Wednesday, June 26, 2019

Returning Russia to Council of Europe lacking arguments. It will be seen as a Western weakness.

Regarding the voting on the right of Russia to return to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Court for Human Rights.

1. The argument of "return to dialogue with Russia" by Germany and France is severely lacking because:

A. Russia does not recognize that it has annexed Crimea through an armed "referendum", ie on the basis of an occupation, even if followed by a "referendum." Such armed referendums are illegal, a fact neglected by Russia, which in all other international disputes invokes the international law, yet not in this case convenient to Russia. The referendum was, however, illegal under international law, which is contrary to the concept of a rule of law invoked by Russia, local or international.

B. Also, despite the "Minsk" dialogue on Donbas/Eastern Ukraine, Russia continues to occupy Donbass and provide weapons and send troops to the region, controlling the area directly from the Kremlin (Surkov etc) and, obviously, refusing to recognize it - thus refusing dialogue.

C. Also, the dialogue on the latest events /confrontation on Georgia is absent and only threats are heard, which is contrary to the idea of ​​a return to dialogue.

D. Negotiations on the Transnistrian issue in the Republic of Moldova, even in spite of the previous Government concessions on registering the "separatist" cars with "neutral" (no Moldovan flag / marking) car plates and thus offering transport opportunities for Russian investors in the Transnistrian region, are de facto blocked by Russia. Mimicking dialogue, through the presence and direction of proxy "separatists", does not demonstrate the desire for resolutions or dialogue.

E. Russia did not modify its foreign policy and military concepts that allows it unilateral, unsanctioned by UN, intervention. 

2. The argument of Russia opening was overturned immediately after that vote by statements by Russian officials that any subsequent "threat" would have repercussions. This demonstrates not only the refusal to dialogue - rather a continued belligerent policy internally and externally. Apparently  the vote seems to have encouraged Russia and did not open it for dialogue. Taking into account that in International Relations both power politic dynamics and local "individual" factors influence the perceptions of the decision-makers, the CoE vote can be seen by the Kremlin not only as a gain. It can also be seen as a proof of what Russian leaders often propagate as a "decadence" and "weakness" of the West. The vision of "weakness" is completely neglected by the West, which in its own complacency neglects this Russian element in international relations, which is wrong, as reality proves. The same logic is applicable by Kremlin towards the individual voters (national political players) of the resolution.

3. The argument of Russia's return to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems to severely lack the factual situation - this argument suggests that such a return gives a certain percentage of ordinary Russians higher chances to benefit from ECtHR decisions - yet misses the fact that Russia has already adopted national legislation (!) through which it can neglect ECtHR decisions. Thus, this argument in favor of the vote was null ab initio. One should consider that the Kremlin will allow some minor" cases into ECtHR, without a too serious of an impact on general civic freedoms in Russia, to "demonstrate" a so-called "factual democratic attitude." Those who follow the subject understand that such unrepresentative cases are maintained, especially in relatively small numbers compared to the total number of issues, to use them against external critics, but without real impact on human rights at home, followed by "whataboutism" (diverting attention to "what about you violating the rights of... - an argumentation allowing the person/state continue violations, based on mistakes or illegal actions of others - basically, I am equal to "you", so if you stole or destroyed something, why can't I, nevermind the legal implications).

Another argument noted by Alina Polyakova in FT (if I am not mistaken) is the precedent of Russian exclusion for other cases - as, for example, this situation is closely followed by Turkey, with a high number of cases. However, if a country is to self-exclude from ECtHR, just as Russia self-excluded itself from other (military) treaties, due to violating them when those didn't fit its purposes, and blamed the West for it, this argument would not stand in all such cases.

(in absence of time, the only link I am providing is the one on Russian decision to overrule ECtHR decisions - see below)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35007059
Posted by at No comments:

Tuesday, April 9, 2019

Moldovan Socialists confirm Dodon's plan for Russian language in Republic of Moldova


By Vlad Lupan
New York, April 9, 2019

Today's press conference of the Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova, informally led by the Moldovan President, Igor Dodon,[i] supports the suspicion that his undeclared and denied plan to place the country under Russian control exists and is still in motion.[ii]

President Dodon returned from another trip to Moscow, after Dmitri Kiseliov, from Russia Today (RT) channel, closely affiliated with the Kremlin’s Presidential administration and on sanctions lists by the West, issued stark warnings[iii] to the Moldovan president to avoid another involvement with the Moldovan Democratic Party leadership and essentially seek a regime change, as Vlad Socor of Jamestown Foundation suggests.[iv] Kremlin dislikes the Democrats, as they played a pro-Western card for a while, even expelling Russian diplomats[v], despite being in a de-facto power sharing with the Socialists.[vi] The Democratic leadership was reported to be involved in the Russian Laundromat scheme[vii] and was also criticized by the European Parliament for state capture.[viii]

The Socialist Party press conference today was organized after RT criticism, post-negotiations with the Democrats and primarily to respond to the invitation of the self-declared pro-Western ACUM (meaning “Now”) block, to oust the Democratic Party in power until recently.[ix]

ACUM previously rejected the pro-Russian Socialist Party invitation to form a joint Government to oust Democrats. Such a Government would have been detrimental to ACUM’s image of anti-corruption and pro-Western party.[x] The block launched a counter-invitation to the Socialists to vote for a minority, ACUM headed, Government, for the same purpose. The Socialist part refused the coalition in today’s press conference and seemingly forwarded a number of conditions for any support to a future government in the Republic of Moldova.

Apparently, as a part of the post electoral positioning in Moldova, ACUM may have lured the Socialists where Dodon’s party openly requested Russian to become the "inter-ethnic" language of the Republic of Moldova, making it the only overall language in a predominantly Romanian speaking Republic of Moldova, where over 80% of the population responds that it speaks Moldovan/Romanian language[xi] (Romanian[xii] is a part of the Romance/Latin language group, where the so-called Moldovan is in fact the same language, as linguists and Encyclopedia Britannica also recognizes[xiii]).

The position of the Socialist Party voiced today, seemingly focused on several points and requests, foreign and linguistic policy related, reflecting previous concerns about Moscow’s goals:
1.      To ensure the Socialists receive the position of the Speaker of the Parliament, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and that of Defense. They also requested return of the Security and Information Service of Moldova (Intelligence Services), currently under Parliamentary oversight, back under the control of the President[xiv], who is their informal leader.
2.      The Socialists are again requesting to refrain from entry into European Union and NATO.
3.      Russian language to have the inter-ethnic tongue statute.
4.      Cancellation of the law restricting the re-broadcasting of certain Russian televisions in Moldova.[xv]
Their first request would put the Russian affiliated Socialists in complete control of both the Presidency and Parliament, Foreign affairs and Defense, as well as the intelligence community, de facto controlling the government completely.

Their objection against NATO and EU, making no distinction among the two, is in line with previous Russian opposition, for which Moldovan goods were embargoed by Moscow.[xvi] This proves that the Russian desire to recover its influence on the territory of the former USSR continues via their political proxy.[xvii]

The request for Russian language to become a tongue of inter-ethnic communication needs to consider that, in fact, the Russian language, by the law of 1989 on functioning of languages in the Republic of Moldova already has such a statute.[xviii] The Socialists, in fact, requested an upgrade to the current statute. After USSR years of linguistic domination by Russia, despite the declared equality of languages, and the consequent independence movement based on the preservation and promotion of language, such a law would mean a return to the USSR status quo and firm re-arrangement of the Latin speaking Republic of Moldova into the “Russian World” a construct for Kremlin’s domination.[xix]

The fourth point on Socialists’ agenda was reopening of the Russian propaganda channels in the Republic of Moldova. This may also indicate that the warning signals from Moscow meant that they should be prepared for early elections.

The requests advanced by the Moldovan Socialists, after the return of President Dodon from Moscow, confirm the following important developments:
i.                    The so-called anti “oligarchic”[xx] stance of the Socialists has been visibly diminished by today’s refusal to oust the Democrats, thus strengthening the perception of being under Democrats leadership control.
ii.                  The ACUM block, despite seemingly setting a trap to make such a stance transparent, might create tensions within its own pro-Western and anti-corruption electorate, due to the appeal to unite their forces with pro-Russian Socialists, involved in previous financial irregularities[xxi] as well.[xxii]
iii.                That President Dodon’s previous plan to place the Republic of Moldova, via foreign, security policy, as well as Russian linguistic dependency of the  “Russian World” firmly into Kremlin’s sphere of influence was reiterated today by other means and was real.

The unchecked Socialist government would mean the return of a “Transnistrization” plan for Republic of Moldova. It would re-attempt to place the country under Russian control, via further disingenuous con-federalization with Kremlin controlled “separatist” proxies in the East of Moldova, and possible fragmentation to the North and South. Moscow’s direct political control via internal political proxies, such as Socialists and several other forces, would:
A.    create tensions with neighboring countries, as it happened during the rule of the Party of Communists, whose members are now in Mr. Dodon’s party,
B.    place Russian military in the “separatist” Transnistrian region in a permanent legal presence mode, providing a better, more operational position in the Black Sea vicinity,
C.    allow Russian military more freedom to monitor or scout USA military installation at Deveselu Base and Costanta ports,
D.   allow Russian business via Moldovan laws on citizenship via investment to circumvent US and EU sanctions, presenting themselves as Moldovan,
E.    create a more permanent point of pressure and distraction for Ukraine, during a warm conflict in the East, in its South-West, despite initial failed attempts to create another Popular Bessarabian Republic in the South. It would lock and pull some of the military resources away from Donbass.
F.     Ukraine’s and Moldova’s voters seem to have voted in various forms for a perceived anti-corruption and democratization of their societies. It is unclear if anti-corruption electoral promises in both countries are part of the modern trend or an actual reality. However, the failure of such promises would suppress hopes for a positive outcome for a number of citizens, generating another increase in migration where elderly, socially oriented voter base, might be closer to Russia and less knowledgeable about or inclined towards change.

It is clear that Moldovan and Ukrainian elections show the willingness, supported by Kremlin’s actions, to invest in local politics, be it in Moldova’s Dodon or in the speculated support for Ukraine’s Kolomoiski and, thus, allegedly Zelensky.[xxiii] One thing is certain, Moscow is not afraid of direct financial support and investments into other countries politics, while the West seems to urge, yet not invest properly in anti-corruption and democratization efforts that people in the Eastern Europe, especially young ones, seem to vote for.



Posted by at No comments:

Monday, February 25, 2019

Main scenarios after Moldova elections

Moldova elections - 99.35% polling stations reports counted, but results are clear, if Agora's math is correct:
PSRM 18+17=35
PD 13+17=30
ACUM 14+12=26
Sor 5+2=7
Independent 3

Scenario 1 - PD+Sor+Independents would again "buy" missing MPs from other parties. The quantity is high & therefore such an action seems problematic for now.

Scenario 2a & 2b (disingenious PD negotiations with ACUM that would probably reject such an offer, so that PD can justify an alliance with PSRM):
2a return to govern with PSRM covertly,
2b return to govern with PSRM this time openly,

EDIT: 2c - totally forgot the third option, Dodon may "borrow" sone MPs to Dems, but deny it in public.

In the meantime he already suggested early elections (it may be his tactical positioning ahead of negotiations)

Scenario 3 would be early elections, which cannot be ruled out.

Democrats+Sor are missing at least 14-17 MPs (17 if we consider that Independents are not related to DP). In 2009 parties resisted the attempts by the Communists (with DP's Plahotniuc & Dodon with the communist party) to buy one MP. That resistance provoked early elections. The 2009 change was in different conditions, however. Now in 2019 PSRM probably already calculated if it is worth going to new elections or not, as the results of early elections may not necessarily change too much, under current circumstances, despite 2009 precedent. Thus scenarios 2a&b seem to regain ground, as a group of 11 experts noted in a 2018-2019 overview. However nothing is yet written in stone. PSRM may decide a war by attrition and go into early elections. If they don't join forces with PD the probability of early elections may raise significantly. Let's see which scenario happens in 2019.

For other elements of these elections please see Stanislav Secrieru and Dionis Cenusa competentcpompet on their Facebook accounts.

By V.Lupan
February 25, 2019,
New York, USA.
Posted by at No comments:

Saturday, February 23, 2019

Moldovan elections with a kompromat twist


Moldovan elections 2019
A new “idea” to get rid of the governing oligarch, Vladimir Plahotniuc, is flawed – there are simpler ways.
Instead this idea looks like a kompromat construct.

By Vlad Lupan,
February 23, 2019

Moldovan Parliamentary elections will take place tomorrow, February 24, 2019. The battle is mainly taking place between three actors - the governing Democratic Party led by Vladimir Plahotniuc, the Party of Socialists, previously led by the current Moldovan President, Igor Dodon, and the ACUM (“Now”) Block jointly led by the previous reformist Education Minister, Maia Sandu, and a former prosecutor and lawyer, Andrei Nastase. According to, what I believe to be the least susceptible to internal meddling, IRI opinion poll, conducted in December 2018 - January 2019 by Gallup and local Magenta Consulting polling, these are the three parties to certainly enter the parliament, with perhaps one more addition of Sor Party (read from here further Shor), led by the controversial businessman involved in the theft of $1bln from the Moldovan banking system.[i]

Moldovan observers consider that the currently governing Democrats share an uneasy coalition with the pro-Russian socialists, which is called “Binom”, while Transparency International called a power-sharing arrangement.[ii] I previously suggested that this arrangement has a “good cop-bad cop”[iii] play in it, for the distribution of spheres of influences between these two political players to win the support of the West and East alike. Mr. Dodon Socialists nominally oppose the Democrats and consult with President Putin, while the Democrats sometimes expel Russian military and propaganda media. ACUM block at one moment participated together with Mr. Dodon in protests against the Democrats, whom they believe to be corrupt, and also are at odds with Mr. Dodon over Russian influence in Moldova.

The most recent idea appeared in a Russian language media outlet, is that after elections Dodon’s Socialists and ACUM center-right pro-EU/US should unite and oust corrupt Plahotniuc’s party from the governing positions, and then organize clean elections. This line of argument is substantially flawed, as we will show later, after a short backgrounder.

Basic background
Mr. Shor’s party grew up from “Ravnopravie” movement, which previously advocated for union with Russia[iv], while now only continues to maintain a center-left, socially oriented program.[v] Yet this party is seemingly a member of the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE) - Mr. Shor, convicted in the first level court for his involvement in the banking fraud, continues to run in elections, and managed to register two European MPs outside the joint European Parliament election observation effort, where ACRE is present.[vi] This generated a rebuttal from MEPs, stating that theirs is the only European Parliament observation mission officially registered for these elections.[vii]

Mr. Plahotniuc is also known as the former major contributor to the Communist Party finances up to 2009.[viii] And although Russia and its Interior Ministry identified him as a Russian citizen and one of the perpetrators of the Russian Laundromat[ix], which leads me to believe that they want to help Mr. Dodon in current elections – such an involvement, with his relative, the current Spekaer of thee Palriament, Mr. Candu, was actually reported by the RISE-Moldova investigative journalism group that exposed the Russian Laundromat and other schemes[x]. RISE-Moldova is a reputable institution. Hence, the electoral context is exposing an actual situation.

In his turn, Mr. Dodon’s Socialists finances do not seem to be in order as well, according to the same RISE-Moldova.[xi] Mr. Dodon returned from his recent trip to Moscow with a Gazprom flight.[xii] Though, to my knowledge, nobody put an official request, such a trip provided by a foreign company linked to a Government, amounts to passive corruption at least and is against Moldovan legislation. He also recently launched a renewed version of the originally Russian drafted Kozak plan that would plant Moldova firmly into the Russian World/Russki Mir.[xiii] His office denied the veracity of the document, suggesting another set of document would be provided after elections.

ACUM block – an anti-corruption, pro-democracy, hence pro-European and Pro-Western block, is formed by two younger persons. Maia Sandu and Andrei Nasase, with limited previous political experience.
-         The main criticism directed towards Maia Sandu is for her membership in the Alliance for European Integration Government and the failure to object in the governmental sessions (in a Government led by the Liberal-Democrats, with the participation of the Democrats and Liberals), to the $1bln theft and the sale of the Moldovan Airport to what initially turned out to be an ex-KGB operative, who later transferred the business to Mr. Shor (see above for Shor Party). Ms. Sandu was the Minister of Education in that coalition Government.[xiv]
-         The other ACUM leader is Andrei Nastase. He is criticized for receiving money from off-shore accounts, possibly linked to two Moldovan businessmen, both with the same family name Topa (unrelated, yet partners), involved in a long-term business battle with Mr. Plahotniuc. They were convicted of blackmail and money laundering by the Moldovan justice system, often reported to be politically influenced and flew to Germany. Mr. Plahtoniuc ousted the two Topa from the Moldovan VictoriaBank, while Plahontiuc’s previous boss, the Communist President, Vladimir Voronin, nationalized Air Moldova company after they invested in it and lost $7mln. The two businessmen are criticized for presenting their case in an incomplete manner to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled in their favor and gave them $7ml in compensation, while being represented by Andrei Nastase.[xv] Mr. Nastase also won Moldovan capital, Chisinau, mayoral elections against the Socialist Party candidate, and Presidential adviser to Mr Dodon[xvi], which was cancelled by the Moldovan justice system, reported to be largely subordinated to Mr Plahotniuc.[xvii] Both EU and US issued strong condemnations to such a development.[xviii]

A new idea – Socialists and ACUM to vote Plahotniuc down and organize early “clean” elections

A new idea to get rid of the governing oligarch, Vladimir Plahotniuc, was launched on a Russian language website.[xix] It suggests that Pro-Putin Socialists and pro-Western ACUM block, despite being in disagreement, should vote down the government controlled by the corrupt governing oligarch and then organize new “clean” early elections. While ridding Moldova of corruption is a necessary development, the plan is fatally flawed and should not be supported, for the following reasons:

1.     Mr. Plahotniuc doesn't necessarily need the administrative resources of the State to effectively participate in new elections. For his party it is good to have have them, yet not a must. Plahotniuc can handle the elections with his own money. The vote down, may indeed send a signal to the "field" that he is no longer in charge – still, there are other barriers that make it less relevant.

2.     To organize new "clean" elections one would need to change the Central Electoral Commission - that's impossible, per Moldovan legislation during elections. As a secondary matter, I would add that changing the electoral law back, would be generally good – however, it would be against the Coucnil of Europe (Venice Commission) and OSCE practice, which is invoked as the best practice by at least ACUM. 

3.     Same limitations go for the Audio-Visual Council.

4.     No one will be able to take away Plahotniuc's media overwhelmingly present in Moldovan houses. They broadcast popular Russian channels, however, with his news inserted. These will probably work double time for his campaign in the media.

5.     An ACUM alliance with Dodon, despite previous joint protests against Plahotniuc, is a whole different matter. Such an alliance may annihilate ACUM's credibility with its voters right ahead of early elections. ACUM voters are staunchly anti-Dodon and wary of Russian interests in Moldova. And, predictably, ACUM just "signed" a public promise that they won't do such an alliance.

6.     An ACUM alliance with Dodon, would also undermine ACUM's credibility with the Western factors. Mr. Plahotniuc payed considerable amounts of money to lobby in USA a image of Dodon’s controller and of ACUM being partners to Russian controlled Dodon in their joint protests against Plahotniuc.

7.     The issue of believing Dodon – we are talking about the President who was elected on a wave of fake news, using own & Russian support for such fake news, who "imported" money via off shore companies from "unknown" sources and travels to coordinate with Putin as often as he needs to, returning with a Gazprom flight. There is little doubt that after dealing with Mr. Plahotniuc, he might not be the right person to trust in organizing "clean" elections.

However the most important argument is - if Mr. Dodon wants early elections, he simply doesn't have to form a coalition with Plahotniuc. Without such a coalition, and with ACUM determination to avoid a political suicide via a coalition either with Dodon or Plahotniuc there will be early elections, to which President Dodon publicly called many times. If ACUM is not needed for early elections, and because taking down Plahotniuc’s government solves little, then such a joint action will only play to reinforce Plahotniuc’s claim that he is the only pro-Western player in Moldova,, despite his suggested involvement in the Russian laundromat.

All these factors, together, do not support such a scenario, in fact they undermine only one specific party - ACUM block.

My current projections show that at this point both Plahotniuc and Dodon will expect election results to either go into early elections or actually form a new "non"existent coalition (the old "Binom" again) between their parties. The Binom may function according to the old true and tried formula, when Demacrats would play the "pro-Western" card and "attempt controlling" Dodon, while the President would continue his Russian connection.

Additionally, they have been shifting toward what they called a "pro-Moldova" position, as the Democrats declared after being criticized by EU, which would argue that they a smart play between the West and East in necessary and more realistic for Moldova’s survival. I’d argue that Moldova agonizes between the Putin’s style “Sovereign Democracy” and EU for over 20 years and the pro-Moldova stance just delays the democratic development of the country, justifying Russian laundromats and endemic corruption.




Posted by at No comments:
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)