Moldovan reaction to Georgian events,

These days I have been asked what is the Moldovan reaction to Georgian events. I wrote an e-mail in response and in the process of writing I finally got to write my extended opinion, practically a larger analysis of Moldovan reactions - however, this is my perception as of 13-14 August 2008. Meanwhile, there will be developments by the civil society.

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The civil society in Moldova was the first to react. Within the civil society there are two main sets of views over who started the armed conflict (while about its conduct and results - below). One is the view that Georgia started a miscalculated campaign to regain South Ossetia, which seems quite unlikely, although, of course, one can see elements of such an assessment in the military campaign that unfolded later. It is difficult to share this point of view because it is voiced by people, majority of whom are less familiar with Georgia, although have contacts with Georgians and, most importantly, are recognized experts on Moldova. It might seem that some of such statements are based on the Russian propaganda, which such analysts normally distrust. From the logical point of view it is difficult to argue that Georgia attacked South Ossetia thinking that Russia would not react - such a scenario where Georgians were "not thinking" is impossible and should be disregarded.

Experts reactions prove that there is a limited amount of independent information on Georgia in Moldova and it is mainly supplied to the media by the same civil society actors, mentioned above - which makes it a closed circle.

There is another view within the civil society and finally political parties, Transnistrian separatists and Gagauz autonomy in the south of Moldova also reacted, last two in favour of South Ossetia, of course:

Another civil society view is that Russia, who was preparing the destabilization of Georgia for a while, as Abkhazian events unfolded, provoked the Georgians and used the opportunity to "punish" Tbilisi for their NATO bid. It also used another opportunity - the one to ensure that the image of Georgia as a energy transit corridor is damaged and further unilateral dependency on Russian energy blackmail is further ensured. This was quoted by a most of the experts. This point of view was supported in my Monday article in the local (opposition) newspaper Timpul that has most impact in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau. I also inform the Moldovan political parties there and the civil society that at least in Lithuania and Latvia the civil society is actively demonstrating in front of the Russian Embassies. A call to set up a bank account for Georgia is also in the article, although, of course, it is clear that such an initiative would be difficult since Moldova was hit by an extremely severe flooding that devastated the North and the South of the country and people, who live in the poorest country of Europe, already transferred money to the local calamities account. That diminishes the possibilities to raise money for Georgia, although a simple set up of an account could at least send a positive signal to Tbilisi.

The civil society conclusions is that regardless of the view on who started the conflict, both groups of the civil society analysts who spoke on the Georgian topic (and representing the majority of political analysts in Moldova), share the same opinion that Russia did not have the right to military intervene in Georgia. Its reaction was not legitimate and the actions were unjustified and exaggerated.

Within the Moldovan political scene, two political parties picketed the Russian Embassy. One is the Liberal Party (PL) of the current Chisinau Mayor (with some, although limited, prospects to enter the Parliament in 2009) and the other party is People's Christian-Democrats Party (PPCD), which supports the Governing Communist party. The fact that this party (PPCD) reacted is interesting due to their close relationship with party in power. PPCD however is used with meetings of protests, as it is an inheritor of the National Front Movement of 80's and later used this tactics to gain political points. Currently in decline, some can argue that PPCD's reaction is either populist or represents a principled decision. It seems, though, that there is a close feeling for Georgia in PPCD. However, the decision to picket the Russian Embassy might indeed use the opportunity and incorporates both support for Georgia and making needed political points in an already familiar and recognizable stile before 2009 elections. At the same time, it also might mean that the governing party allows PPCD such actions since these parties are not comfortable with the Georgian military defeat and Russian actions. We are aware that Russia allegedly warned Moldova in 2006-2008 to be more obedient, which should be, in Moscow's view, a positive step in the light of "future events", which will prove that a more moderate stance of Moldova would pay off. It is clear that Russian warnings, if true, meant that Moscow was preparing a destabilization in Georgia, including a military campaign. That was not a scenario that Moldova would like or support.

Consequently the official State position was expressed by the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which issued a careful statement, only on 11 August, in which it aligns itself, as usual, with the French Presidency of the EU statement made by France on EU's behalf in Vienna, at the OSCE Permanent Council on 8 August 2008. The three days delay shows the indecision and confusion of the Moldovan leadership with regard to what position Moldova should take. It was understood by the governance that Georgian precedent can have an extremely negative impact on Moldova, which faces a Russian controlled separatist conflict as well. It was also understood that now, when Russia did not respond to Moldovan initiative up to this moment, the Moldovan position in negotiation with Moscow on Transnistrian conflict, particularly before 2009 elections, would weaken even more. The governance, through this rather weak statement, shows that they still hope for the "mercy" of Moscow and would not make harsh statements before 2009 elections. It is not clear yet, how they would react further - would they finally and completely give in, or rather start preparations to ensure more autonomy from Russia.

It is very much worth mentioning that Transnistrian separatist leadership already next day, on 12 August, announced that they are withdrawing from conflict resolution negotiations that have just restarted after several years of blockage from Transnistrian side. The separatists conditioned their return to the talks by a Moldovan condemnation of Georgian aggression over South Ossetia. Previously, in April 2008, the Transnistrian leadership launched a precondition to restart negotiations - Moldova should sign an Agreement/Treaty between two countries (Moldova and Moldovan Transnistrian Republic). Moldova did not react to the Transnistrian draft Agreement/Treaty. However, after Georgian events, in the above mentioned 12 August Transnistrian statement, the separatists also stated that they "examine the opportunity to draft and sign a new agreement regarding the guarantees of peace, security and stability in the region, which would correspond to the real situation". Transnistrian leader also reminds the people of Transnistrian and South Ossetia that they voted for independence in 2006 referendums (see text in Russian on the website of the "Transnistrian Presidency": http://presidentpmr.org/material/659.html). That confirms that conflict resolution negotiations in Moldova might be seriously damaged, despite governmental hopes. Transnistrian leadership is casually used by Moscow to block negotiations to extract more concessions from Moldova, or West. The most probable scenario, therefore, is that Russia will now use the "tougher stand" of Transnistrian separatists to attempt extracting more concessions out of Moldova, US and UE. As a first prove of that is the answer of the Moldovan Government delivered on on 14 August, according to which the separatist decision to withdraw from negotiations is groundless, however their return to negotiations will not be preconditioned by Chisinau (see Azi.md, 14 August, in English http://www.azi.md/news?ID=50637).

Another worrying statement comes from the Russia oriented Gagauz autonomy located in the south of Moldova, where they deplore South Ossetian victims, but not Georgian victims whatsoever.

Probably, again on the local political scene, a sign of worry for the governing communist party that is not sure yet whether it is supported by Moscow or not yet is the 13 August reaction of the semi-communist/semi-Russian ethnic Movement "Ravnopravie" (Equality) that is alleged to be directly supported by Kremlin and by the Russian Embassy. The leader of that movement, usually voicing Moscow's stance, declared that 31 volunteers addressed his movement with a request to fight on South Ossetian side and that Presidents Saakashvili and Bush should be trialed for genocide, while, most importantly, he called for the withdrawal of Moldova from GUAM.

The leader of the main opposition party Our Moldova Alliance (AMN) made a statement condemning the genocide made by Georgians in South Ossetia(NB), which seems to be exactly the words of Ravnopravie Movement. Despite the fact that he also condemns Moscow in his statement for its reaction, this clear piece of Russian propaganda restated by Urecehan raises a number of serious questions with regard to his affiliation, or his and his staff qualification. The issue of pro-Moscow affiliation already was raised in 2005 elections when he was allowed by Moscow to preferentially meet with the Transnistrian separatist leader right before 2005 elections, while Communists were rejected. The issue of AMN non-European orientation was further aggravated by serious allegations that he received Russian funds and PR specialists from Moscow in 2005. However, it still remains unclear if this Russian-made statement shows his renewed affiliation to Kremlin or simply reflects the lack of professional staff in his team, a very serious problem that he and other parties face in Moldova. Nevertheless, such a statement from an experienced politician is politically unforgivable under current circumstances.

The issue of withdrawing from CIS has floated immediately after Georgian statements of withdrawal from this organization. Communist governance is not reacting in any way, while one pro-governmental party (Democrats Party - PD) is suggesting this will not happen as Moldova is not in the same situation as Georgia and it should wait and see how west will support Georgia and if Russians will withdraw. A similar stance has AMN leader Urechean. The other two important opposition parties Liberal Party (PL), which holds the municipality, and Liberal Democrat Party, which is drawing heavy criticism from the Communist governance, and whose leader’s financial assets were allegedly taken over by the communists recently, are basically against CIS.

The reactions of Ukraine and Romania were of interest as well.

The tougher stance of Ukraine was probably welcomed not only by the Moldovan civil society. I was probably deemed positive by the communist party in power, as they understand that Ukraine could provide the necessary buffer with Russia. Ukraine was a country that was swinging in time between support to Moscow in negotiations and support to Moldova, although permanently declaring its good intentions towards Chisinau, and, I would dare suggest towards Moscow as well, probably. It is my impression that at this point it would be better for Ukraine to change it’s very soft, if not even supportive, stance towards Transnistrian separatist leadership and come closer to Moldova. It will be difficult to do, since Moldova is not clear yet how to proceed, as it seems. The planned visit by the Ukrainian President would probably clear some issues; however such high level contacts between Kiev and Chisinau should intensify dramatically to ensure coordination and support to each other, which is absolutely necessary, in my opinion.

Another country with which the relations are rather bad is Romania that is, with Russian pressure, accused by Moldovan authorities of imperial revisionism, which is far from being truth. More intense contacts with historically supportive Bucharest would have been very important for Chisinau, instead of quarreling on Moscow's request with Romania to prove loyalty to Russia in order to dissipate fear of reunification with Romania. The Romanian reaction, although voiced by a more populist and popular President is also interesting. Romanian President Traian Basescu answered to a question from a student from the Republic of Moldova that the situation in Moldova is far different from Georgia, as it does not border Russia, and due to the fact that it borders Romania, a NATO member. Most importantly the Romanian president stated that the task of Bucharest is to protect Romanian citizens wherever they live, as in Moldova there are a very high number of Romanian citizens. That statement comes after years of handing over Romanian passports in Moldova to the population whose parents only 60 years ago were all Romanian citizens. However, most importantly, this statement repeats Moscow's rhetoric of right of intervention to protect Russian citizens abroad, quoted in the case of South Ossetia.

The discussions on the Georgian issue are continuing both in the political, State and civil society sectors of Moldova, although the intensity of these discussions is diminishing with the armed conflict in Georgia slowing down. The two most important views probably exist now in Moldova – one may be reflecting the official way of not annoying Russia and Moldovan submissions to Moscow might be presented again as an anti-Georgia, good way, of doing business with Moscow by the pro-governmental mass-media, which controls the entire national TV broadcast and rural newspaper readers. Another point of view comes from within the civil society – it is considered that there is a new political and geopolitical reality emerging in relations between EU and US on one side, and Russian on the other – these new relations are no longer in favor of Moscow, which showed its real intentions, both in terms of cutting alternatives for European energy and being a rising neo-colonial empire. This should be used for Moldova’s advantage. Hopefully this point of view would be finally embraced, silently and with a great delay, as usual, by the State.

Argumentul Legal demonstreaza - Rusia incalca dreptul international

Mai jos este Non-Paperul (Argumentarea Legala) prin care sunt reduse la nimic toate "argumentele" nevalabile si ilegale ale Federatiei Ruse.

Salut reactia partidelor politice din Republica Moldova, care au condamnat atacurile asupra Georgiei. In particular sunt placut surprins de organizarea actiunilor de protest de catre acele partide, care sunt in contact cu guvernarea si care pana la urma, au demonstrat impotriva actiunilor Federatiei Ruse in Georgia. Sper ca asemenea actiuni sa nu fie folosite in lupta politica interne, pentru ca nu ar fi in nici un caz in interesul Georgiei!

Iata inceputul argumentarii si cei care doresc sa vada mai multe urmeaza sa apese pe linkul "Read More" de la sfarsitul postarii.

NON-PAPER

GEORGIA IN STATE OF WAR WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Note: This is a brief document that summarizes the facts that took place during the last days on the territory of Georgia. This paper focuses on the qualification of the current facts with respect to the situation between Russian Federation and Georgia as of August 9, 2008. This document represent a copyright of a small group of Students from Georgia, who remain solely responsible to all interpretation given to the facts in context of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and does not represent an official opinion of any Government, Institution or Agency.

Introduction

In the last couple of days the situation in Georgia has dramatically changed. Currently Georgia is in State of War. Namely, in violation with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the Russian Federation has used force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, thus forcing Georgia to act in self-defense in accordance with requirements given in article 51 of the UN Charter. It is also contended, that Georgia is in situation of an international armed conflict with the Russian Federation which governed by the relevant rules of the International Humanitarian Law and unfortunately, the Russian Federation is committing grave violation of the rules of humanitarian law by targeting civilian population and cities, rather than directing its attacks against military objective.




Factual Situation on Grounds

From early hours of August 8, the armed attack was launched against Georgia by Russian Federation. The territory next to South Ossetia (Tskinvali Regions) in particular cities of Gori, Kareli and nearby villages, were bombed. In particular two SU 24 type fighter jets violated the airspace, intruded into the territory of Georgia from Russian Federation and bombed radar station located in Gori region. A missile was also dropped in the village of Variani as a result of which 7 persons were injured. Around 11:30 a.m. four SU 24 fighter jets entered the airspace of Georgia. 2 bombs were dropped at the police office building in Kareli, as a result of which several persons were injured.

Moreover since the 7th of August 2008, 3 columns consisting of hundreds of armed personnel as well as tens of heavy armed vehicles were entering region of Georgia - South Ossetia, via Rocki tunnel, from the Russian Federation.

From the second part of the day (8th of August 2008), following cities have been bombed by the fighter jets entering territory of Georgia from the Russian Federation:
- City of Gori and nearby areas;
- Black Sea Port Poti;
- Upper Abkhazian territory;
- Villages such as Senaki, Khoni and Oni;
There are casualties among civilian population in all the aforementioned places, as the bombing has been directed towards the cities and villages per se indiscriminately. Currently, according to official information 57 civilians had been killed in course of the hostilities.

The aforementioned facts have been preceded by an escalated situation in the Tskhinvali Region of Georgia from 1st of August 2008, when the attacks have been carried out by the representatives of the Separatist regime of South Ossetia (Tskinvali Region). Georgian villages – Upper and Lower Niqozi, Avnevi, Ergneti and Eredvi were subjected to the heavy fire from machine-guns and grenades. The fire was lead in the direction of check-points of Georgian peacekeepers and police. As a result of an intensive shelling, 6 civilians were injured, houses destroyed. Attacks continued on 5-6 of August, when fire from machineguns and grenades were opened at Georgian village Nulli and Georgia and police checkpoint respectively. On August 7 separatists once again attacked Georgian villages Eredvi, Frisi, Avnevi, dvani and Nulli, as a result of which 2 Georgian peacekeepers were wounded. Later that day the attacks were continued.

The Russian Federation under the pretext of its right to “self-defense of its nationals abroad” decided to enter the territory of Georgia from early hours of 8 of August 2008. Its claims are based on the fact, that the population of the Tskhinvali Region in recent hears has received the citizenship of the Russian Federation. However, currently, as noted above, the military operation by the Russian armed forces are carried out outside the Tskhinvali region and include bombing of the cities of Georgia near the capital Tbilisi as well as of cities and villages that are hundreds of kilometers away from the Tskhinvali Region.


PART ON JUS AD BELLUM

The Russian Federation has violated the Principles on the Prohibition of the Use of Force and has carried out Acts of AGRESSION

1. Russia Violated the Principles of the UN Charter and carried out Act of Aggression

The Russian has argued in the course of last two days that it has been acting in accordance with the principles of international law, namely it has been acting in self-defense and entered to territory of Georgia in order to defend its citizens/nationals on the territory of South Ossetia, Georgia. It shall be noted, that South Ossetia (Tkshinvali Region) is part of Georgia that has been under control of the separatist regime supported by the Russian Federation.

First it is retained that acts of the Russian Federation constitute violation of the prohibition of the use of force ad constitutes act of an agreesion. And second, the acts of the Russian Federation cannot be justified under the self-defense, either under the treaty law or customary rules of international law.

Article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter stipulates that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” As it is clarified by authoritative scholar Simma in A Commentary to the UN Charter, the prohibition includes any use of armed force, even small and temporary operations that do not result in any deprivation of territory. The Russian Federation has been carrying out armed attack against Georgia since early morning of 8 August 2008, by carry out targeted bombing of various regions of Georgia.

It is noteworthy that there are certain exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force strictly defined by the UN Charter. Namely, the legitimate use of Self-defence under Article 51 is one of such exceptions. Another exception is actions mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The former is argued by Russian as a lawful ground for use of force and the legal arguments are given below. The latter is not relevant to the given facts and thus not discussed.

In addition, it represents a typical example of intervention that goes against the territorial integrity and political independence of Georgia .

According to the Article 1 of the 1974 Resolution 3314 on the Definition of Aggression, “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”. The definition almost repeats the wording of article 2.4 of the UN Charter. The difference lies within the term “armed force” inserted and the “threat” of use of force omitted. It is thus evident that according to the definition proposed by the resolution, unlike article 2.4 of the UN charter, aggression takes place only in case an “armed force” is used and the “threat of use of force” does not constitute aggression under international law.

The Resolution contains seven provisions defined as aggression:
o Invasion or attack by armed forces of one State upon another State, occupation or annexation resulting from this;
o Bombardment or the use of any weapons by one State against another State;
o Blockade of ports or coasts of one State by armed forces of another State.
o Attack on armed forces of one State by armed forces of another State;
o Using a State’s armed forces within another State, when this presence is with the agreement of the receiving State, but when the usage is contrary to the terms agreed upon or the presence is for a longer time period than agreed upon;
o One State allowing another State to use its territory for perpetrating acts of aggression against a third State;
o Sending armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries into another State to carry out acts of force amounting to acts of aggression as they are defined above or substantial involvement therein.
The acts listed in article 3 are not exhaustive and according to the article 4 the SC has discretion to consider other acts as acts of aggression under the provisions of the UN Charter.

It is evident from the current situation in the territory of Georgia that the actions of the Russian Federation clearly amount to the acts of aggression. From early hours of August 8 territory next to South Ossetia in particular cities of Gori, Kareli and nearby villages, were bombed. The Russian Federation’s clear aggression leads to the sorrowful results for Georgia Moreover, even today, when Georgia is still ready for the peaceful negotiations, the Russian Federation continues bombing Georgian territory

2. Russian can not lawfully invoke right of self-defense as legal grounds for intervention in Georgia

Under treaty law, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of self-defence. The right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 applies to cases where an “armed attack” occurs against a Member of the United Nations. The exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack. Existence of prior armed attack carried out by state against a state is essential. In order to be legitimate, a military action carried out in self-defence must meet the requirements of necessity (no other alternative action is possible) and proportionality (the response is proportionate to redress the initial attack).

Not all violations of article 2.4 of the UN Charter constitute an “armed attack”. The latter only exists when force is used on a relatively large scale and with substantial effect. ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case: “[...] an armed attack must be [...] of such gravity as to amount to” an actual armed attack”

It is argued that the Russian Federation may not invoke the principle of self-defence since the incidents in the region of South Ossetia, which constitutes an integral part of Georgia and is recognized as such by the international community, did not constitute an “armed attack” of Georgia against the Russian Federation. In addition, it is submitted that the military action of the Russian Federation did not meet the requisite of necessity since other diplomatic means were available in order to redress the issue and of proportionality, as far as the military operation carried out by the Russian Federation affected and caused damage to the whole territory of Georgia on which casualties were fixed among the civilian population and civilian objects.

Self-defense in customary international law is based on the "Caroline Doctrine," which established the state's right to use force in order to defend itself against real and imminent threats that require immediate response in circumstances where all peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been exhausted and the response is essential and proportional to the threat .

It is argued that the Russian Federation cannot invoke its customary right to self-defence since:
o The Russian Federation has not faced the real and imminent threat leading to self-defence. The confrontations in the region of South Ossetia, which was caused by the Russian Federation itself, posed real and imminent threat to Georgia;
o Even if there existed any kind of threat to the Russian Federation, it has not exhausted all peaceful means for the settlement of the dispute, as far as even today, when Georgia is ready for the peaceful negotiations, the Russian Federation continues bombing Georgian territory.

3. Russian can not justify its act under the pretext of “Protection of Its National Abroad”

Russian Federation has been threatening Georgia to use force “for the protection of its nationals” in the Georgian two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region.

It is argued, that international law does not recognize the legality of use of force for the protection of the “nationals abroad” as such and existing practice shows that, States have argued the right to protection nationals abroad within the context of the right of self-defence .

Furthermore, the International Law Commission in its First Report on Diplomatic Protection of 2000, approved by the General Assembly by its resolution, emphasized that the state practice in combination with the prohibition of use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter outlaws use of force under the pretexts of diplomatic protection. The only exception to this provision, permitting the unilateral use of force by States, is Article 51, which deals with the right of self-defense . The illegality of Russia’s possible invocation of the right to self-defense has been discussed above.

Thus, any use of force by the Russian Federation against Georgia can only be categorized as an illegal armed reprisal, which is clearly prohibited under international law .

PART ON JUS IN BELLO

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is Applicable to the State of War in Georgia and Parties to the Conflict Should Comply with Respective Rules of IHL

1. IHL is Applicable to the Current State of War whatever the Argument of the Russian Federation can be under the Rules of Jus Ad Bellum

It is contends that the on-going activities fall under the legal frameworks of the law of armed conflicts, i.e. international humanitarian law (IHL) and the treatment of the persons as well as conduct of hostilities are regulated by the well defined rules and principles of IHL.

In addition it shall be noted that the purpose of IHL is to limit the suffering caused by war by protecting and assisting its victims as far as possible. IHL also known under the term Jus in Bello therefore addresses the reality of a conflict without considering the reasons for or legality of resorting to force. It regulates only those aspects of the conflict which are of humanitarian concern. IHL applies irrespective of the reasons for the conflict – whether the force used was legitimate in accordance with the principles of UN Charter (under law of Jus ad Bellum).

IHL is intended to protect war victims and their fundamental rights, no matter to which party they belong. That is why IHL (Jus In Bello) must remain independent of law on the use of force or law on the prevention of war (Jus Ad Bellum).

2. Applicable Regime under IHL governing situation between Georgia and the Russian Federation is the Laws of an International Armed Conflict
It is argued that the existing situation, since August 7 2008 amounts to an international armed conflict as defined and governed by Common Article 2 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Paragraph 1 of the Common Article 2 declares “…the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”. Formally, Common Article 2 determines two requirements for the application of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1947. First, that there shall be an armed conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties – that is between States that are parties (ratified/acceded) to the Geneva Conventions. And second, there is no need for formal declaration of war. Therefore, any declaration on behalf of the Russian authorities that there is no
As to what amount actually to an armed conflict the respectful Commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as Opinion Paper issued by the International Commission of the Red Cross in March 2008 noted, that international armed conflict occurs when one or more States have recourse to armed force against another States regardless of the reasons and intensity of the confrontation. It depends on the factual conditions – what actually happens on the ground .
In addition, according to the well-established practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State” . The Commentators and Legal experts also concerted that “…as soon as the armed forces of one State find themselves with wounded or surrendering members of the armed forces or civilians of another State on their hands, as soon as they detain prisoners or have actual control over a part of the territory of the enemy State, then they must comply with the relevant convention" .
There is an international armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 between Georgia and the Russian Federation due to the factual circumstances on the ground cited above. The aforementioned facts clearly indicate direct involvement of the Russian armed forces into the conduct of hostilities on the territory of Georgia that constitutes an international armed conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation and triggers application of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which both Georgia and the Russian Federation are parties to .
3. Persons shall be Protected in accordance with the IHL
According to IHL, the persons in situation of an international armed conflict fall under protection of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, namely:
o Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field;
o Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea;
o Geneva Convention III Relative for the Treatment of Prisoner of War;
o Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War;
o As well as Additional Protocol I of 1977;
Under international humanitarian law, no one has an intermediate status – everyone in enemy hands must have some definite status, either a "prisoner-of-war…covered by the Third Geneva Convention," or a "civilian covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention."
4. Parties to the Conflict shall Abide to the Principles and Rules Governing Conduct of Hostilities in accordance with IHL – Russian Federation violates Principles of Distinction
The law governing the conduct of hostilities regulates military operations by prohibiting or limiting certain attacks as well as the use of certain arms. The law of conduct of hostilities is based on a certain number of general rules codified in Additional Protocol I as well as regarded part of customary law.

First, the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose means and methods of warfare is not unlimited . Second, the means and methods of combat of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited . And third, the respect for principle of distinction shall be upheld. Namely :
o Distinction between civilians and combatants;
o Distinction between civilian objects and military objectives;
o Prohibition of indiscriminate attacks;
o Proportionality in attack;
o Precautions in attack;
o Precautions against the effects of attacks.

In addition all participants to an armed conflict to retain following:
o The prohibition on declaring that no quarter will be given, or that there will be no survivors.
o Prohibition of attacks against persons hors de combat, or those no longer participating in hostilities;
o The prohibition of perfidy;
The facts on the ground already show that the Russian Air Forces have violated the fundamental principles governing the conduct of hostilities as the bombing has been carried out with respect to the civilian objects. Hence, during last two days the main target of attack have been cities and villages populated by civilians and not representing military objects. As a result of these attacks houses and other property have been destroyed and tens of casualties among civilians are registered. These activities represent a flagrant violation of the principles mentioned above.
5. All Parties to an International Armed Conflict should comply with the rules and principles of International Humanitarian Law and with the Requirements of Humanity
We call upon all parties to an international armed conflict as well as members of the international community “to respect and ensure respect of application” of IHL norms in the conflict region in accordance with the requirements of the Common Article 1 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the State Parties to the said Conventions are under a legal obligation to implement in a good faith .
In particular, we urge all parties apart from the specific rights and obligations envisaged in the relevant articles of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, it would comply with the fundamental guarantees enshrined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common article 3 is like a “convention in miniature”, frequently sited list includes basic rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict , known as “elementary consideration of humanity” deriving from the “principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience” embedded in Common Article 3 , which has been recently categorized as minimum core of mandatory rules… reflecting the most universally recognized humanitarian principles .

Paragraph I of the Common Article 3 provides in imperative manner humane treatment without discrimination to all persons taking no active part in hostilities, including the members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those places hors de combat by sickness, wound, detention or any other cause. This paragraph includes list of acts that shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place with respect to abovementioned persons - as such, it allows no deviation from the following minimum prohibition:
- the violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
- taking of hostages;
- outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
- the passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Paragraph II in general terms notes the obligation to collect and care for wounded and sick.

Georgia a căzut pradă provocărilor ruseşti

Am scris duminica ziua un articol pentru Timpul care a fost publicat luni. Criticam lipsa de reactie de la noi, atat oficial cat si civil. Intre timp parca si opinia publica si politica se mai dezmorteste, asa sciopatand. Reactionam foarte greu.
Iata mai jos articolul, care poate fi gasit la adresa:

http://www.timpul.md/Article.asp?idIssue=825&idRubric=8537&idArticle=19262

Un fost parlamentar mi-a sugerat din meleaguri indepartate sa citim situl azer:
http://www.day.az/news/georgia/127133.html

Georgia a căzut pradă provocărilor ruseşti

În ultimele zile, două evenimente internaţionale ne captează atenţia - începutul Jocurilor Olimpice şi războiul din Georgia. Rusia a fost prima cea care a transmis imagini de acolo, acuzând Tbilisi de declanşarea unui război în Osetia de Sud. Din păcate, aceleaşi acuzaţii le-am auzit ieri la unul din posturile cu renume internaţional, BBC. Este rezultatul războiului informaţional pornit de Rusia contra Georgiei, o dezinformare preluată, iarăşi, de presa europeană.


Realitatea este alta - de câteva luni Rusia aduce întăriri militare în zona separatistă a Abhaziei şi creşte tensiunile în Osetia de Sud. Deşi schimburile de focuri în zona abhază nu au încetat din 1993, tensiunile din ultimele luni, în particular de după Summitul NATO de la Bucureşti au fost ridicate de către Rusia la un nivel foarte periculos. Doar câteva săptămâni în urmă presupuneam că aceste tensiuni nu vor trece într-un conflict armat, pentru că Rusia a fost preîntâmpinată de către SUA şi Europa. Moscova, însă, simţea nevoia să acţioneze cât mai curând şi a aşteptat momentul cel mai potrivit pentru a distrage atenţia de la un asemenea atac - Jocurile Olimpice.

Aşadar, realitatea din Georgia este diferită de cea pe care o prezintă uneltele de propagandă ruseşti. Pe parcursul lunii iulie şi august au fost atacate de câteva ori forţele georgiene, aflate în satele din apropierea Osetiei de Sud. Trebuie să ştim că Ţhinvali este un orăşel, un centru administrativ al unei regiuni muntoase cu doar 70.000 de locuitori. Această „capitală” se află la mai puţin de un kilometru de „frontiera” cu Georgia, pe marginile orăşelului se află suburbii controlate de Tbilisi, iar tot teritoriul seamănă cu o zebră unde liniile albe sunt controlate de Tbilisi, iar cele negre de separatişti. Nici pe departe o situaţie ca în RM. Mai mult, nu există o familie georgiană sau osetină din zonă care să nu fie înrudită cu cealaltă etnie.

Situaţia din zona abhază era mult mai gravă, cu schimburi de focuri mai intense, în particular odată cu sosirea unui contingent rus adiţional. Însă după agravarea situaţiei din Abhazia, care a servit drept o manevră de distragere a atenţiei, Rusia schimbă direcţia de ofensivă şi la 7 august satele georgiene sunt bombardate masiv de către trupele osetine, în fruntea cărora se află comandanţi ruşi sau care sunt controlate de Rusia. Georgia este nevoită să riposteze, doar în apărare. Rusia trimite avioane de luptă şi bombardează zonele paşnice aflate departe de linia de conflict, iar atacurile masive ale artileriei osetine continuă şi, conform datelor georgiene, sunt suplinite cu atacuri ruseşti. În seara zilei de 7 august, Georgia practic capitulează în faţa atacurilor, preşedintele Saakaşvili numind Rusia cel mai important actor şi garantul soluţionării conflictului. Preşedintele georgian propune negocieri şi introduce un moratoriu la lupte din partea trupelor georgiene pe parcursul a şase ore, în schimbul promisiunii Rusiei să oprească bombardamentele satelor georgiene imediat. În urma unor aşteptări îndelungate acest lucru nu se întâmplă, pentru ca peste un timp Moscova să afirme că a pierdut controlul asupra trupelor osetine, exact aşa cum a afirmat şi în regiunea transnistreană în 1992, când armata a 14-a a lui Netkaciov a luptat pentru transnistreni. Iată că, după peste şase ore de bombardament sălbatic al populaţiei paşnice din satele georgiene de către trupele subordonate Moscovei, georgienii nu mai rezistă şi întreprind atacul asupra osetinilor şi Ţhinvali. Rusia atâta şi aştepta - mass-media subordonate Kremlinului transmit imaginile de atac al georgienilor, iar alte surse internaţionale afirmă, preluând comentariile distorsionate ruseşti, că georgienii au dorit să-şi restabilească controlul asupra Osetiei de Sud şi atacul de noapte al georgienilor a declanşat acest război. Un astfel de tratament al evenimentelor nu corespunde realităţilor, după cum vedem.

Mai mult, armata rusească reacţionează într-un timp-record şi intră pe teritoriul Georgiei, afirmând că vine să susţină pacificatorii săi, în realitate atacând trupele georgiene. Faptul că acţiunea militară rusească a fost promptă demonstrează că acest incident a fost o provocare bine pregătită la care, din păcate, georgienii au reacţionat fiind forţaţi de evenimente. În acelaşi timp, vom menţiona că, în conformitate cu dreptul internaţional, nicio armată nu are dreptul să intervină în conflict fără un mandat internaţional, aşa cum a făcut armata a 58-a rusă. Această intervenţie violează normele dreptului internaţional şi integritatea Georgiei şi este conformă, fără îndoială, unui act de agresiune - război! Deci, astfel, se confirmă faptul că Rusia intenţiona, totuşi, să atace Georgia, încă de mai multă vreme, iar Georgia a fost nevoită să se apere, în condiţii inegale, cu atenţia internaţională distrasă la Jocurile Olimpice şi împotriva unei maşini de propagandă ruseşti bine pusă la punct.

De ce Rusia, care a fost avertizată diplomatic să nu întreprindă acţiuni de destabilizare în Georgia, s-a hotărât totuşi să meargă mai departe de destabilizare şi a pornit la război? Există câteva explicaţii, şi anume:

1. Federaţia Rusă era presată de timp, odată cu apropierea deciziei de a acorda Georgiei şi Ucrainei foaia de parcurs pentru a deveni membru al NATO. Moscova, care se opune extinderii NATO la frontierele sale, şi-a pus drept scop să demonstreze că aceste ţări nu sunt „demne” şi suficient de „stabile” pentru a obţine această foaie de parcurs.

2. Europa şi implicit statele europene membre ale NATO sunt extrem de interesate în Georgia în calitatea sa de rută de tranzit al hidrocarburilor (petrol, gaz). Pentru a face Europa dependentă de gazele ruseşti, Moscova avea nevoie să demonstreze că Georgia este prea instabilă pentru a fi o rută de tranzit al energiei, care ar permite Europei să fie mai puţin dependentă de şantajul energetic rusesc.

3. Rusia ameninţase mai devreme că va răspunde la precedentul de utilizare a forţei fără mandat internaţional în cazul Kosovo şi acum a făcut acelaşi lucru.

4. Kremlinul şi-a restabilit încrederea prin petrol-dolari, dar avea nevoie şi de o victorie militară în afara Rusiei.

5. Moscova a dorit să creeze anumite condiţii favorabile în cazul „conflictelor îngheţate” tot de ea, dar în acelaşi timp a testat terenul să vadă reacţia Occidentului, care a fost neadecvată acţiunilor Rusiei.

6. Războiul împotriva Georgiei a mai avut o ţintă - Ucraina. Vladimir Putin afirma mai devreme că aceasta poate ajunge divizată în două, dacă va merge pe calea integrării euroatlantice. Rusia a dorit să demonstreze în Georgia seriozitatea afirmaţiilor sale.

Trupele georgiene rezistă, dar se pare că maşinăria de război rusească şi-a atins scopurile militare. Europa a reacţionat neadecvat chemând ambele părţi să se abţină de la acţiuni militare, egalând atacatul cu uzurpatorul. Totuşi, credem că Europa a înţeles, măcar acum, cu cine are de a face. Acţiunile Rusiei vor avea repercusiuni practice, dar şi politice de durată.

În termen mediu, din punct de vedere politic, Ucraina are un rol serios în soluţionarea conflictului transnistrean. Kievul ar putea, în sfârşit, să înţeleagă faptul că atitudinea sa, pe care în limbaj diplomatic o vom numi din cale afară de maleabilă, faţă de autorităţile transnistrene trebuie să se oprească aici. Pe ea o paşte acelaşi pericol, într-o măsură mai mare decât RM şi Ucraina va avea nevoie de toţi aliaţii în asemenea circumstanţe, în particular de cei care sunt în situaţii similare. Tot în termen mediu politic, Rusia va obţine o întărire a celui mai mare oponent al ei în SUA, candidatului republican la preşedinţie John McCain, care critică Moscova pentru autoritarism şi atacuri nefondate asupra Georgiei şi Ucrainei.

În termen scurt şi mediu, din punct de vedere practic şi politic, atacul rusesc va duce la o schimbare a politicii europene şi eventual a unei solidarizări a UE privind relaţiile cu Moscova şi acestea nu vor fi relaţii tocmai bune, chiar dacă limbajul diplomatic va spune altele. Imediat, în contextul practic, preşedinţii statelor baltice şi al Poloniei au făcut declaraţii, în calitate de membri ai UE şi NATO, că nu vor lăsa Georgia baltă. Am văzut mai devreme că Lituania a fost capabilă să impună UE să discute cu Rusia subiectul Moldovei şi Georgiei. Acum mult mai multe state ale UE vor fi mai deschise în a susţine balticii în vederea unor acţiuni concrete pentru a opri efectiv Rusia şi a schimba lucrurile în susţinerea Georgiei.

Doar o singură ţară, care este într-o situaţie dificilă cu un conflict îngheţat pe teritoriul său, nu a făcut nicio declaraţie - Republica Moldova. Credem că autorităţile de la Chişinău se amăgesc dacă, în sinea lor, cred că cedările pe care le fac Rusiei le vor scuti de la ocupaţia RM. Poate nu pe cale militară, dar o asemenea ocupaţie poate avea loc. În situaţia în care UE îşi va schimba atitudinea faţă de Rusia şi, probabil, va susţine serios Ucraina, RM ar trebui să-şi schimbe orientarea de la un parteneriat strategic cu un agresor la integrarea deplină, inclusiv politică, cu o Uniune a prosperităţii şi libertăţii. Iar societăţii civile, partidelor politice şi oficialităţilor din Moldova le adresez următorul apel: Georgia are nevoie de susţinere acum şi chiar dacă Moldova a trecut prin stihia naturii, cred că este nevoie de a se organiza pentru crearea unui fond de asistenţă financiară Georgiei imediat!

Balticii ameninta Rusia!

Iata mai jos una din primele reactii adecvate la actiunile Rusiei, chiar la nivelul a patru presedintei membri ai UE si NATO. Mai clar nu se poate - absolut admirabil! Se asteapta si alte actiuni, iar noi...

In context, vreau sa aduc la cunostinta societatii civile si a tuturor celor interesati de situatia din Georgia, ca societatile civile din statele baltice picheteaza activ ambasadele Federatiei Ruse!

Ulterior, eventual azi seara sau mai probabil maine dimineata (azi voi fi nitel ocupat si voi merge la euTV, la 20.00), voi plasa non-paperul Georgiei privind razboiul declansat de Rusia asupra sa.

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Joint Declaration of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Presidents on the Situation in Georgia

09.08.2008

We, the leaders of the former captive nations from Eastern Europe and current members of the European Union and NATO– Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – are extremely concerned about the actions of the Russian Federation against Georgia.

We strongly condemn the actions by the Russian military forces against the sovereign and independent country of Georgia.

Following the unilateral military actions of the Russian military forces, we will use all means available to us as Presidents to ensure that aggression against a small country in Europe will not be passed over in silence or with meaningless statements equating the victims with the victimizers. To this end we intend to urge our governments to take the following positions in discussions and to raise these concerns in the European Union and the North Atlantic Council:

- Can the current Russian authorities be called adequate strategic partners of the EU;

- Can the family of European democratic countries pursue a mutually beneficial dialogue with a country that uses heavy military armour against an independent country;

- It is pointless to continue a “visa facilitation” program with a country that does not meet even the minimal requirements set by the EU and which uses visa facilitation to issue Russian Federation passports to foreigners and then abuses this EU given privilege to claim intervention rights such as "we are protecting Russian citizens" in South Ossetia.

- The actions of the Russian Federation in Georgia should influence the talks with the Russian Federation, including negotiations on the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

We underline the obvious bankruptcy of Russian “peacekeeping operations” in its immediate neighbourhood. The Russian Federation has overstepped a red-line in keeping the peace and stability in the conflict zone and in protecting Russian citizens outside its own borders.

The EU and NATO must take the initiative and stand-up against the spread of imperialist and revisionist policy in the East of Europe. New international peacekeeping forces should be created as the current setting proved to be ineffective.

We regret that not granting of the NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia was seen as a green light for agression in the region.

We believe that the EU and NATO as the key organizations for European and Transatlantic stability and security should play a leading and crucial role in securing freedom, security and prosperity of countries not only in the EU but also in the neighboring European area.

It a litmus-test for the credibility of the EU and NATO to solve the conflict in its immediate neighborhood and to prove for all EU and NATO members, aspirant countries and democratic partners that it is worth being members and partners of these organizations.

This Declaration is open for the accession by the leaders of other democratic countries.


President of the Republic of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves
President of the Republic of Latvia Valdis Zatlers
President of the Republic of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus
President of the Republic of Poland Lech Kaczyński


Office of the President
Public Relations Department
Phone +372 631 6229

GEORGIA ON MY MIND !!!

Am cateva secunde la dispozitie si nu pot, chiar daca cu o intarziere, sa nu scriu ceva despre Georgia, unde am stat un an, pentru a solutiona conflictul georgiano-sud osetin, Georgia, unde lasat prieteni si unde am lasat o parte din inima mea. Sunt un om care crede in relatii bune cu multe state, inclusiv cu Federatia Rusa, dar si altii, acum insa nu Rusia face ceea ce vrea, nu ce trebui... Asa ca Georgia capteaza toata atentia si simpatia mea.

Cred ca urmarim cu totii ce se inatmpla in Georgia, asa ca nu este nevoie de multe informatii. Nu de asta scriu acest post, dar pentru ca sunt cu gandurile acolo, iar cu ochii aici.

Deci, totusi, cateva momente, scurt - care apar in razboul de dezinformare impotriva Georgiei:

1. TAB/BTR georgian distrus de osetini ieri, in schimburile de focuri cu asa-nuimitele forte georgiene, apartinea de fapt Fortelor de Mentinere a Pacii georgiene, deci care se aflau acolo de multa vreme si iesau constant in patrulare... adica, nu trupelor de infanterie care cica "atacau" Osetia de Sud. Adica, atacul era cam fabricat, desi schimburiel de focuri au fost aprige si se apropiau fortele terestre si un deznodamant, cine stie care...

2. Fara indoiala Georgia a decis, IN FINE, sa trimta trupe in Osteia.

3. Georgia a fost bombardata doua zile in sir de pe teritoriul Federatiei Ruse... ASA E!!!

4. Ieri seara georgienii au oprit unilateral focul si intre 18.00-24.00 si le-au propus osetinilor negocieri, daca opresc bombardamentele. Bombardamentele satelor georgienie au continuat...
- Avioanele rusesti au bombardat oraselul Gori si satele din apropiere, pasnice...
- Aproape de ora 24.00 georgienii au ripostat si au declarat ca vor reinstala ordinea constitutionala. Imediat au fost acuzati de tradare de rusi si osetini, oare nu petru ca abea asteptau sa-i declare pe georgieni culpabili (vezi de ce nu opreau focul...)?

ASA E!

SA NE INFORMAM SI GANDIM !

Daca vreti inca cateva randuri mai piparate si nedeontologice, dar cred (cu rima) logice, cititi la Read More aici:

Si acum cateva randuri de "directe" si "rele" cu georgieni si oarecum "moldoveni" - e razboi si Georgia din tot timpul avea optiunea aceasta. DIN TOT TIMPUL a existat SI un plan militar la ei!

Georgia, fara indoiala, vroia sa-si restabileasca teritoriul! Georgia e un stat! Rusia nu si-a permis o asemenea umilinta, nu-i asa? Nu o sustin nicicum, mai cu seama ca fiind o autocratie, a omorat la stanga si dreapta, furand cecenii noptile din case - autocratiile sunt barbare! Dar statul e stat, cel putin acolo! Teoriile celor care spun ca nu mai poate exista un stat-natiune sunt teoreme depasite de realitati, noi nu suntem in Europa. Noi suntem in zona unde Rusia stie ca ea este un stat si toti ceilalti trebuie sa fie sub mana ei. E un lucru obiectiv si nu tine de teorii, tine de realitati! Georgia este un stat tanar, dar si ea vrea sa-si restabileasca teritoriul, care i-a fost sustras chiar de o autocratie, aceeiasi autocratie, de altfel...

Georgia vroia din tot timpul sa invinga - dar ce om intreg la cap ar afirma ca nu exista asemenea stat, orice stat, care sa nu vrea sa invinga!!!???

Cine vrea sa piarda?!
Cine vrea sa fie umilit?!
Cine vrea sa fie atacat si sa nu sa se apere?!
Cine vrea sa fie lipsit de toate si sa mai si plece capul, ca sabia, dupa cum se stie...?!
Cine vrea sa fie un pierdant ordinar?!

Cei care n-au demnitate, n-au neam si isi schimba "pozitia" ca o ... Stiti voi!

Georgia, Domnilor, nu este o partenera, ea este un partener!!!

Ea, anume ea, este respectata! In Georgia nu trebuie sa ai sau sa nu ai incredere, cu ea totul e clar. Asa a fost clar si cu statele baltice. Cine varsa sange pentru neam este respectat, cine lupta pentru libertate este respectat! Librtate=Respect!

Georgia, iti va fi greu, poate iti va fi extraordinar de greu, poate lucrurile nu vor merge asa cum ai planificat sau, asa cum iti este obiceiul, ai decis emotiv dar ferm, dar Georgia - pentru VERTICALITATE si dorinta de a fi LIBERA primesti tot RESPECTUL meu! Si stiu ca nu doar al meu!

Te urmarim Georgia!

Dumnezeu sa te ajute!!!.

Moldova – balet între Rusia şi România

Articolul de mai jos a fost publicat de Revista 22 de la Bucuresti.

E o perspectivă poate mai geopolitică, poate mai puţin geopolitică, dar în anumit fel explicativă, deşi nu numaidecât critică, care încearcă să dea câţiva din factorii ce influneţează relaţia Chişinău-Bucureşti în contextul presiunilor deja tradiţionale exercitate de către Rusia asupra Republicii Moldova.

Toate drepturile pentru republicare, citat, etc îi aparţin revistei. Articolul a fost publicat marţi 15 iulie 2008 în versiunea hard (pe hârtie) şi va apărea în format electronic în curând pe situl revistei - care este următorul: Revista 22.

Multumesc cu această ocazie Revistei 22 pentru publicare şi sprijin editorial profesionist!

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Moldova – balet între Rusia şi România

Lazăr Comănescu şi-a încheiat recent vizita în Republica Moldova, stârnind comentarii contradictorii. „Răţoială“, „dezgheţ“, „pantomimă diplomatică“, „tăcerea miniştrilor“ şi „au găsit limbă comună“ sunt doar câteva dintre cuvintele utilizate de jurnalişti pentru a descrie vizita ministrul de Externe de la Bucureşti. Relaţiile moldo-române pot fi uşor caracterizate „tradiţional proaste“, dacă privim din perspectiva ultimilor 15 ani. Evident, tradiţia a fost întreruptă în timp, dar a rămas în linii mari valabilă şi acum. În general, politica externă a Republicii Moldova a înregistrat în aceşti ani fluctuaţii permanente şi nu doar în relaţiile cu România, dar şi cu ceilalţi actori de pe scena internaţională. România, totuşi, prezintă interes pentru Republica Moldova atunci când poate promova interesele occidentale ale Chişinăului. De aici şi prieteniile de moment cu preşedintele Traian Băsescu sau cu georgianul Mihail Saakaşvili sau ucraineanul Viktor Iuşcenko, care se produc pe fundalul unor relaţii mai proaste cu Rusia sau al unor alegeri din Republica Moldova. Astfel, preşedintele Republicii Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, a declarat la începutul acestui an că ţara sa este ostaticul jocului geopolitic al marilor puteri, subscriind filosofiei locale de a-şi ajusta linia politică internă şi externă după interesele actorilor dominanţi.

Filosofia de „ostatic“ este acum vizibilă în relaţia cu Rusia. Politica Partidului Comuniştilor din Republica Moldova (PCRM), aflat la guvernare din 2001, a fost dintotdeauna să-şi lase o opţiune de rezervă. Acest fapt explică iniţierea de către preşedintele Voronin în 2005 a unor consultări cu Vladimir Putin, la doi ani de când relaţiile cu Rusia s-au răcit, în urma refuzului liderului de la Chişinău de a semna Memorandumul Kozak, de reglementare a crizei transnistrene. Relaţia cu Rusia a ajuns să domine agenda contactelor Republicii Moldova cu România, NATO şi, parţial, cu Uniunea Europeană. Preşedintele Voronin a început, astfel, încă în 2005, pregătirile pentru campania electorală din 2009, în care tema soluţionării conflictului transnistrean va domina agenda.

Comuniştii de la Chişinău, dorind să utilizeze subiectul transnistrean în scopuri electorale, au încercat să negocieze direct cu Moscova. Liderii moldoveni au răcit relaţia cu Bucureştiul poate datorită unor sugestii de la Moscova, conform cărora dialogul transnistrean va fi reluat doar atunci când Republica Moldova va prezenta asigurări că nu se va uni cu România, adică prin semnarea de către România a Tratatului de bază şi Tratatului de frontieră.

Miza electorală era următoarea – Chişinăul propune Moscovei un pachet de documente prin care separatiştii ruşi de la Tiraspol vor obţine veto în parlament şi în subiecte de securitate internaţională, integrare europeană şi alte subiecte de politică externă, dar şi internă. În schimb PCRM organizează alegeri cu participarea măcar de formă a transnistrenilor şi le câştigă. Chişinăul spera să obţină şi susţinerea mediatică a Moscovei, prezentă masiv în Republica Moldova. Astfel, printre moldoveni, „primul canal“ al televiziunii ruse este cel mai vizionat, cu o încredere de peste 90% în rândurile populaţiei din Moldova, iar prim-ministrul rus Putin şi actualul preşedinte Dmitri Medvedev se bucură în Republica Moldova de o popularitate de peste 70%, adică aproape de două ori mai mare decât cea a preşedinţilor Voronin sau Băsescu. Fără îndoială, comuniştii ar putea să cedeze Moscovei în schimbul unor declaraţii pozitive despre Vladimir Voronin şi PCRM din partea lui Putin şi Medvedev făcute la televiziunea rusă, atât de credibilă în Moldova. Printre condiţiile puse de Moscova se află răcirea relaţiilor cu România şi semnarea Tratatelor de bază şi de frontieră.

Aşa s-ar putea explica de ce Chişinăul a recurs în ultimul timp la condiţionarea semnării Convenţiei privind micul trafic de frontieră de semnarea ambelor tratate. Argumentul este slab, pentru că România a recunoscut Republica Moldova încă în 1992 în frontierele sale de acum. Problema Chişinăului este că Federaţia Rusă nu a răspuns în niciun fel, se pare, propunerilor venite din Moldova. Mai mult, Rusia pune noi condiţii pentru a reveni la masa de negocieri. De obicei, în soluţionarea conflictului transnistrean, Moscova cere Tiraspolului să spună ceea ce ruşii cred, dar nu pot declara oficial. Astfel, separatiştii au cerut Chişinăului să semneze un Tratat, prin care este recunoscută existenţa a două state – Republica Moldova şi Republica Moldovenească Nistreană. Acest scenariu nu a fost luat în calcul la Chişinău.

Liderii PCRM nu mai sunt credibili la Moscova, după refuzul lor de a semna Memorandumul Kozak. De altfel, presa de la Chişinău afirmă că Rusia investeşte deja în alte personalităţi politice din Republica Moldova. Încă în luna iunie a acestui an se relata despre reactivarea unor organizaţii susţinute de Moscova. În iunie a fost anunţată crearea a două organizaţii proruseşti, cea mai importantă fiind „Prietenii Rusiei“, în care a fost cooptat fostul prim-ministru al Republicii Moldova Vasile Tarlev, cu un rating de popularitate înalt în Moldova, dar şi Mihail Formuzal, liderul regiunii autonome Găgăuze, din sudul Republicii Moldova, care afişează tendinţe de separatism.

Într-un asemenea context, Republica Moldova îşi va modifica relaţiile cu România cât de curând se poate. Vizita ministrului Lazăr Comănescu este tocmai un asemenea semnal, de vreme ce vizita a fost iniţiată chiar de Chişinău. Într-adevăr, în lipsa unei reacţii pozitive a Moscovei, Partidul Comuniştilor de la Chişinău, în tradiţionala sa manieră, îşi caută din nou o portiţă de scăpare prin încălzirea relaţiilor cu Bucureştiul. Însă nu trebuie să înţelegem că autorităţile de la Chişinău sunt disperate şi vor cădea ca mărul copt în mâinile Bucureştiului. Relaţiile pe care Republica Moldova şi le-a construit cu statele baltice, în particular Lituania, îi permit să negocieze direct şi putem spune cu relativ succes cu Uniunea Europeană, fără România. Poate şi imaginea proastă europeană a unui stat certăreţ cu vecinii i-a motivat, eventual inconştient, pe oficialii moldoveni să-şi repare din imagine, dar nu şi din interese – acestea rămân neschimbate pentru alegerile din 2009. E posibil că acum Chişinăul să „sperie“ Rusia cu o relaţie mai bună cu România, în acelaşi timp încercând să obţină de la Bucureşti semnarea acestor două tratate în speranţa să „îmbuneze“ Moscova.

Romania-Moldova, Rusia-UE

O saptamana in urma, la 16 iunie 2008, am fost invitat sa vorbesc, impreuna cu Dan Dungaciu, prof. Brezianu, Vlad Spanu si Vladimir Socor, la un seminar international organizat de catre Institutul pentru stinte politice si relatii internationale a Academiei Romane si Fundatia Moldova de la Washington, despre Republica Moldova si integrarea sa europeana si relatiile cu NATO.

In cadrul seminarului a fost discutata situatia pre-electorala cu tot cu deficientele de democratie (Dan Dungaciu), dar si relatiile RM-Romania (Brezianu), precum si solutionarea conflictului transnistran (Socor). Organizarea acestui seminar a avut loc la Muzeul Cotroceni, cu alte cuvinte chiar sub aripa presedintiei romane. Faptul ca acesta a fost un seminar care a fost organizat dupa patru ani de la ultimul eveniment de acest gen, precum si faptul ca a fost primita aprobarea pentru desfasurarea acestui seminar la Cotroceni denota ca subiectul este de un interes deosebit in contextul actual al relatiilor, proaste, cu Romania.

Evenimentul a fost "acoperit" intr-o maniera extensiva de catre Moldova Suverana si anumite persoane si servicii din Republica Moldova, care au atacat seminarul si organizatorii sai fara sa mentioneze direct ca e vorba de acest eveniment. Cum este posibila o asemenea performanta - ei bine, voi face publicitate Moldovei Suverane si voi spune ca desi pare neverosimil - este adeverat.

La 17 iunie, ziua imediat dupa seminar, aceasta publica o "opinie a unui cititor", un articol care se numeste "Atacuri romanesti asupra neutralitatii tarii noastre" si care de cativa amici a fost asociata cu scrisul unei persoane apropiate unui consilieri din Presedintia RM.

A doua zi Moldova Suverana primeste ajutor calificat - "proba" de "conspiratie globala" asupra micei tari Moldova, care precis este tinta a toata lumea dimprejurul nostru, care toti vor sa ne cotropeasca - totusi, multa lume presupune ca aceasta "mostra" ar fi "ajutor de la "organe"". Acest "articol", care seamana a raport-paranoie atat de specifi enigmaticelor "organe" - afirma ca mai toti absolventii institutiilor de invatamant din Romania sunt "spiuni rumani". Ma intreb in a cata generatie? Ma intreb ce sa spun despre cei care au absolvit in Rusia? Sau Marea Britanie, or poate Franta, or, poate Doamne fereste(?), in Israel?

Si cum Republica Moldova este, daca sa ne uitam drept si sa gandim asa cum scrie aghentu 007 de la Moldova Suverana, o tara mica - asta inseamna ca toti suntem aghenti si ne spionam unul pe altul, numai ca inca nu ne-am depistat unii pe altii, sau poate ne-am depistat dar nu recunoastem si continuem un joc dublu, sau poate... stop, ca ajung s agandesc ca absolvent al FSB-ului rusesc... glumesc, cred.

In fine s-a ajuns si la atacuri la persoana - iar co-organizatorul seminarului Dan Dungaciu a avut aceasta "onoare" de la Moldova Suverana, in care s-a scris sa despre asa-zise pseudo-seminare de integrare europeana, fara sa mai zica care anume, sau unde. Ori poate iarasi o fi scris articolul un alt mare "spion", sau, cine stie, vre-un alt "organ", ca doar nu le-au tradus din alte limbi, de exemplu romana sau alta.

Mesajul de final al Moldovei Suverane este - nu atrageti atentia la tot felul de seminare organizate cu sau de romani despre integrarea europeana a Republicii Moldova, de parca am trebui sa intelegem ca integrarea europeana nu mai este importanta?

Si ce sa credem noi, locuitorii Republicii Moldova, unde tocmai Moldova Suverana are un statut, nu si mesaj, special, constructiv... ei, iata ca personal voi crede ca situatia e mai proasta decat ni se pare si asta pentru ca acoperirarea mediaica din partea celelilalte mas-media din Moldova a lipsit aproape cu desavarsire(exceptie Radio Europa Libera si... Unimedia, despre care puteti specula "europeneste" cat doriti, dar faptul e fapt). Si tot aceasta pe fundalul afirmatiei organizatorilor ca invitatia a fost transmisa la toate agentiile din Republica Moldova si reactiilor dedicate, de trei zile in sir, a Moldovei Suverane...

O astfel de reactie la un seminar este simptomatica pentru realitatile ce ne asteapta pe parcursul anului 2008 si in 2009? Sa vedem impreuna, totusi, mai departe. De fapt, la seminar s-a vorbit mult despre ce se intampla in Moldova, dar mai putin despre ce se intampla in Romania vizavi de Moldova. Motivul este ca majoritatea participantilor au avut impresia ca la Bucuresti nu exista o viziune clara, pur si simplu o intelegere, despre situatia din Republica Moldova si ce trebuie de facut in conjunctura actuala. Fostul Prim-Ministru Roman a amintit ca uz acord putea fi semnat, dar acum se pare ca situatia s-a schimbat. Adevarat, dar atunci nimeni nu stia cum se va schimba situatia, nici macar situatia din Romania. Toti ne credem vesnici(?), chiar si guvernarea actuala de la Chisinau asa se crede, asa s-au crezut si se vor crede alti aflati la guvernare? Sau, poate, pana la urma, nimic nu-i vesnic pe pamant...

Romania de acum, se pare, oscileaza intre declaratiile partidelor si figurelor politice utilizand subiectul Republicii Moldova pentru un efect politic intern, fara sa mai tina cont de de efectul in RM si, pe de alta parte, intre teama de a strica si mai mult relatiile cu autoritatile de la Chisinau, dar si in speranta unor schimbari (de vis, se pare). Chisinaul oficial de acum este multumit - un asemenea comportament este exact ceea ce isi dorea de dreagul unei relatii mai bune cu Rusia. De fapt, schimbari in 2009 pur si simplu nu vor fi, spun "taind in carne vie",ca sa fie clar - barometrele actuale arata ca procentajul la alegeri poate varia astfel incat din partidele deja in Parlamentul RM - PCRM ar putea lua 32% din voturi, AMN vre-o 12-14%, iar PPCD, PD si PL putin asupra pragului de 6%, pe cand PLDM e pe sau pe-sub prag, iar PSD-PDS nu trec si au scopul sa-si mentina in mainile lor macar orasul Chisinau, ca altfel dispar. Am menitionat la Bucuresti si faptul ca "Presedintele tuturor cetatenilor RM" le-a indicat cu cine sa voteze, intr-o maniera care, iata, nu corespunde promisiunii sale pe care a facut-o cu cateva zile anterior la Bruxelles sa asigure alegeri libere si corecte - am in vedere interviul sau de la NIT din 30 mai, dupa ce pe aripile euforiei europene a spus - votati PCRM, PD si PPCD. Democratie...

Nu stiu daca mesajul privind cum va evolua situatia politica din Republica Moldova a fost inteles de oficialii din Romania. Totusi, am inteles ca in sala au fost prezenti responsabili de la MAE-ul roman, Directia Relatii cu Romanii de Pretutindeni (ah, rumanii istia), dar si de la Presedintie. Am mai vazut in slaa pe cineva care discuta subiectul Moldovei si cu Prim-Ministrul roman. Am auzit ca reprezentantii oficiali din Romania au incercat sa afle cat mai mult despre politica actuala a guvernarii comuniste vizavi de Romania de la persoane care discuta cu guvernantii de la Chisinau. Am sugerat si eu, in discursul meu, ca reprezentantii Romaniei sa inceapa un dialog cat mai activ cu autoritatile din Republica Moldova, indiferent de dificultatile acestei incercari. Se pare ca tocmai ca sa confirme prezenta acestor difcultati, chiar oficialii de la Chisinau au refuzat zilele astea vizita lui Geoana - presupun ca cineva si-a amintit de declaratiile cum trebuie tratata Moldova cand se poarta "urat" cu Romania. Insistenta de a veni la Chisinau este o parte necesara si doar un prim pas pentru Romania. Despre celelalte voi vorbi in timp si, cu putina intelegere, voi face referinte si la relatia noastra cu Ucraina.

In fine, evolutia relatiilor cu Romania, dar si cu Ucraina este, de fapt, ostateca relatiilor cu Rusia si procesului electoral din Republica Moldova. Desi Presedintele Ucrainei incerca sa vina la Chisinau pentru a normaliza relatia pe axa Kiev-Chisinau-Bucuresti si a incerca sa discute subiectul transnistrean, cred ca o asemenea tentativa este sortita esecului pana Moscova va purta Chisinaul oficial "de nas". Iar Moscova intentioneaza sa faca exact asa. In asemenda circumstante Moldovei ii vor fi utili acei avocati despre care spune acum ca nu are nevoie - atat de Ucraina, cat si de Romania, perceptuta in Europa, deschis sau in soapta, drept aliatul natural al Moldovei si care e considerat de populatia Moldovei drept stattul care poate contribui cel mai mult la integrarea noastra europeana, dar vom avea nevoie si de Lituania, Slovenia, Croatia, Polonia si nu in ultimul rand de SUA si multi altii. Relatiile cu Rusia sunt importante, dar trebuie sa intre in albia normalitati, nu subsidiaritatii.

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Iata ca despre aceste fapte am si vorbit in interviul publicat astazi in ziarul Timpul, pe care-i multumesc pentru faptul ca sunt integrationisti europeni pe baricade, asa cum veti vedea si din interviul facut de ei cu mine - il puteti citi in format electronic daca click-ati aici: http://www.timpul.md/Article.asp?idIssue=795&idRubric=8218&idArticle=18661