming from the conflict between original more Russian interests-oriented
provisions and attempt to adjust the paper with some red lines from Western
actors.
1. Contradictions - the draft on page one refers in preamble to a unitary state
with two equal subjects with equal powers (полномочия) in foreign policy,
defense, security, currency. It also speaks in General Provisions of a unitary
multinational neutral state, in para 1 and 5. Yet para 6 states that “The equality
of “Moldova-Transnistria” sides in negotiations process on the Transnistrian
conflict settlement does not lead to their equal legal status/powers (правосубьектность)”.
2. Removing the 2005 law - the most contentious for Russia Moldovan 2005 law that determines
that the Transnistrian conflict resolution would be done in accordance with the
Moldovan Constitution and international law provisions is eliminated on page 2,
para 9 of General provisions, clearing the way for a construct similar to one
in 2003.
3. The return to 2003 Kozak “federalization” memorandum provision
of a bicameral Parliament and exclusive presence of Transnistrian representatives
in Moldovan Government, justice system and Constitutional court can be found again
on page 2, para 3 and 10. However, a mirroring process of ensuring some sort of
a guarantee by placing trusted Moldovan officials in the Transnistrian
structures is absent. The previous Kozak Memorandum veto powers granted to Transnistrians, who are almost
entirely Russian citizens, are not mentioned on this page. These are present,
however, in the document and relocated to sections and paras on page3.
4. On page 1 in the Basic Parameters chapter,
on page 2 para 9 the document requires to return to the Moldovan language with the
Cyrillic script, denying the populace of Moldova hard earned linguistic independence
and placing a fractured “reunited” Moldova back into the Cyrillic space of the Russian
World, as noted in the chapter on linguistic
dependency.
5. A precedent
- a combination of elements from the previous 2001-2003 federalization talks and
current Gagauz Autonomy parliamentary right, can be found in para 4, on page 2.
Among other things this will create a precedent for Gagauz autonomy to request
a similar upgrade federal status, as noted above.
6. Para 7 on page 2, as well as the entire set
of provisions in the Chapter on Guarantees
on page 3 speaks about guarantees, without providing a legal ground and compulsory
measures to guaranteeing actors to maintain those promises. The Budapest
Memorandum of 1994 on de-nuclearization of Ukraine proved that the lack of repercussions
is convenient to Russia. The fact that OSCE is called to guarantee these
provisions, is relevant – the OSCE does not have leverages and is dependent on
the rule of consensus. The rule of consensus was successfully misused by the
Russian Federation as a veto in OSCE and other international consensus
organizations before. Without appropriate leverages such a language and
provisions on guarantees is meaningless.
7. The UN
does not have a mechanism of guarantees to ensure all sides’ compliance,
if one of the interested parties is a member of the UN Security Council and even
less in case of OSCE and other organizations (Dangers of Vetocracy, Ukrinfo,
February 12, 2019).[v]
The suggestion of OSCE to handle the conflictual provisions, if those may
arise, goes against the fact that OSCE has only a political, yet no legal body
to settle disputes. It resembles the requirement of Russia to conduct a UN peacekeeping
operation in Ukraine only to protect OSCE observers, not to actually implement
the Minsk agreements, violated by Russia itself and its proxies.
8. Another dangerous provision is to related
to the old Russian position on the synchronization
of the political settlement with Russian troops withdrawal from Moldova according
to the formula “no settlement the way Russia wants it, no withdrawal”. The para3
on Internal Guarantees on page 3 speaks about the demilitarization of both sides,
while para 3 on Neutrality – a Russian demand often repeated in the media for
the last 20 years – is directly making a reference to the idea. Such a
development confirms the previous attempt from the governing Democrats to
manage Russia by refusing to request a compete withdrawal of Russian troops,
including the so-called peacekeepers and ask for their replacement with an
international force, in the UN resolution of June 2018, as we noted at that
time. Such a language allows the entire contingent to stay, and while is not
identical, it is in substance sufficiently similar to Kozak 2003 Memorandum
requirement for stationing of the Russian troops over extended period of times (DW,
July 16, 2018).[vi]
The deadline of 2040 for the settlement confirms the approach.
There are more provisions worth mentioning. However, the already
pointed out provisions seems to prove that this draft is an edited and
rearranged, sometimes poorly, version of the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, making another
attempt at Moldova’s “Transnistrization” and firmly placing it this time in the
sphere of influence of the Russian
Federation, the Russian World.
No mandate - the “wrong”
document?
While the leaked document was received from Munchen, from one of
the participants to the Conference, who got hold of the draft distributed there,
it is rumored that the presidency quickly denied its veracity. This could not
be yet confirmed. The photographed document came to Moldova after Dodon
presented it there. There is little doubt that this the actual document
prepared by President Dodon’s office. Its quick denial suggests the lack of
comfort and confidence that this document would not have the support of Moldovan
citizens, just like the Kozak Memorandum in 2003 drove people out to protest it
en masse. Yet his draft claims the people support it. While Kozak Memorandum
was drafted by the Russian envoy, it would be interesting to find out where the
2018-2019 paper was drafted.
One year ago, we wrote that the acceptance
by the Governance to transfer the Transnistrian file to the President Dodon does
not go in line with its declared pro-European and pro-US stance. At that time
we noted that a “truly pro-European government cannot afford the luxury of
transferring this political case almost exclusively to the President of the
Republic of Moldova and should block such developments.” Unfortunately, this
did not happen (Foreign Policy
Association of Moldova, Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, April 2018, issue
nr.2).[vii]
One year later, today, the reaction of the opposition seems to underline the
cooperation of the President with the governing Democrats in the matter of
Russian involvement and interest of both Moldovan actors to settle with Russia (Unimedia, February 20, 2019).[viii]
The set of measures on Transnistrian settlement that we have mentioned before
could not have been implemented without a coordinated approach between the
government and the President. Moldovan Parliamentary elections are going to
happen in five days. It is unclear if the undeclared coalition between the
Democrats and Socialists would coalition after the elections, since it depends on
their results and possible legal actions that the political players, including
the opposition may take against them. The danger of such a coalition was rated
high in a study written in the fall of 2018 and published in Ukraine in January
2019 (Elections in Moldova, Ukrainian
Prism, January 2019).[ix]
What comes after 2019
elections in Moldova, on the South Western flank of Ukraine
While President Dodon quick, though unconfirmed, denial may create
the impression that he is not going to follow up on the new Transnistrian plan,
we would presume that he would wait for a better timing, after February 24
elections, to have more freedom to act. It would depend on the post-electoral
coalitions or even early elections. Therefore, the life of this document may not
be over and we can expect new developments in 2019. In 2003 the US Ambassador, EU,
OSCE and NATO officials criticized the Kozak plan as failing to reflect the
interests of the Moldovans or gather consensus within their membership, thus placing
Moldovan leadership under pressure, and saving Moldova from disintegrating (RFE/RL-Moldova, August 13, 2016)[x] and becoming a precedent
in Eastern Europe political takeover by Russia and its proxies. In 2019 there
are two actors playing for this plan – the purported pro-US Democrats and Dodon’s
Socialists, distributing their “spheres of influence” among themselves. It is time
for the Western actors to stop supporting the open and covert pro-Russian or
opportunistic forces in the Republic of Moldova, ready to play along with
Kremlin. Otherwise they risk to help create a negative precedent ahead of
Ukraine elections and a hostile area on Ukraine South-Western flank.
The "Plan":
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