Wednesday, February 20, 2019

Moldovan pro-Russian President secret plan for Transnistrian conflict settlement leaked

Moldovan pro-Russian President secret plan for 
Transnistrian conflict settlement - leaked

by Vlad Lupan,
New York, February 20, 2019

According to a number of private discussions with Moldovan experts, we knew that the pro-Russian President Dododn was preparing a set of documents for Transnistrian conflict settlement. Moldovan media reported about my previous information on his plan for a neutrality resolution at UN, a document that was brought to my attention before the Moldovan authorities even considered to prepare a UN resolution for Russian troops withdrawal (Independent.md, June 5, 2017).[i]

According to another private discussion this fall with one of the Moldovan experts from IDIS-Viitorul, an attempt to pitch a plan for Transnistrian conflict settlement was done by President Dodon’s team, during a visit to USA and possible to other Western governments. There was no confirmation that they had meetings with the US State Department, though such a rumor did circulate.

Several days ago, one of the Russian language news portals from Moldova denied that President Dodon was invited to Munich Security Conference. He travelled there nonetheless to use the opportunity to have some meetings on the margin of the MSC2019 to pitch his plan again (OMG Media Group, February 15, 2019)[ii]

The situation somewhat resembles the 2003 developments with Kozak Memorandum, when the Moldovan (Communist) President Voronin asked Moscow to step in and facilitated a “shuttle diplomacy” effort by President Putin’s Chief of Staff, Special Envoy Dmitri Kozak. The plan was supposed to ensure the s-called federalization of the Republic of Moldova, however, via separatists’ veto powers against any foreign policy decisions of Moldova, a veto in Constitutional Court, as well as a Russian military base to stay until 2020 with the possibility of unlimited extension (Maria Levchenko, OpenDemocracy, February 25, 2016). [iii] As such provisions prove, such a plan would not mean federalization. It was rather a form of Russian protectorate, via proxies, over the rest of the Republic of Moldova, and the Moldovan experts called it the “Transnistrization of the Republic of Moldova.”

Current President Dodon and the current leader of governing Democrats were the Minister of Economy in Voronin’s Government and one of the financiers of the Communist party respectively, at the time of 2003, when the so-called Kozak Memorandum was prevented.



A “Transnistrization” of Moldova in the works again
The new “plan” comes after repeated visits to Russia of the President Dodon, the opening of the so-called Transnistrian representation in Moscow without an adequate response form the Government, and after a set of international transportation and export concession by the Moldovan governing Democrats to Russian businesses in Transnistrian region.

After these actions Russia nominated again the same Dmitry Kozak, of 2003 Memorandum, to lead Moscow’s efforts in Transnistrian conflict settlement. Such a nomination presumes an “opportunity to resurrect the issue of federalization” in exchange for the Russian, possibly indirect, support to both President Dodon and governing Democrats (Dumitru Minzarari, Jamestown Foundation, July 23, 2018).[iv] We have indicated that the nomination of Mr. Kozak would presume another attempt of Tranistrization.

Despite the facy that the plan is speaking about the post-settlement Moldovan having one international status, several provisions in the preamble contradict that- the plan presumes a split of the Republic of Moldova in two legal subjects, with separate armies, coin and, foreign ministries. Moreover, as per previous negotiations on Transnistrian conflict settlement, any negotiations on the so-called federalization of Moldova usually evolve in discussions about a trilateral or quadrilateral “federation” and later “confederation” etc. Opening this Pandora box, the President Dodon, who has a previous Chief Negotiator of the Transnistrian problem on his team, knows very well that the already existing Gagauz Autonomy will require an identical status, possibly with external support from Turkey and Russia, while the last would be expected to foment the somewhat mixed North of the Republic of Moldova, politically sympathetic to Moscow.

The old problem of linguistic dependency and the myth of “multi-nationalism”
The struggle for independence in the Republic of Moldova also meant the return to Latin alphabet at the end of USSR, in 1989, since Soviet “Moldovan” was in fact Romanian language written in Cyrillic alphabet. For many Moldovans the language was a sign of their independence. One of the first laws the new multi-party Parliament inacted in 1989 was to return the Moldovan schooling system returned to Latin script. As of 1992, the Ministry of Education curricula, compulsory for all the schools, confirmed the declaration of independence on Romanian language and decreed that pupils in schools only studied Romanian language and literature, not Moldovan. From 1992 till 2019 this provision is still in force. Therefore, another return to Cyrillic after 28 years of Latin script despite being a nuisance, it in an important symbolic gesture towards the Soviet past and loyalties to Russia. Such a step would also ground the populace linguistically into the Russian space (Русский Мир).

The USSR experience of a dominant Russian language and the functioning of the Transnistrian separatist “republic” showed that while Russian, “Moldovan” and Ukrainian languages were declared as “official” in Moldovan SSR and in that “separatist” region after 1992, the Russian language dominated and its users undermined others, suffocating other two. Therefore, the existing body of experience shows that the linguistic dependency would lead to another round of russification.

The past USSR and current Transnistrian linguistic practices are indicators as to how the so-called multi-national state would be constructed in the Russian World.

Dangerous provisions
The document is fraught with conflicting and interpretable provisions. Since the provisions are prepared and presented to the Western actors since September 2018, these do not seem to be mistakes. Such points may indicate contradictions stemming from the conflict between original more Russian interests-oriented provisions and attempt to adjust the paper with some red lines from Western actors.

1.      Contradictions - the draft on page one refers in preamble to a unitary state with two equal subjects with equal powers (полномочия) in foreign policy, defense, security, currency. It also speaks in General Provisions of a unitary multinational neutral state, in para 1 and 5. Yet para 6 states that “The equality of “Moldova-Transnistria” sides in negotiations process on the Transnistrian conflict settlement does not lead to their equal legal status/powers (правосубьектность)”.

2.      Removing the 2005 law - the most contentious for Russia Moldovan 2005 law that determines that the Transnistrian conflict resolution would be done in accordance with the Moldovan Constitution and international law provisions is eliminated on page 2, para 9 of General provisions, clearing the way for a construct similar to one in 2003.

3.      The return to 2003 Kozak “federalization” memorandum provision of a bicameral Parliament and exclusive presence of Transnistrian representatives in Moldovan Government, justice system and Constitutional court can be found again on page 2, para 3 and 10. However, a mirroring process of ensuring some sort of a guarantee by placing trusted Moldovan officials in the Transnistrian structures is absent. The previous Kozak Memorandum veto powers granted to Transnistrians, who are almost entirely Russian citizens, are not mentioned on this page. These are present, however, in the document and relocated to sections and paras on page3.

4.      On page 1 in the Basic Parameters chapter, on page 2 para 9 the document requires to return to the Moldovan language with the Cyrillic script, denying the populace of Moldova hard earned linguistic independence and placing a fractured “reunited” Moldova back into the Cyrillic space of the Russian World, as noted in the chapter on linguistic dependency.

5.      A precedent - a combination of elements from the previous 2001-2003 federalization talks and current Gagauz Autonomy parliamentary right, can be found in para 4, on page 2. Among other things this will create a precedent for Gagauz autonomy to request a similar upgrade federal status, as noted above.

6.      Para 7 on page 2, as well as the entire set of provisions in the Chapter on Guarantees on page 3 speaks about guarantees, without providing a legal ground and compulsory measures to guaranteeing actors to maintain those promises. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on de-nuclearization of Ukraine proved that the lack of repercussions is convenient to Russia. The fact that OSCE is called to guarantee these provisions, is relevant – the OSCE does not have leverages and is dependent on the rule of consensus. The rule of consensus was successfully misused by the Russian Federation as a veto in OSCE and other international consensus organizations before. Without appropriate leverages such a language and provisions on guarantees is meaningless.

7.      The UN does not have a mechanism of guarantees to ensure all sides’ compliance, if one of the interested parties is a member of the UN Security Council and even less in case of OSCE and other organizations (Dangers of Vetocracy, Ukrinfo, February 12, 2019).[v] The suggestion of OSCE to handle the conflictual provisions, if those may arise, goes against the fact that OSCE has only a political, yet no legal body to settle disputes. It resembles the requirement of Russia to conduct a UN peacekeeping operation in Ukraine only to protect OSCE observers, not to actually implement the Minsk agreements, violated by Russia itself and its proxies.

8.      Another dangerous provision is to related to the old Russian position on the synchronization of the political settlement with Russian troops withdrawal from Moldova according to the formula “no settlement the way Russia wants it, no withdrawal”. The para3 on Internal Guarantees on page 3 speaks about the demilitarization of both sides, while para 3 on Neutrality – a Russian demand often repeated in the media for the last 20 years – is directly making a reference to the idea. Such a development confirms the previous attempt from the governing Democrats to manage Russia by refusing to request a compete withdrawal of Russian troops, including the so-called peacekeepers and ask for their replacement with an international force, in the UN resolution of June 2018, as we noted at that time. Such a language allows the entire contingent to stay, and while is not identical, it is in substance sufficiently similar to Kozak 2003 Memorandum requirement for stationing of the Russian troops over extended period of times (DW, July 16, 2018).[vi] The deadline of 2040 for the settlement confirms the approach.

There are more provisions worth mentioning. However, the already pointed out provisions seems to prove that this draft is an edited and rearranged, sometimes poorly, version of the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, making another attempt at Moldova’s “Transnistrization” and firmly placing it this time in the sphere of influence of the Russian  Federation, the Russian World.

No mandate - the “wrong” document?
While the leaked document was received from Munchen, from one of the participants to the Conference, who got hold of the draft distributed there, it is rumored that the presidency quickly denied its veracity. This could not be yet confirmed. The photographed document came to Moldova after Dodon presented it there. There is little doubt that this the actual document prepared by President Dodon’s office. Its quick denial suggests the lack of comfort and confidence that this document would not have the support of Moldovan citizens, just like the Kozak Memorandum in 2003 drove people out to protest it en masse. Yet his draft claims the people support it. While Kozak Memorandum was drafted by the Russian envoy, it would be interesting to find out where the 2018-2019 paper was drafted.

One year ago, we wrote that the acceptance by the Governance to transfer the Transnistrian file to the President Dodon does not go in line with its declared pro-European and pro-US stance. At that time we noted that a “truly pro-European government cannot afford the luxury of transferring this political case almost exclusively to the President of the Republic of Moldova and should block such developments.” Unfortunately, this did not happen (Foreign Policy Association of Moldova, Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, April 2018, issue nr.2).[vii] One year later, today, the reaction of the opposition seems to underline the cooperation of the President with the governing Democrats in the matter of Russian involvement and interest of both Moldovan actors to settle with Russia (Unimedia, February 20, 2019).[viii] The set of measures on Transnistrian settlement that we have mentioned before could not have been implemented without a coordinated approach between the government and the President. Moldovan Parliamentary elections are going to happen in five days. It is unclear if the undeclared coalition between the Democrats and Socialists would coalition after the elections, since it depends on their results and possible legal actions that the political players, including the opposition may take against them. The danger of such a coalition was rated high in a study written in the fall of 2018 and published in Ukraine in January 2019 (Elections in Moldova, Ukrainian Prism, January 2019).[ix]

What comes after 2019 elections in Moldova, on the South Western flank of Ukraine
While President Dodon quick, though unconfirmed, denial may create the impression that he is not going to follow up on the new Transnistrian plan, we would presume that he would wait for a better timing, after February 24 elections, to have more freedom to act. It would depend on the post-electoral coalitions or even early elections. Therefore, the life of this document may not be over and we can expect new developments in 2019. In 2003 the US Ambassador, EU, OSCE and NATO officials criticized the Kozak plan as failing to reflect the interests of the Moldovans or gather consensus within their membership, thus placing Moldovan leadership under pressure, and saving Moldova from disintegrating (RFE/RL-Moldova, August 13, 2016)[x] and becoming a precedent in Eastern Europe political takeover by Russia and its proxies. In 2019 there are two actors playing for this plan – the purported pro-US Democrats and Dodon’s Socialists, distributing their “spheres of influence” among themselves. It is time for the Western actors to stop supporting the open and covert pro-Russian or opportunistic forces in the Republic of Moldova, ready to play along with Kremlin. Otherwise they risk to help create a negative precedent ahead of Ukraine elections and a hostile area on Ukraine South-Western flank.





The "Plan":





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