Association Promo-Lex, one of the NGOs that monitors the early elections of 29 July 2009, issued today, at 18.00hrs it second report.
Out of 34 infringements reported by them in their second report, seven are mentioning problems with the misuse of mobile ballot boxes, which is a matter that involves more voters (the report is in Romanian, however, see cases no.6, 7, 17, 22, 28, 29 and 31).
Promo-Lex reported that people also vote according to the F9 form – a replacement for regular ID cards, when the ID card is missing (old expired, stolen, etc). As observers reported, the F9 form is photocopied and then the „voters” just come with photos taped on the forms and vote (multiple cases), for... (exactly).
The News Portal Azi.md reports that in Ungheni town, a private bus was contracted to transport students who are now in vacation to the Moldovan capital, so that they can vote – ahead of April 5 they were not allowed to vote in towns where thy study, for these elections the situation was “reinterpreted” and they could not vote at home. The owner of the bus was allegedly called by traffic police one day ahead of the elections and „suggested” not to transport them, otherwise he might have problems. In the morning of the Electoral Day the owner found that the registration numbers of the bus were torn down, missing and two of the wheels were completely wrecked. He called for police, which did not even show up...
In another location, local newspaper with an internet TV station (JurnalTV) reported that a voter in Codru outlet, near Chisinau, allegedly tried to stuff in the ballot box 15 ballots, all “voted” for the Communist party.
Unimedia News portal reported today, July 29, that in Sangera, Sergiu Bumbu (the son of Deputy Mayor of Sangera), who is Our Moldova Alliance political party representative, requested Communist party sympathisers to stop violations of electoral norms [unspecified]. In response, a representative of the Communist party shot Bumbu in the leg. Latest news reports say that instead of driving Sergiu Bumbu to a hospital, he was taken to the Botanica police commissariat (in Chisinau, Moldovan capital).
Media also reports that his father, deputy Mayor of Sangera, was attacked as well - an unidentified person, accompanied by two Communist District Councilors (Vasile Bulgăr and Dumitru Baciu), stroke the Deputy Mayor of Sangera, Mr. Ştefan Bumbu, with the head, over Deputy mayor's face. Police did not detain the attacker, despite the fact that they talked to the offender...
Jurnl.md report that 49,2% of people voted in the elections - the elections are valid from the point of view of turnout(Vlad Lupan Comments: recognition threshold was lowered by communist party to 33% in June 2009, although Council of Europe's Venice Commission suggested no electoral legislation should be changed six months ahead of the elections). Over 1,300,000.00 people voted by 19.00hrs. This is 3% less than on April 5. Additionally the Jurnal.md newspaper reports that 66,879.00 voters were registered on supplementary lists.
Another news speaks about a person introduced in the electoral rolls 52 times, with different ID number.
Unofficial sources report that at 18.00hrs the Communist party already gathered 47% of the votes, which is again a figure that might be questioned in the view that there are many infringements and that the polls were showing a decline of Communist party popularity, while such 47% support contradicts the polls and might be related to infringements.
See the entire Promo-Lex report, however in Romanian here at Read more: ->
COALIŢIA CIVICĂ PENTRU ALEGERI LIBERE ŞI CORECTE
ASOCIAŢIA PROMO-LEX
Raport interimar nr. 2
Monitorizarea zilei alegerilor parlamentare anticipate
Publicat la 29 iulie 2009, ora 18.00
Introducere
Monitorizarea alegerilor parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie 2009 în şapte circumscripţii electorale este un proiect realizat de Asociaţia Promo-LEX în cadrul Coaliţiei Civice pentru Alegeri Libere şi Corecte „Coaliţia 2009”. „Coaliţia 2009” este o uniune benevolă de organizaţii non-guvernamentale, care implementează proiecte întru îmbunătăţirea procesului electoral şi sporirea încrederii cetăţenilor în proces. Programele de monitorizare a alegerilor în cadrul „Coaliţiei 2009” sunt implementate atât de Promo-LEX, cît şi de alte organizaţii care fac parte din aceasta.
Al doilea raport intermediar din ziua alegerilor parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie 2009 se referă la monitorizarea circumscripţiilor electorale Floreşti, Rezina, Dubăsari, Anenii Noi, Căuşeni, Ştefan Vodă şi regiunea transnistreană a Republicii Moldova de către peste 270 observatori. Aceste raioane mărginesc regiunea transnistreană şi găzduiesc secţii de votare speciale destinate alegătorilor cu domiciliul în regiunea transnistreană. Informaţia din raport a fost colectată de observatorii Promo-LEX în raioanele monitorizate prin observare directă, întâlniri cu interlocutori şi consultarea documentelor oficiale.
Constatările şi recomandările din prezentul raport sunt formulate cu bună credinţă şi prezentate în spiritul unei cooperări sănătoase cu toate părţile interesate în edificarea unui proces electoral transparent şi corect în Moldova. Autorii solicită persoanelor şi instituţiilor interesate să ofere informaţii, să critice sau să corecteze anumite aspecte sau recomandări incluse în Rapoartele de monitorizare a procesului electoral în circumscripţiile nominalizate. Efortul de monitorizare se ghidează de Constituţia Republicii Moldova, Codul Electoral, şi standardele şi principiile internaţionale de observare a alegerilor.
Proiectul este susţinut financiar de National Endowment for Democracy.
I. Constatări.
1. La orele 12.30 în cele 11 secţii de votare în care pot vota alegătorii din regiunea transnistreană, şi-au exercitat dreptul la vot 2346 alegatori.
2. La orele 17.30 în cele 11 secţii de votare în care pot vota alegătorii din regiunea transnistreană, şi-au exercitat dreptul la vot 3982 alegatori.
3. În municipiul Bender, au rămas plasate pe stâlpii şi blocurile de locuit afişele concurentului electoral PCRM.
4. În satul Varniţa, raionul Anenii Noi, Victor Petrov, preşedintele secţiei de votare nr. 41, intimidează observatorul Promo-LEX, interzicându-i să se deplaseze şi să stea doar pe scaun.
5. În satul Răscăieţi, raionul Ştefan Vodă, din cauza incompetenţei unui membru al biroului electoral al secţiei electorale care deservea alegătorii din regiunea transnistreană, s-a creat aglomeraţie. La intervenţia observatorului Promo-LEX, preşedintele secţiei de votare a schimbat membrul respectiv.
6. În oraşul Căuşeni, secţia de votare nr. 2, Veaceslav Nogai, preşedintele Asociaţiei de război şi muncă, a adus o listă de 26 (douăzeci şi şase) de persoane, pentru care, din nume propriu a solicitat deplasarea urnei mobile la domiciliul persoanelor respective. Cetăţeanul Iurie Arhipov, care era una din cele 26 de persoane indicate în listă, fiind inclus în lista de bază, a votat deja. Acesta a declarat observatorului Promo-LEX că nu a solicitat deplasarea urnei mobile la domiciliul său.
7. În satul Ciobanovca, Anenii Noi nu a fost întocmit procesul verbal şi, respectiv, nu le-au introdus în cele două urne mobile.
8. În satul Chircăieştii Noi, raionul Căuşeni, dnul Cericov Fiodor, reprezentant PCRM în secţia de votare nr. 16 din localitate, intimidează observatorii independenţi, interzicându-le să vorbească la telefonul mobil.
9. În satul Carahasani, raionul Ştefan Vodă, s-a permis votarea pentru doi studenţi, care au viza de reşedinţă temporară în alte localităţi.
10. În satul Gordineşti, raionul Rezina, Onu Ludmila, vice-preşedintele consiliului raional, Gobjilă Vasile, secretarul consiliului raional şi Lonichi Iulia, primarul satului Gordineşti, au stat la intrarea în secţia de votare circa 30 de minute. La secţia de votare din localitate au venit cu automobilul primăriei.
11. În satul Olăneşti, raionul Ştefan Vodă, au rămas plasate pe stâlpi şi în alte locuri neregulamentare afişele concurenţilor electorali PPCD, PCRM, PLDM, iar în satul Talmaza, acelaşi raion, ale concurentului electoral PCRM.
12. În satul Copanca, raionul Căuşeni, la secţia de votare nr. 23, dna Tihonov Zinaida (observator din partea PCRM) se deplasa prin sat şi întocmea o listă a persoanelor care vor să voteze la domiciliu. Lista a fost prezentată preşedintelui biroului electoral al secţiei de votare.
13. În satul Zaim, raionul Căuşeni, înainte de sigilarea urnei de votare au votat cel puţin 10 (zece) persoane. Procesul verbal întocmit este incomplet - nu a fost semnat, ştampilat şi nu era scris numărul buletinelor de identitate.
14. În satul Slobozia, raionul Ştefan Vodă, la ora 11.30 a dispărut fila din listele electorale ale cetăţenilor incluşi în listă numerele de ordine de la 161 până la 218 (57 persoane). În acest sens s-a întocmit un proces verbal.
15. În oraşul Căuşeni, secţia de votare nr. 2 o persoană a votat, indicându-se cu domiciliul Dimitrie Cantemir 44/2. Această adresă nu există.
16. În satul Tarasova, raionul Rezina, au votat trei persoane care au prezentat forma F 9 cu fotografia lipită cu bandă adezivă, fără a fi indicat numărul documentului.
17. Primarul satului Pârâta, raionul Dubăsari, s-a deplasat în localitate cu urna mobilă. Observatorii nu au fost informaţi de acest fapt. Respectiv, nu se cunoaşte numărul buletinelor de vot şi lista persoanelor la care acesta se va deplasa.
18. Primarul satului Feşteliţa, raionul Ştefan Vodă, pe parcursul a două ore a stat în incinta secţiei de votare. Observatorul Promo-LEX a atenţionat preşedintele secţiei de votare respective despre inadmisibilitatea faptului dat. Ultimul nu a reacţionat şi a permis staţionarea în continuare a primarului.
19. În secţia de votare nr. 42 din satul Taraclia, raionul Căuşeni, listele electorale sunt întocmite incorect, la nici o persoană nu a fost indicată seria şi numărul buletinului de identitate. Preşedintele secţiei de votare a declarat că în acest fel listele au fost primite de la primărie. Membrii biroului electoral al secţiei de votare includ seria şi numărul buletinului de identitate cu pixul. În secţia sus-indicată, urna şi draperiile sunt de culoare roşie.
20. La secţiile de votare nr. 16 din Ciobanovca şi nr. 30 Merenii Noi, ambele din raionul Anenii Noi, s-a constatat nerespectarea distanţei de 100 de m de la secţia de votare de colaboratorii de poliţie.
21. La secţia de votare nr. 2 Anenii Noi, observatorul Promo-LEX a constatat trei persoane decedate incluse în listele de bază. Este vorba de persoanele Ciumacenco Stanislav 05.09.1963 a. n., cu nr. 1534 pe lista electorală buletin de identitate A 25018197, care fiind verificat în baza de date al Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale figurează ca fiind nevalabil; Teslari Andrei 30.11.1959 a.n., cu nr.462 pe lista electorală, buletin de identitate A 25004732 care fiind verificat în baza de date al Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale figurează ca fiind nevalabil; Cobuşcean Evdochia, a.n. 20.08.1930, cu nr. 1957 pe lista electorală, paşaport IV BM 646800, verificarea în baza de date al Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale este imposibilă.
22. La secţiile de votare nr. 15 din satul Talmaza, nr. 24 din satul Antoneşti şi nr. 17 din satul Caplani din raionul Ştefan Vodă, au fost depuse cereri de solicitare a urnei mobile pentru votarea la domiciliu, care erau scrise de una şi aceiaşi persoană la calculator. Observatorii au înaintat cereri pentru a refuza înregistrarea acestor persoane în registrul persoanelor care au solicitat votarea la domiciliu prin intermediul urnei mobile.
23. În subsolul Casei de Cultură din satul Malovata Veche, raionul Dubăsari, unde este amplasată secţia de votare, funcţionează un bar în care se comercializează băuturi alcoolice. Observatorii Promo-LEX au depus o contestaţie în adresa preşedintelui biroului electoral al secţiei de votare, pentru a iniţia acţiuni în vederea scoaterii din comercializarea băuturilor alcoolice în ziua alegerilor. La momentul de faţă o decizie asupra cazului nu a fost primită.
24. La secţia de votare din satul Ţînţăreni r-ul Anenii Noi, primarul din localitate s-a aflat în apropierea secţiei de votare aproximativ 30 de minute, mai mult timp decât este necesar pentru exprimarea opţiunii de vot.
25. Sunt prezente afişe electorale ale concurenţilor electorali în localităţile Talmaza secţia de votare nr.28 (PCRM), Olăneşti (PCRM, PPCD, PL şi PLDM) şi Palanca (Palanca), raionul Ştefan Vodă
26. În satul Teliţa r-ul Anenii Noi, s-au eliberat certificate cu drept de vot la şase persoane: Mitreanu Oleg A 25062688, Ursu Andrei A 25036719, Niţorean Vitalie A 25074434, Niţorean Ştefan A 25049165, Clichici Sergiu A 25067211, Cheliminciug Serghei A 25058391. În urma verificării în baza de date a Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale a acestor acte de identitate s-a constatat că buletinele de identitate A 25036719 (Ursu Andrei) şi A 25058391 (Cheliminciug Serghei) nu sunt valabile, iar buletinul de identitate A 25049165 (Niţorean Ştefan) nu este de găsit în baza de date.
27. În satul Fîrlădeni raionul Căuşeni, dna Malîi Tamara a fost surprinsă în momentul în care semna pentru alegătorul Leşan Alexei, care la acel moment nici nu se afla în incinta secţiei de votare. Doamna a explicat că persoana dată ar fi fost la secţie, i-a eliberat buletin de vot, dar ultimul a uitat să semneze în lista electorală. Incidentul se cercetează.
28. Secţia de votare nr.1 Căuşeni membrii biroului s-au pornit cu urna mobilă. Buletinele de vot au fost luate din secţie fără a fi numărate. Pe drum membrii secţiei au întocmit o nouă listă, mai mult ca atât au fost opriţi de un automobil din care membrii au primit o altă listă cu persoane care solicită urna mobilă. Nici una din listele noi nu au fost prezentate observatorilor, cu toate că au solicitat să le vadă.
29. Secţia de votare nr.8 Căplani Ştefan Vodă, la orele 14.00 a fost prezentată de către Calalb Vladimir Ilici prin care a solicitat urna mobilă pentru 17 persoane. La iniţiativa observatorilor, membrii biroului electoral al secţiei de votare nu au luat în calcul această listă şi respectiv persoanele nu au fost incluse în registrul alegătorilor care au solicitat urna mobilă.
30. Primarul satului Feşteliţa, raionul Ştefan Vodă, Tudoreanu Nicolai Gheorghe, de la orele 9.30 pînă la 16.00 aflându-se la o distanţă de circa 50 metri de la secţia de votare discută cu alegătorii care vin pentru a-şi exercita dreptul la vot. Preşedintele biroului electoral al secţiei de votare, dna Ceban Liubovi atenţionată asupra acestui fapt, a neglijat solicitările observatorilor şi nu a intervenit pentru a curma incidentul.
31. La secţia de votare nr. 5 din satul Antoneşti, raionul Ştefan Vodă, la orele 8.30 Zamă Veaceslav şi Chirilov Vladimir au venit cu cereri comune pentru 24 persoane, pentru a vota la domiciliu. La insistenţa observatorilor aceste cereri nu au fost admise.
32. La secţia de votare din satul Feşteliţa r-ul Ştefan Vodă, membrul biroului electoral al secţiei de votare, dna Galafton Natalia a eliberat buletin de vot cetăţeanului Bulhac Ivan, fără ca cel din urmă să dispună de buletin de identitate.
33. Preşedintele secţiei de votare din satul Ustia nu a oferit observatorului Promo-LEX posibilitatea de a analiza listele persoanelor care au votat în baza certificatelor pentru drept de vot.
34. În satul Teliţa în registrul persoanelor care au solicitat urna mobilă au fost înregistrate 23 persoane. Monitorizând procesul de votare petrecut de către membrii secţiei de votare cu urna mobilă, observatorii au constatat că o mare parte din persoane incluse în listă de fapt nici nu au solicitat posibilitatea să voteze la domiciliu. Astfel din cele 23 persoane incluse iniţial în listă doar 19 persoane au votat, confirmându-se astfel includerea în lista respectivă a numelor de către alte persoane decât solicitanţii indicaţi.
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
11 Georgian observers are held at the airport
VL Comments:
Election non-observation: 11 Georgian observers are held at the airport, as Azi.md reports. Security and information service allegedly replied that they are not worthy of monitoring the elections, hence no accreditation. They will be "deported" from Moldova. Kyrgystan observers had the same fate...
End of comment
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Azi.md
http://www.azi.md/ro/story/4730
11 observatori georgieni sunt tinuti in aeroport
11 georgieni, membri ai Retelei Europene a Organizatiilor de Monitorizare a Alegerilor, sunt tinuti in aeroport de dimineata si nu sunt lasati sa intre in R. Moldova, informează StireaZilei.md
azi.md, 27 iulie 2009, 18:38
Serghei Tkacenko, seful misiunii de observatori REOMA, a declarat, pentru Stirea Zilei, ca nimeni nu le spune care este motivul interdictiei aplicate celor 11 georgieni.
“Li s-au luat pasapoartele si i-au izolat. Nu putem comunica cu ei. Nu au nici produse, nici macar apa. Am trimis un jurist, dar nu i s-a permis sa discute cu ei. Le-au spus doar ca vor astepta cursa de maine seara pentru a fi trimisi inapoi”, a spus Tkacenko.
Potrivit lui, Comisia Electorala Centrala urma sa le acorde astazi acreditari observatorilor europeni, dar, din motive necunoscute, aceasta chestiune nici nu a fost pusa in discutii la sedinta.
“Saptamana trecuta am cerut acreditarea a 140 de observatori din diferite tari, iar CEC a formulat invitatii pentru toate persoanele. Ulterior, comisia a decis sa ofere acreditari doar pentru 53 de observatori, iar, in forma verbala, ni s-a spus ca Serviciul de Informatii si Securitate a decis ca ceilalti “nu sunt demni pentru a observa alegerile din Republica Moldova”. Am sperat ca la sedinta de astazi a CEC incidentul se va rezolva, iar observatorii deja au pornit spre Moldova”, a spus seful misiunii REOMA.
Potrivit lui, nu au primit acreditari observatorii din Georgia si cei din Kargastan.
Comisia Electorala Centrala si Serviciul Vamal nu au oferit, deocamdata, explicatii pe marginea acestui caz.
Election non-observation: 11 Georgian observers are held at the airport, as Azi.md reports. Security and information service allegedly replied that they are not worthy of monitoring the elections, hence no accreditation. They will be "deported" from Moldova. Kyrgystan observers had the same fate...
End of comment
------------------------------------------
Azi.md
http://www.azi.md/ro/story/4730
11 observatori georgieni sunt tinuti in aeroport
11 georgieni, membri ai Retelei Europene a Organizatiilor de Monitorizare a Alegerilor, sunt tinuti in aeroport de dimineata si nu sunt lasati sa intre in R. Moldova, informează StireaZilei.md
azi.md, 27 iulie 2009, 18:38
Serghei Tkacenko, seful misiunii de observatori REOMA, a declarat, pentru Stirea Zilei, ca nimeni nu le spune care este motivul interdictiei aplicate celor 11 georgieni.
“Li s-au luat pasapoartele si i-au izolat. Nu putem comunica cu ei. Nu au nici produse, nici macar apa. Am trimis un jurist, dar nu i s-a permis sa discute cu ei. Le-au spus doar ca vor astepta cursa de maine seara pentru a fi trimisi inapoi”, a spus Tkacenko.
Potrivit lui, Comisia Electorala Centrala urma sa le acorde astazi acreditari observatorilor europeni, dar, din motive necunoscute, aceasta chestiune nici nu a fost pusa in discutii la sedinta.
“Saptamana trecuta am cerut acreditarea a 140 de observatori din diferite tari, iar CEC a formulat invitatii pentru toate persoanele. Ulterior, comisia a decis sa ofere acreditari doar pentru 53 de observatori, iar, in forma verbala, ni s-a spus ca Serviciul de Informatii si Securitate a decis ca ceilalti “nu sunt demni pentru a observa alegerile din Republica Moldova”. Am sperat ca la sedinta de astazi a CEC incidentul se va rezolva, iar observatorii deja au pornit spre Moldova”, a spus seful misiunii REOMA.
Potrivit lui, nu au primit acreditari observatorii din Georgia si cei din Kargastan.
Comisia Electorala Centrala si Serviciul Vamal nu au oferit, deocamdata, explicatii pe marginea acestui caz.
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
Mr. Obama - Reset the reset button
In case of Russia - Reset The Reset Button, Mr. President
My (Vlad Lupan's) comment: I am posting less and less on my blog recently - that's because of a project I work on in the Moldovan electoral context.
However, I wanted to call an expert yesterday and ask him if he had an opportunity to follow and write about US-Russia Summit. Meanwhile STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com/), an American geopolitics site, sent their analysis on the event.
My interest is, of course, the post-Soviet space - Moldova now being one of the players for Russian money and interests, in time of elections. One should understand, though, that I am not the one to believe that Moldovan issues are crucial in the past-USSR area. My country is just another subject or object in the game - however, if you are a Government and know that, you can play that game too. Use the possibilities, interests and play them as much as you can. A small country that does not have natural resources, should have a very good diplomacy...
Leaving aside the matter of Moldovan diplomacy, which deserves a particular posting, which will come in due time, the main issue is the observation of Stratfor - links and arrangements on the former-USSR.
Strafor brings up Obama's speech to prove the US President did not give up on Ukraine and Georgia during the Summit - STRATFOR: In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.”
Stratfor also suggests that "Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement."
However, in terms of US and Russian perceptions, the Russian press indeed most probably focused on two things:
1. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to.
2. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.
These two things are not negligible, since the Russian press reflects Kremlin thinking as well. Although Strafor believes that President Obama did not give clear signs of freeze towards post-Soviet space and that the Summit was routine, which is good, the official Russian perception may differ from US President's intentions.
Thus:
1. The first point (majority of people must choose) would be interpreted by Kremlin as follows - Russia with Germany and France, for various reasons, managed to confirm that without a NATO referendum in Ukraine nothing will be finally decided on NATO enlargement to this country. This, in Kremlin's perception, means it has a free hand to work through Russian mass media and Ukrainian political parties to deter a pro-NATO scenario (referendum, etc) - thus at all preventing or delaying this decision and turning things in its favour. Russian media is one of the most popular in the former Soviet space - hence Ukraine is, to an exaggerated, however generally true sense, left in an area with a more assertive Russia (close to Russia's mercy).
2. When an American President places the "referendum" issue, so much sought by Russia, in the same context and in the same speech with the following phrase: "And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation." - it can and probably will be easily perceived in the post-USSR space and particularly in Russia, as - US does not want to have any complaints about Russian behaviour in the post-Soviet space from NIS. Former Soviet republics must be careful (close to Russia's mercy), while Russia is freer to act in this area, carefully, of course.
Hence, as much as the US leadership and experts wanted to prove that no major concession was made in the post-USSR area, their perception will not be shared by Kremlin, and worse, by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.
If the intention of the US administration was not to send such messages to Russia, it will take US diplomacy some time to persuade Kremlin about it, as well as much effort to convince the Newly Independent States, which are more difficult to be let persuaded by "after-words".
The President Obama was viewed as a new beginning in Europe. However, in Eastern Europe, the realities are not like in Western Europe. The two often do not understand each other. They live in two different dimensions - one of inter-state relations, and another of Russian realpolitik, whether one likes it or not. From a country in Eastern Europe that faces the harsh side of the Russian realpolitik for several months now, I would suggest to President Obama that we live here in the world of realities, not expectations. Russia will not change its approach, it will adapt it - however, Russia is no longer a super-power, for the very reasons Stratfor mentions it (who cares about how many warheads are reduced - the topic is not about the deterrence anymore).
I thought I would be able to write a post ahead of Russia-US summit - the only thing I wrote was a very brief comment to President Obama - In case of Russia, Reset the reset button, Mr. President!
P.S. Lets see if people will read to the end. To those who know me, disregard this Post Scriptum, while to those who don't know me - I am NOT an anti-American or anti-Obama;) Now I wonder how many will ask me over e-mail or (less) on comments if I am an anti-american...
Read the entire STRAFOR analysis at:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090707_routine_u_s_russian_summit?utm_source=GWeeklyS&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=090707&utm_content=readmore
or just click on Read More that follows here ->
The U.S.-Russian Summit Turns Routine
July 7, 2009 | 1941 GMT
By George Friedman
Related Special Topic Page
* Special Summit Coverage
The Moscow summit between U.S. President Barack Obama, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has ended. As is almost always the case, the atmospherics were good, with the proper things said on all sides and statements and gestures of deep sincerity made. And as with all summits, those atmospherics are like the air: insubstantial and ultimately invisible. While there were indications of substantial movement, you would have needed a microscope to see them.
An agreement was reached on what an agreement on nuclear arms reduction might look like, but we do not regard this as a strategic matter. The number of strategic warheads and delivery vehicles is a Cold War issue that concerned the security of each side’s nuclear deterrent. We do not mean to argue that removing a thousand or so nuclear weapons is unimportant, but instead that no one is deterring anyone these days, and the risk of accidental launch is as large or as small whether there are 500 or 5,000 launchers or warheads. Either way, nuclear arms’ strategic significance remains unchanged. The summit perhaps has created a process that could lead to some degree of confidence. It is not lack of confidence dividing the two countries, however, but rather divisions on fundamental geopolitical issues that don’t intersect with the missile question.
The Fundamental Issues
There are dozens of contentious issues between the United States and Russia, but in our mind three issues are fundamental.
First, there is the question of whether Poland will become a base from which the United States can contain Russian power, or from the Russian point of view, threaten the former Soviet Union. The ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that the United States has slated for Poland does not directly affect that issue, though it symbolizes it. It represents the U.S. use of Polish territory for strategic purposes, and it is something the Russians oppose not so much for the system’s direct or specific threat — which is minimal — but for what it symbolizes about the Americans’ status in Poland. The Russians hoped to get Obama to follow the policy at the summit that he alluded to during his campaign for the U.S. presidency: namely, removing the BMD program from Poland to reduce tensions with Russia.
Second, there is the question of Iran. This is a strategic matter for the United States, perhaps even more pressing since the recent Iranian election. The United States badly needs to isolate Iran effectively, something impossible without Russian cooperation. Moscow has refused to join Washington on this issue, in part because it is so important to the United States. Given its importance to the Americans, the Russians see Iran as a lever with which they can try to control U.S. actions elsewhere. The Americans do not want to see Russian support, and particularly arms sales, to Iran. Given that, the Russians don’t want to close off the possibility of supporting Iran. The United States wanted to see some Russian commitments on Iran at the summit.
And third, there is the question of U.S. relations with former Soviet countries other than Russia, and the expressed U.S. desire to see NATO expand to include Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians insist that any such expansion threatens Russian national security and understandings with previous U.S. administrations. The United States insists that no such understandings exist, that NATO expansion doesn’t threaten Russia, and that the expansion will continue. The Russians were hoping the Americans would back off on this issue at the summit.
Of some importance, but not as fundamental as the previous issues, was the question of whether Russia will allow U.S. arms shipments to Afghanistan through Russian territory. This issue became important last winter when Taliban attacks on U.S. supply routes through Pakistan intensified, putting the viability of those routes in question. In recent months the Russians have accepted the transit of nonlethal materiel through Russia, but not arms.
Even before the summit, the Russians made a concession on this point, giving the United States the right to transit military equipment via Russian airspace. This was a significant policy change designed to demonstrate Russia’s flexibility. At the same time, the step is not as significant as it appeared. The move cost the Russians little under the circumstances, and is easily revoked. And while the United States might use the route, the route is always subject to Russian pressure, meaning the United States is not going to allow a strategic dependence to develop. Moreover, the U.S. need is not as apparent now as it was a few months ago. And finally, a Talibanized Afghanistan is not in the Russian interest. That Russia did not grant the U.S. request last February merely reveals how bad U.S.-Russian relations were at the time. Conversely, the Russian concession on the issue signals that U.S.-Russian relations have improved. The concession was all the more significant in that it came after Obama praised Medvedev for his openness and criticized Putin as having one foot in the Cold War, clearly an attempt to play the two Russian leaders off each other.
What the Summit Produced
Much more significantly, the United States did not agree to withdraw the BMD system from Poland at the summit. Washington did not say that removal is impossible, but instead delayed that discussion until at least September, when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Moscow. A joint review of all of the world’s missile capabilities was established at the summit, and this joint review will consider Iranian — and North Korean — missiles. The Polish BMD system will be addressed in that context. In other words, Washington did not concede on the point, but it did not close off discussions. The Russians accordingly did not get what they wanted on the missiles at the summit; they got even less of what they wanted in the broader strategic sense of a neutralized Poland.
The Russians in turn made no visible concessions on Iran. Apart from studying the Iranians’ missile systems, the Russians made no pledge to join in sanctions on Iran, nor did they join in any criticism of the current crackdown in Iran. The United States had once offered to trade Polish BMDs for Russian cooperation on Iran, an idea rejected by the Russians since the BMD system in Poland wasn’t worth the leverage Moscow has with Iran. Certainly without the Polish BMD withdrawal, there was going to be no movement on Iran.
NATO expansion is where some U.S. concession might have emerged. In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.”
On the surface, this reiterated the old U.S. position, which was that NATO expansion was between NATO and individual nations of the former Soviet Union, and did not — and should not — concern Moscow. The terms of expanding, reforming and contributing to NATO remained the same. But immediately after the Obama-Putin meeting, Russian sources began claiming that an understanding on NATO expansion was reached, and that the Americans conceded the point. We see some evidence for this in the speech — the U.S. public position almost never has included mention of public support or reforms.
In many ways, however, this is splitting hairs. The French and Germans have long insisted that any NATO expansion should be limited to countries with strong public support for expansion, and which meet certain military thresholds that Georgia and Ukraine clearly do not meet (and could not meet even with a decade of hard work). Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement.
Therefore, we come away with the sense that the summit changed little, but that it certainly didn’t cause any deterioration, which could have happened. Having a summit that causes no damage is an achievement in itself.
The Kennedy Trap
Perhaps the most important part of the summit was that Obama does not seem to have fallen into the Kennedy trap. Part of the lack of serious resolutions at the summit undoubtedly resulted from Obama’s unwillingness to be excessively accommodating to the Russians. With all of the comparisons to the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev summit being bruited about, Obama clearly had at least one overriding goal in Moscow: to not be weak. Obama tried to show his skills even before the summit, playing Medvedev and Putin against each other. No matter how obvious and clumsy that might have been, it served a public purpose by making it clear that Obama was not in awe of either of them. Creating processes rather than solutions also was part of that strategy.
It appears, however, that the Russians did fall into the Kennedy trap a bit. The eagerness of Putin’s advisers to tout U.S. concession on Ukraine and Georgia after their meeting in spite of scant public evidence of such concessions gives us the sense that Putin wanted to show that he achieved something Medvedev couldn’t. There may well be a growing rivalry between Medvedev and Putin, and Obama might well have played off it.
But that is for the gossip columns. The important news from the summit was as follows: First, no one screwed up, and second, U.S.-Russian relations did not get worse — and might actually have improved.
No far-reaching strategic agreements were attained, but strategic improvements in the future were not excluded. Obama played his role without faltering, and there may be some smidgen of tension between the two personalities running Russia. As far as summits go, we have seen far worse and much better. But given the vitriol of past U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, routine is hardly a negative outcome.
In the meantime, BMD remains under development in Poland, there is no U.S.-Russian agreement on Iran and, as far as we can confirm at present, no major shift in U.S. policy on Ukraine and Georgia has occurred. This summit will not be long remembered, but then Obama did not want the word “disastrous” attached to this summit as it had been to Kennedy’s first Soviet summit.
We wish there were more exciting things to report about the summit, but sometimes there simply aren’t. And sometimes the routine might turn out significant, but we doubt that in this case. The geopolitical divide between the United States and Russia is as deep as ever, even if some of the sharper edges have been rounded. Ultimately, little progress was made in finding ways to bridge the two countries’ divergent interests. And the burning issues — particularly Poland and Iran — continue to burn.
My (Vlad Lupan's) comment: I am posting less and less on my blog recently - that's because of a project I work on in the Moldovan electoral context.
However, I wanted to call an expert yesterday and ask him if he had an opportunity to follow and write about US-Russia Summit. Meanwhile STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com/), an American geopolitics site, sent their analysis on the event.
My interest is, of course, the post-Soviet space - Moldova now being one of the players for Russian money and interests, in time of elections. One should understand, though, that I am not the one to believe that Moldovan issues are crucial in the past-USSR area. My country is just another subject or object in the game - however, if you are a Government and know that, you can play that game too. Use the possibilities, interests and play them as much as you can. A small country that does not have natural resources, should have a very good diplomacy...
Leaving aside the matter of Moldovan diplomacy, which deserves a particular posting, which will come in due time, the main issue is the observation of Stratfor - links and arrangements on the former-USSR.
Strafor brings up Obama's speech to prove the US President did not give up on Ukraine and Georgia during the Summit - STRATFOR: In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.”
Stratfor also suggests that "Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement."
However, in terms of US and Russian perceptions, the Russian press indeed most probably focused on two things:
1. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to.
2. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.
These two things are not negligible, since the Russian press reflects Kremlin thinking as well. Although Strafor believes that President Obama did not give clear signs of freeze towards post-Soviet space and that the Summit was routine, which is good, the official Russian perception may differ from US President's intentions.
Thus:
1. The first point (majority of people must choose) would be interpreted by Kremlin as follows - Russia with Germany and France, for various reasons, managed to confirm that without a NATO referendum in Ukraine nothing will be finally decided on NATO enlargement to this country. This, in Kremlin's perception, means it has a free hand to work through Russian mass media and Ukrainian political parties to deter a pro-NATO scenario (referendum, etc) - thus at all preventing or delaying this decision and turning things in its favour. Russian media is one of the most popular in the former Soviet space - hence Ukraine is, to an exaggerated, however generally true sense, left in an area with a more assertive Russia (close to Russia's mercy).
2. When an American President places the "referendum" issue, so much sought by Russia, in the same context and in the same speech with the following phrase: "And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation." - it can and probably will be easily perceived in the post-USSR space and particularly in Russia, as - US does not want to have any complaints about Russian behaviour in the post-Soviet space from NIS. Former Soviet republics must be careful (close to Russia's mercy), while Russia is freer to act in this area, carefully, of course.
Hence, as much as the US leadership and experts wanted to prove that no major concession was made in the post-USSR area, their perception will not be shared by Kremlin, and worse, by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.
If the intention of the US administration was not to send such messages to Russia, it will take US diplomacy some time to persuade Kremlin about it, as well as much effort to convince the Newly Independent States, which are more difficult to be let persuaded by "after-words".
The President Obama was viewed as a new beginning in Europe. However, in Eastern Europe, the realities are not like in Western Europe. The two often do not understand each other. They live in two different dimensions - one of inter-state relations, and another of Russian realpolitik, whether one likes it or not. From a country in Eastern Europe that faces the harsh side of the Russian realpolitik for several months now, I would suggest to President Obama that we live here in the world of realities, not expectations. Russia will not change its approach, it will adapt it - however, Russia is no longer a super-power, for the very reasons Stratfor mentions it (who cares about how many warheads are reduced - the topic is not about the deterrence anymore).
I thought I would be able to write a post ahead of Russia-US summit - the only thing I wrote was a very brief comment to President Obama - In case of Russia, Reset the reset button, Mr. President!
P.S. Lets see if people will read to the end. To those who know me, disregard this Post Scriptum, while to those who don't know me - I am NOT an anti-American or anti-Obama;) Now I wonder how many will ask me over e-mail or (less) on comments if I am an anti-american...
Read the entire STRAFOR analysis at:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090707_routine_u_s_russian_summit?utm_source=GWeeklyS&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=090707&utm_content=readmore
or just click on Read More that follows here ->
The U.S.-Russian Summit Turns Routine
July 7, 2009 | 1941 GMT
By George Friedman
Related Special Topic Page
* Special Summit Coverage
The Moscow summit between U.S. President Barack Obama, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has ended. As is almost always the case, the atmospherics were good, with the proper things said on all sides and statements and gestures of deep sincerity made. And as with all summits, those atmospherics are like the air: insubstantial and ultimately invisible. While there were indications of substantial movement, you would have needed a microscope to see them.
An agreement was reached on what an agreement on nuclear arms reduction might look like, but we do not regard this as a strategic matter. The number of strategic warheads and delivery vehicles is a Cold War issue that concerned the security of each side’s nuclear deterrent. We do not mean to argue that removing a thousand or so nuclear weapons is unimportant, but instead that no one is deterring anyone these days, and the risk of accidental launch is as large or as small whether there are 500 or 5,000 launchers or warheads. Either way, nuclear arms’ strategic significance remains unchanged. The summit perhaps has created a process that could lead to some degree of confidence. It is not lack of confidence dividing the two countries, however, but rather divisions on fundamental geopolitical issues that don’t intersect with the missile question.
The Fundamental Issues
There are dozens of contentious issues between the United States and Russia, but in our mind three issues are fundamental.
First, there is the question of whether Poland will become a base from which the United States can contain Russian power, or from the Russian point of view, threaten the former Soviet Union. The ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that the United States has slated for Poland does not directly affect that issue, though it symbolizes it. It represents the U.S. use of Polish territory for strategic purposes, and it is something the Russians oppose not so much for the system’s direct or specific threat — which is minimal — but for what it symbolizes about the Americans’ status in Poland. The Russians hoped to get Obama to follow the policy at the summit that he alluded to during his campaign for the U.S. presidency: namely, removing the BMD program from Poland to reduce tensions with Russia.
Second, there is the question of Iran. This is a strategic matter for the United States, perhaps even more pressing since the recent Iranian election. The United States badly needs to isolate Iran effectively, something impossible without Russian cooperation. Moscow has refused to join Washington on this issue, in part because it is so important to the United States. Given its importance to the Americans, the Russians see Iran as a lever with which they can try to control U.S. actions elsewhere. The Americans do not want to see Russian support, and particularly arms sales, to Iran. Given that, the Russians don’t want to close off the possibility of supporting Iran. The United States wanted to see some Russian commitments on Iran at the summit.
And third, there is the question of U.S. relations with former Soviet countries other than Russia, and the expressed U.S. desire to see NATO expand to include Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians insist that any such expansion threatens Russian national security and understandings with previous U.S. administrations. The United States insists that no such understandings exist, that NATO expansion doesn’t threaten Russia, and that the expansion will continue. The Russians were hoping the Americans would back off on this issue at the summit.
Of some importance, but not as fundamental as the previous issues, was the question of whether Russia will allow U.S. arms shipments to Afghanistan through Russian territory. This issue became important last winter when Taliban attacks on U.S. supply routes through Pakistan intensified, putting the viability of those routes in question. In recent months the Russians have accepted the transit of nonlethal materiel through Russia, but not arms.
Even before the summit, the Russians made a concession on this point, giving the United States the right to transit military equipment via Russian airspace. This was a significant policy change designed to demonstrate Russia’s flexibility. At the same time, the step is not as significant as it appeared. The move cost the Russians little under the circumstances, and is easily revoked. And while the United States might use the route, the route is always subject to Russian pressure, meaning the United States is not going to allow a strategic dependence to develop. Moreover, the U.S. need is not as apparent now as it was a few months ago. And finally, a Talibanized Afghanistan is not in the Russian interest. That Russia did not grant the U.S. request last February merely reveals how bad U.S.-Russian relations were at the time. Conversely, the Russian concession on the issue signals that U.S.-Russian relations have improved. The concession was all the more significant in that it came after Obama praised Medvedev for his openness and criticized Putin as having one foot in the Cold War, clearly an attempt to play the two Russian leaders off each other.
What the Summit Produced
Much more significantly, the United States did not agree to withdraw the BMD system from Poland at the summit. Washington did not say that removal is impossible, but instead delayed that discussion until at least September, when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Moscow. A joint review of all of the world’s missile capabilities was established at the summit, and this joint review will consider Iranian — and North Korean — missiles. The Polish BMD system will be addressed in that context. In other words, Washington did not concede on the point, but it did not close off discussions. The Russians accordingly did not get what they wanted on the missiles at the summit; they got even less of what they wanted in the broader strategic sense of a neutralized Poland.
The Russians in turn made no visible concessions on Iran. Apart from studying the Iranians’ missile systems, the Russians made no pledge to join in sanctions on Iran, nor did they join in any criticism of the current crackdown in Iran. The United States had once offered to trade Polish BMDs for Russian cooperation on Iran, an idea rejected by the Russians since the BMD system in Poland wasn’t worth the leverage Moscow has with Iran. Certainly without the Polish BMD withdrawal, there was going to be no movement on Iran.
NATO expansion is where some U.S. concession might have emerged. In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.”
On the surface, this reiterated the old U.S. position, which was that NATO expansion was between NATO and individual nations of the former Soviet Union, and did not — and should not — concern Moscow. The terms of expanding, reforming and contributing to NATO remained the same. But immediately after the Obama-Putin meeting, Russian sources began claiming that an understanding on NATO expansion was reached, and that the Americans conceded the point. We see some evidence for this in the speech — the U.S. public position almost never has included mention of public support or reforms.
In many ways, however, this is splitting hairs. The French and Germans have long insisted that any NATO expansion should be limited to countries with strong public support for expansion, and which meet certain military thresholds that Georgia and Ukraine clearly do not meet (and could not meet even with a decade of hard work). Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement.
Therefore, we come away with the sense that the summit changed little, but that it certainly didn’t cause any deterioration, which could have happened. Having a summit that causes no damage is an achievement in itself.
The Kennedy Trap
Perhaps the most important part of the summit was that Obama does not seem to have fallen into the Kennedy trap. Part of the lack of serious resolutions at the summit undoubtedly resulted from Obama’s unwillingness to be excessively accommodating to the Russians. With all of the comparisons to the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev summit being bruited about, Obama clearly had at least one overriding goal in Moscow: to not be weak. Obama tried to show his skills even before the summit, playing Medvedev and Putin against each other. No matter how obvious and clumsy that might have been, it served a public purpose by making it clear that Obama was not in awe of either of them. Creating processes rather than solutions also was part of that strategy.
It appears, however, that the Russians did fall into the Kennedy trap a bit. The eagerness of Putin’s advisers to tout U.S. concession on Ukraine and Georgia after their meeting in spite of scant public evidence of such concessions gives us the sense that Putin wanted to show that he achieved something Medvedev couldn’t. There may well be a growing rivalry between Medvedev and Putin, and Obama might well have played off it.
But that is for the gossip columns. The important news from the summit was as follows: First, no one screwed up, and second, U.S.-Russian relations did not get worse — and might actually have improved.
No far-reaching strategic agreements were attained, but strategic improvements in the future were not excluded. Obama played his role without faltering, and there may be some smidgen of tension between the two personalities running Russia. As far as summits go, we have seen far worse and much better. But given the vitriol of past U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, routine is hardly a negative outcome.
In the meantime, BMD remains under development in Poland, there is no U.S.-Russian agreement on Iran and, as far as we can confirm at present, no major shift in U.S. policy on Ukraine and Georgia has occurred. This summit will not be long remembered, but then Obama did not want the word “disastrous” attached to this summit as it had been to Kennedy’s first Soviet summit.
We wish there were more exciting things to report about the summit, but sometimes there simply aren’t. And sometimes the routine might turn out significant, but we doubt that in this case. The geopolitical divide between the United States and Russia is as deep as ever, even if some of the sharper edges have been rounded. Ultimately, little progress was made in finding ways to bridge the two countries’ divergent interests. And the burning issues — particularly Poland and Iran — continue to burn.
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Louis O'Neill - Moscow Plays It Smart In Moldova, As Others Dither
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
Commentary
Moscow Plays It Smart In Moldova, As Others Dither
------------------------------------------------
A brief comment by Vlad Lupan to this article of Louis O'Neill, published by RFE/RL on June 29, 2009:
Russia proves again it can move fast to support the people they need in the former USSR space in electoral situations. Kremlin does it for its ends, of course. Should we watch and be "careful" (in my dictionary this means do as little as possible). Russian involvement was seen in previous elections in Ukraine and is repeatedly the case in Moldova. The EU reacted in Ukraine, US as well. Why Moldova is different? We do remember Ukraine's neighbours coming to visit Moldova's eastern neighbour. Moldova now is itself an Eastern Neighbour of EU - the Eastern Partnership was just launched and... In US everyone is still on the "reset" button.
Louis O'Neill gives us his perception on how the Moldovan Communist party, EU and US are acting under such circumstances, and gives us food-for-thought on what should be done.
I agree with this perception and I allow myself to say two things:
1. Moldova is an EU neighbour and no one can hide from that. EU can still make a difference in Moldova, at least to avoid a headache and avoid a second Belarus, or "belarussisation" of Moldova. Is it not EU's interest or perhaps other interests like Russia prevail?
2. Mr. Obama - reset the reset button! Its already time to face the realities, not expectations.
------------------------------------------------
Read O'Neill article in full on Radio Free Europe at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/Moscow_Plays_It_Smart_In_Moldova_As_Others_Dither/1765163.html
Or, to read it on my blog, just click on Read More there ->.
June 29, 2009
By Louis O'Neill
The "Big Daddy" of U.S. Democratic Party politics in the 1960s and '70s, Jesse Unruh, had a wonderfully ribald saying about the role of money and influence in the business of government: "If you can't drink a lobbyist's whiskey, take his money, sleep with his women, and still vote against him in the morning, you don't belong in politics."
Moldova's Big Daddy, acting President Vladimir Voronin, recently held meetings in Moscow with vastly bigger daddies: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Voronin expressed gratitude for the Kremlin's singular support of Moldova's Communists following the chaos and violence after the April 5 elections and reiterated his view that "colored revolutions" and "foreign interference" have no place in the Republic of Moldova.
In return for this seeming fealty, Voronin arrived home to announce massive Russian financial support for Moldova just one month before the controversial repeat parliamentary elections scheduled there for July 29.
Voronin described the half-billion-dollar loan as a "political decision" by Moscow. Although the details will be "discussed by experts" later on, Voronin quickly suggested the money would go to repairing and building roads, gas grids, irrigation networks, and "finishing houses," whatever that might mean.
For his part, Putin said, "We believe it's possible...the first tranche [of $150 million] could reach Moldova within the next six weeks or two months." At the same time, Putin made a powerfully symbolic gesture in granting $20 million for the reconstruction of Moldova's burned-out parliament, the destruction of which during the April postelection rioting angered Moldovans of all political persuasions. And as a bonus, Russia apparently lifted all previous restrictions on agricultural exports from Moldova.
EU Outmaneuvered
Voronin and Putin have used this visit and this announcement to tactically outmaneuver their respective rivals once again. Just as before the April elections, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov bucked up the Moldovan Communists with his first visit to Chisinau in eight years, with this trip Voronin has shown himself to average voters as a man of action who is respected by serious leaders and brings home the bacon.
No matter that the first dollar won't be dispatched, if at all, until after the Moldovan elections, because the implicit hint to the electorate is that "if you vote for the Communists, you will get your house finished."
By conditioning the money on the outcome of the vote, Moscow has essentially secured a free option on Voronin and his Communists' mini-vertical of power, while at the same time blowing wind into their sails for the campaign.
If they win, the Russian money flows and then the Kremlin exacts its yet-unknown price, which may include something as comprehensive as a Transdniester settlement along the lines of the 2003 Kozak memorandum or piecemeal elements like military basing rights in Transdniester, Russian as an official state language in Moldova, or assurances that under no conditions will the European Union Border Assistance Monitoring Mission be renewed. If the opposition somehow prevails, then the money spigot is turned off and both Voronin and Putin blame the policies of the new government for alienating Russian help.
Much as in Pikalyovo recently, Putin has swooped in to save the day with timely financial intervention. Only this time the whipping boy was not a down-on-his-luck oligarch strangling a one-company town, but, by implication, the EU's entire brand-new Eastern Partnership, launched on May 7. Russia has shown itself to be far more flexible and responsive to "eastern partner" Moldova than Brussels, and without all those vexing human rights obligations and endless EU technical reporting requirements to file.
Faced with the biggest upheaval in Moldova since the Transdniester conflict itself, the EU has essentially ceded the field. While Putin has offered loans equaling about 12 percent of Moldova's gross domestic product during the depths of a world economic crisis, the best the EU could muster recently was encouragement that Moldova continue to reform its legal system. While without doubt a vital step, such "concrete ideas for enhancing our relationship" (as the Eastern Partnership website contemplates) need to be matched with equally concrete, sustained, hands-on help.
Turning East, For Now
Putin's bold financial move also contrasted dramatically with the departure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from Moldova in early June. Citing "instability" in the country and the "provisional character" of the current government, the IMF decided to postpone until fall negotiations on a new financial program for Moldova.
Voronin, with Russian aid securely in his pocket, let loose with the kind of earthy comments that are increasingly characterizing his public statements. He claimed that the IMF left Moldova "as a woman leaves her husband who is acting badly," adding that "this is the second time that they are going.... They left in 2001 and then they returned in 2004 and asked how we achieved such success. We managed because you were not here. They thought we'd just roll over and die. Someone else here is calling the shots."
This last comment was a parting slap not only at Brussels, but at Washington, which has also been remarkably quiet on Moldova. This appears to be due to delays in assembling President Barack Obama's foreign-policy team, the rhetoric of "reset," and careful calibration in advance of the Obama-Medvedev meeting in Moscow in July. Whatever the reason, the Kremlin has noticed it and is acting accordingly.
But anyone who thinks Voronin's latest turn to the east portends a permanent shift should take a close look at recent history. In the last eight years, Voronin has already tacked back and forth several times between Russian orientation and European integration. He was elected in 2001 on a pro-Russian platform that included joining a joint customs union, making Russian an official state language, and several positions that would surface in the Kozak memorandum.
Then in late 2003, under great pressure from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's chairmanship and others, he killed the Kozak memorandum -- a very difficult decision that likely went against his instincts and preferences. This led to several years of pro-European jaw-boning as Russian troop and armament withdrawals stopped.
But there was little concrete action on reform as Chisinau shopped around its own comprehensive "package" plan for Transdniester settlement to the Kremlin. When it became abundantly clear that this approach wasn't going to fly and with elections approaching, Voronin, ever mindful of remaining relevant in the face of term limits, bent again toward Moscow.
So if Voronin stays in power, it shouldn't be surprising if down the road he changes vectors again. After all, as the Kremlin often reminds, it is a multipolar world. Time will tell whether, like Big Daddy Unruh, Vladimir Voronin has the fortitude to look a man square in the eye, take his money, and then vote against him."
Louis O’Neill was White House fellow to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2004 to 2005 and OSCE ambassador and head of mission to Moldova from 2006 to 2008. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.
Commentary
Moscow Plays It Smart In Moldova, As Others Dither
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A brief comment by Vlad Lupan to this article of Louis O'Neill, published by RFE/RL on June 29, 2009:
Russia proves again it can move fast to support the people they need in the former USSR space in electoral situations. Kremlin does it for its ends, of course. Should we watch and be "careful" (in my dictionary this means do as little as possible). Russian involvement was seen in previous elections in Ukraine and is repeatedly the case in Moldova. The EU reacted in Ukraine, US as well. Why Moldova is different? We do remember Ukraine's neighbours coming to visit Moldova's eastern neighbour. Moldova now is itself an Eastern Neighbour of EU - the Eastern Partnership was just launched and... In US everyone is still on the "reset" button.
Louis O'Neill gives us his perception on how the Moldovan Communist party, EU and US are acting under such circumstances, and gives us food-for-thought on what should be done.
I agree with this perception and I allow myself to say two things:
1. Moldova is an EU neighbour and no one can hide from that. EU can still make a difference in Moldova, at least to avoid a headache and avoid a second Belarus, or "belarussisation" of Moldova. Is it not EU's interest or perhaps other interests like Russia prevail?
2. Mr. Obama - reset the reset button! Its already time to face the realities, not expectations.
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Read O'Neill article in full on Radio Free Europe at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/Moscow_Plays_It_Smart_In_Moldova_As_Others_Dither/1765163.html
Or, to read it on my blog, just click on Read More there ->.
June 29, 2009
By Louis O'Neill
The "Big Daddy" of U.S. Democratic Party politics in the 1960s and '70s, Jesse Unruh, had a wonderfully ribald saying about the role of money and influence in the business of government: "If you can't drink a lobbyist's whiskey, take his money, sleep with his women, and still vote against him in the morning, you don't belong in politics."
Moldova's Big Daddy, acting President Vladimir Voronin, recently held meetings in Moscow with vastly bigger daddies: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Voronin expressed gratitude for the Kremlin's singular support of Moldova's Communists following the chaos and violence after the April 5 elections and reiterated his view that "colored revolutions" and "foreign interference" have no place in the Republic of Moldova.
In return for this seeming fealty, Voronin arrived home to announce massive Russian financial support for Moldova just one month before the controversial repeat parliamentary elections scheduled there for July 29.
Voronin described the half-billion-dollar loan as a "political decision" by Moscow. Although the details will be "discussed by experts" later on, Voronin quickly suggested the money would go to repairing and building roads, gas grids, irrigation networks, and "finishing houses," whatever that might mean.
For his part, Putin said, "We believe it's possible...the first tranche [of $150 million] could reach Moldova within the next six weeks or two months." At the same time, Putin made a powerfully symbolic gesture in granting $20 million for the reconstruction of Moldova's burned-out parliament, the destruction of which during the April postelection rioting angered Moldovans of all political persuasions. And as a bonus, Russia apparently lifted all previous restrictions on agricultural exports from Moldova.
EU Outmaneuvered
Voronin and Putin have used this visit and this announcement to tactically outmaneuver their respective rivals once again. Just as before the April elections, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov bucked up the Moldovan Communists with his first visit to Chisinau in eight years, with this trip Voronin has shown himself to average voters as a man of action who is respected by serious leaders and brings home the bacon.
No matter that the first dollar won't be dispatched, if at all, until after the Moldovan elections, because the implicit hint to the electorate is that "if you vote for the Communists, you will get your house finished."
By conditioning the money on the outcome of the vote, Moscow has essentially secured a free option on Voronin and his Communists' mini-vertical of power, while at the same time blowing wind into their sails for the campaign.
If they win, the Russian money flows and then the Kremlin exacts its yet-unknown price, which may include something as comprehensive as a Transdniester settlement along the lines of the 2003 Kozak memorandum or piecemeal elements like military basing rights in Transdniester, Russian as an official state language in Moldova, or assurances that under no conditions will the European Union Border Assistance Monitoring Mission be renewed. If the opposition somehow prevails, then the money spigot is turned off and both Voronin and Putin blame the policies of the new government for alienating Russian help.
Much as in Pikalyovo recently, Putin has swooped in to save the day with timely financial intervention. Only this time the whipping boy was not a down-on-his-luck oligarch strangling a one-company town, but, by implication, the EU's entire brand-new Eastern Partnership, launched on May 7. Russia has shown itself to be far more flexible and responsive to "eastern partner" Moldova than Brussels, and without all those vexing human rights obligations and endless EU technical reporting requirements to file.
Faced with the biggest upheaval in Moldova since the Transdniester conflict itself, the EU has essentially ceded the field. While Putin has offered loans equaling about 12 percent of Moldova's gross domestic product during the depths of a world economic crisis, the best the EU could muster recently was encouragement that Moldova continue to reform its legal system. While without doubt a vital step, such "concrete ideas for enhancing our relationship" (as the Eastern Partnership website contemplates) need to be matched with equally concrete, sustained, hands-on help.
Turning East, For Now
Putin's bold financial move also contrasted dramatically with the departure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from Moldova in early June. Citing "instability" in the country and the "provisional character" of the current government, the IMF decided to postpone until fall negotiations on a new financial program for Moldova.
Voronin, with Russian aid securely in his pocket, let loose with the kind of earthy comments that are increasingly characterizing his public statements. He claimed that the IMF left Moldova "as a woman leaves her husband who is acting badly," adding that "this is the second time that they are going.... They left in 2001 and then they returned in 2004 and asked how we achieved such success. We managed because you were not here. They thought we'd just roll over and die. Someone else here is calling the shots."
This last comment was a parting slap not only at Brussels, but at Washington, which has also been remarkably quiet on Moldova. This appears to be due to delays in assembling President Barack Obama's foreign-policy team, the rhetoric of "reset," and careful calibration in advance of the Obama-Medvedev meeting in Moscow in July. Whatever the reason, the Kremlin has noticed it and is acting accordingly.
But anyone who thinks Voronin's latest turn to the east portends a permanent shift should take a close look at recent history. In the last eight years, Voronin has already tacked back and forth several times between Russian orientation and European integration. He was elected in 2001 on a pro-Russian platform that included joining a joint customs union, making Russian an official state language, and several positions that would surface in the Kozak memorandum.
Then in late 2003, under great pressure from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's chairmanship and others, he killed the Kozak memorandum -- a very difficult decision that likely went against his instincts and preferences. This led to several years of pro-European jaw-boning as Russian troop and armament withdrawals stopped.
But there was little concrete action on reform as Chisinau shopped around its own comprehensive "package" plan for Transdniester settlement to the Kremlin. When it became abundantly clear that this approach wasn't going to fly and with elections approaching, Voronin, ever mindful of remaining relevant in the face of term limits, bent again toward Moscow.
So if Voronin stays in power, it shouldn't be surprising if down the road he changes vectors again. After all, as the Kremlin often reminds, it is a multipolar world. Time will tell whether, like Big Daddy Unruh, Vladimir Voronin has the fortitude to look a man square in the eye, take his money, and then vote against him."
Louis O’Neill was White House fellow to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2004 to 2005 and OSCE ambassador and head of mission to Moldova from 2006 to 2008. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.
Stiffening Moldova's judiciary
Louis O'Neill, 29 - 06 - 2009openDemocracy and the author have released the content if this article under a Creative Commons license.
Moldova's byzantine politics needs disciplining. If the courts were bolder, they could do it. But how to create an independent judiciary? Louis O'Neill has suggestions
Read this article at OpenDemocracy:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/article/stiffening-moldovas-judiciary
Friday, May 29, 2009
После событий 7 апреля ПКРМ трудно получить «золотой голос» оппозиции
Внимание! Этот блог-пост был опубликован еще 27 мая и думаю остается актуальным, особенно перед вторым раундом голосований перенесенным на 3 июня 2009 г. А ведь сейчас столько спекуляций по поводу того что вот-вот найдется "предатель". Почему мне кажется что его не будет (все мы можем ошибатся, но...) читайте в этом коментарии:
Евразийский Дом
Информационно-Аналитический Портал
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026
После событий 7 апреля ПКРМ трудно получить «золотой голос» оппозиции
Влад Лупан, Независимый эксперт, политический комментатор, Кишинев
Евразийский Дом: «Почему правящей Партии коммунистов не удалось привлечь на свою сторону часть оппозиции (получить «золотой голос») для избрания своего кандидата Президентом Республики Молдова?»
Очень сложно сегодня говорить о возможности «привлечения» молдавской оппозиции на сторону коммунистов. Вероятность такого сценария очень мала, особенно после выборов 2005 года, когда Коммунистическая партия доказала, что она неспособна ни к демократическому правлению, ни к политическим компромиссам. Четыре года назад несколько партий проголосовали за коммунистов, поставив перед ПКРМ 10 условий для реализации процесса демократизации. Однако эти условия выполнены не были, а партии, согласившиеся пойти на компромисс с ПКРМ, или стали практически филиалами Компартии, или не прошли в парламент после выборов в апреле 2009 г.
После 2005 г. в Республике Молдова была установлена вертикаль власти, что подтвердило подозрения оппозиции о том, что Компартия применяет российскую практику подчинения разных политических партий одной платформе. Установление контроля над силовыми структурами, а также финансовая и пропагандистская «война», которую развязала Компартия Молдовы после 2005 г. против тех партий, которые не вошли в ее коалицию, довела страну до ситуации, когда общество сильно поляризовалось до выборов в 2009 г.
Пытки, устроенные полицией над арестованными участниками демонстрации 7 апреля, а также угроза в адрес лидеров оппозиции, которых обвиняют в попытке организации путча, тюремным заключением в 25 лет – все это доказывает, что Компартия не готова идти ни на демократизацию, ни на политические уступки.
--------------------------------
Продолжение на портале:
"Евразийский Дом"
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026
Или жмите Read More далее и читайте все->:
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После пыток тех, кто проголосовал за либеральные партии на выборах 5 апреля, любая из трех партий, которая бы проголосовала за коммунистического кандидата, потеряла бы свой электорат, как это произошло с партиями, которые пошли на коалицию с Компартией после выборов 2005 г. Когда три либеральные партии говорят о серьезных фальсификациях на последних парламентских выборах, для них также встает вопрос о легитимности этих выборов и их результатов.
Еще в 2005 г. я спрашивал одного из организаторов тех переговоров: «Каковы гарантии того, что Компартия выполнит условия по демократизации, так как выход из такой коалиции будет проблематичным?». Поведение коммунистов показало, что они рассчитывали именно на такой среднесрочный сценарий. Условия не были выполнены, что послужило еще одним сигналом того, что и переговоры в 2009 г. между ПКРМ и оппозицией не будут результативными для последней.
Картина не будет полной, если не упомянуть того факта, что Компартия попыталась подкупить, а затем и запугать некоторых либеральных парламентариев. Сейчас эти парламентарии говорят о том, что после 28 мая они объявят данные о давлении на детей некоторых депутатов. В сложившейся моральной и соответственно политической ситуации в стране такой подход Компартии контрпродуктивен.
Ситуация сплотила ряды либералов, и они защитили своих партийных товарищей. В одном из случаев, предположительно, одного из либеральных депутатов и его семью коллеги вывезли за пределы Молдовы. Это является показателем того, что либералы не видят другого выхода из ситуации, а также осознают, что при жестком и бескомпромиссном подходе со стороны Компартии их единственный выход – сплотить ряды и добиваться досрочных выборов.
Евразийский Дом: «Возможен ли компромисс 28 мая между коммунистами и оппозицией? Или все-таки вероятен вариант досрочных выборов?»
Компартия попытается перетянуть одну из либеральных фракций на свою сторону 28 мая. Предположительно, должность президента могла быть предметом торга между ПКРМ и этой фракцией. При этом понятно, что лидер коммунистов Владимир Воронин намерен уменьшить прерогативы будущего президента, сделав его незначительной фигурой. Таким образом, позиция президента не является важной, а для такой партии либералов лучшей альтернативой является ее слияние с другой либеральной партией. Компартия своим поведением может подвигнуть к такому слиянию и усилить либеральный электорат перед досрочными выборами.
Таким образом, компромисс, скорее всего, невозможен, так как коммунисты не оставили либералам лазейки, чистого морального политического выхода, который был бы приемлем для либеральных выборщиков.
Также остается открытым вопрос гарантий, отсутствие конкретного и работающего механизма таковых. Без гарантий не может быть договора ни 28 мая, ни после. Так как 28 мая компромисс, скорее всего, не будет достигнут, такой механизм мог бы быть создан в ситуации досрочных выборов, вероятно, с помощью Европейского Союза. ЕС мог бы посодействовать выходу из сложившейся ситуации, отправив специального посредника высокого ранга для ведения переговоров после 28 мая.
Евразийский Дом: «В случае досрочных выборов, чьи шансы – оппозиции или коммунистов – перспективнее?»
Здесь важными являются несколько факторов:
1. Компартия не будет рисковать второй раз, фальсифицируя результаты досрочных выборов. Соответственно, результаты ПКРМ могут быть, вплоть до десятка процентов, ниже.
2. С другой стороны, коммунисты успешно используют пропагандистскую машину – медиа-холдинг, в который входит в том числе и Молдавское национальное телевидение со 100%-ным покрытием территории страны и большим доверием. Такая ситуация может частично компенсировать потери ПКРМ.
3. С другой стороны, все больше людей получают информацию из других источников информации. Процентное соотношение людей, которые верят в то, что Компартия виновата в беспорядках 7 апреля, растет довольно быстро. Это опять может снизить процент популярности коммунистов.
4. Экономический кризис, вероятно, ударит по стране уже в июне 2009 г. Люди вспомнят осенние заявления премьер-министра о том, что в Молдове кризиса нет и не будет. Ответственность за отсутствие антикризисной программы ляжет на Компартию. С другой стороны, Компартия попытается переложить вину на Запад и на либералов, a последних обвинят в том, что они блокируют политические решения в условиях экономического краха. В то же время, вероятнее всего, Компартия утвердит новый состав правительства, прежде чем будет распущен парламент. Эта ситуация все-таки может изменить процентное соотношение в пользу либералов.
5. Компартия попытается использовать государственные финансовые ресурсы для своей кампании. Это даст ей определенное, хотя и небольшое, преимущество.
6. Есть еще один фактор – явка на выборах. Предыдущий опыт показывает, что добиться высокой явки на выборах летом очень проблематично. Возможно, встанет вопрос о проведении досрочных выборов осенью, хотя это и противоречит закону. Чем больше времени пройдет до новых выборов, тем больше либералы успеют распространить информацию о событиях 7 апреля, даже при сильной медиа-пропаганде коммунистов.
С другой стороны, в Молдове досрочные выборы могут быть проведены только один раз в год. Если новые выборы не будут признаны из-за неявки избирателей или по другим причинам, существует опасность что коммунистический Президент Владимир Воронин останется без парламента в течение полугода. Однако этот сценарий неприемлем ни для кого, даже для Компартии, так как тогда отношения с европейскими структурами испортятся окончательно. В принципе, маловероятно, что такое развитие ситуации будет одобрено Европой или США.
Можно привести еще несколько факторов, а также сценариев развития ситуации, в зависимости от вовлеченности Европейского Союза или России в дела Молдовы. Тем не менее, серьезно возрастает вероятность того, что в случае проведения повторных выборов в парламент коммунисты и оппозиционные партии разделят голоса избирателей поровну.
Влад ЛУПАН ранее занимал должность Директора Управления НАТО в Министерстве иностранных дел Республики Молдова, был официальным переговорщиком в приднестровском урегулировании, участвовал в трех Миссиях ОБСЕ (Грузия/Ю.Осетия, Албания, Хорватия)
27 мая 2009 г.
Евразийский Дом
Информационно-Аналитический Портал
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026
После событий 7 апреля ПКРМ трудно получить «золотой голос» оппозиции
Влад Лупан, Независимый эксперт, политический комментатор, Кишинев
Евразийский Дом: «Почему правящей Партии коммунистов не удалось привлечь на свою сторону часть оппозиции (получить «золотой голос») для избрания своего кандидата Президентом Республики Молдова?»
Очень сложно сегодня говорить о возможности «привлечения» молдавской оппозиции на сторону коммунистов. Вероятность такого сценария очень мала, особенно после выборов 2005 года, когда Коммунистическая партия доказала, что она неспособна ни к демократическому правлению, ни к политическим компромиссам. Четыре года назад несколько партий проголосовали за коммунистов, поставив перед ПКРМ 10 условий для реализации процесса демократизации. Однако эти условия выполнены не были, а партии, согласившиеся пойти на компромисс с ПКРМ, или стали практически филиалами Компартии, или не прошли в парламент после выборов в апреле 2009 г.
После 2005 г. в Республике Молдова была установлена вертикаль власти, что подтвердило подозрения оппозиции о том, что Компартия применяет российскую практику подчинения разных политических партий одной платформе. Установление контроля над силовыми структурами, а также финансовая и пропагандистская «война», которую развязала Компартия Молдовы после 2005 г. против тех партий, которые не вошли в ее коалицию, довела страну до ситуации, когда общество сильно поляризовалось до выборов в 2009 г.
Пытки, устроенные полицией над арестованными участниками демонстрации 7 апреля, а также угроза в адрес лидеров оппозиции, которых обвиняют в попытке организации путча, тюремным заключением в 25 лет – все это доказывает, что Компартия не готова идти ни на демократизацию, ни на политические уступки.
--------------------------------
Продолжение на портале:
"Евразийский Дом"
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026
Или жмите Read More далее и читайте все->:
-------------------------------
После пыток тех, кто проголосовал за либеральные партии на выборах 5 апреля, любая из трех партий, которая бы проголосовала за коммунистического кандидата, потеряла бы свой электорат, как это произошло с партиями, которые пошли на коалицию с Компартией после выборов 2005 г. Когда три либеральные партии говорят о серьезных фальсификациях на последних парламентских выборах, для них также встает вопрос о легитимности этих выборов и их результатов.
Еще в 2005 г. я спрашивал одного из организаторов тех переговоров: «Каковы гарантии того, что Компартия выполнит условия по демократизации, так как выход из такой коалиции будет проблематичным?». Поведение коммунистов показало, что они рассчитывали именно на такой среднесрочный сценарий. Условия не были выполнены, что послужило еще одним сигналом того, что и переговоры в 2009 г. между ПКРМ и оппозицией не будут результативными для последней.
Картина не будет полной, если не упомянуть того факта, что Компартия попыталась подкупить, а затем и запугать некоторых либеральных парламентариев. Сейчас эти парламентарии говорят о том, что после 28 мая они объявят данные о давлении на детей некоторых депутатов. В сложившейся моральной и соответственно политической ситуации в стране такой подход Компартии контрпродуктивен.
Ситуация сплотила ряды либералов, и они защитили своих партийных товарищей. В одном из случаев, предположительно, одного из либеральных депутатов и его семью коллеги вывезли за пределы Молдовы. Это является показателем того, что либералы не видят другого выхода из ситуации, а также осознают, что при жестком и бескомпромиссном подходе со стороны Компартии их единственный выход – сплотить ряды и добиваться досрочных выборов.
Евразийский Дом: «Возможен ли компромисс 28 мая между коммунистами и оппозицией? Или все-таки вероятен вариант досрочных выборов?»
Компартия попытается перетянуть одну из либеральных фракций на свою сторону 28 мая. Предположительно, должность президента могла быть предметом торга между ПКРМ и этой фракцией. При этом понятно, что лидер коммунистов Владимир Воронин намерен уменьшить прерогативы будущего президента, сделав его незначительной фигурой. Таким образом, позиция президента не является важной, а для такой партии либералов лучшей альтернативой является ее слияние с другой либеральной партией. Компартия своим поведением может подвигнуть к такому слиянию и усилить либеральный электорат перед досрочными выборами.
Таким образом, компромисс, скорее всего, невозможен, так как коммунисты не оставили либералам лазейки, чистого морального политического выхода, который был бы приемлем для либеральных выборщиков.
Также остается открытым вопрос гарантий, отсутствие конкретного и работающего механизма таковых. Без гарантий не может быть договора ни 28 мая, ни после. Так как 28 мая компромисс, скорее всего, не будет достигнут, такой механизм мог бы быть создан в ситуации досрочных выборов, вероятно, с помощью Европейского Союза. ЕС мог бы посодействовать выходу из сложившейся ситуации, отправив специального посредника высокого ранга для ведения переговоров после 28 мая.
Евразийский Дом: «В случае досрочных выборов, чьи шансы – оппозиции или коммунистов – перспективнее?»
Здесь важными являются несколько факторов:
1. Компартия не будет рисковать второй раз, фальсифицируя результаты досрочных выборов. Соответственно, результаты ПКРМ могут быть, вплоть до десятка процентов, ниже.
2. С другой стороны, коммунисты успешно используют пропагандистскую машину – медиа-холдинг, в который входит в том числе и Молдавское национальное телевидение со 100%-ным покрытием территории страны и большим доверием. Такая ситуация может частично компенсировать потери ПКРМ.
3. С другой стороны, все больше людей получают информацию из других источников информации. Процентное соотношение людей, которые верят в то, что Компартия виновата в беспорядках 7 апреля, растет довольно быстро. Это опять может снизить процент популярности коммунистов.
4. Экономический кризис, вероятно, ударит по стране уже в июне 2009 г. Люди вспомнят осенние заявления премьер-министра о том, что в Молдове кризиса нет и не будет. Ответственность за отсутствие антикризисной программы ляжет на Компартию. С другой стороны, Компартия попытается переложить вину на Запад и на либералов, a последних обвинят в том, что они блокируют политические решения в условиях экономического краха. В то же время, вероятнее всего, Компартия утвердит новый состав правительства, прежде чем будет распущен парламент. Эта ситуация все-таки может изменить процентное соотношение в пользу либералов.
5. Компартия попытается использовать государственные финансовые ресурсы для своей кампании. Это даст ей определенное, хотя и небольшое, преимущество.
6. Есть еще один фактор – явка на выборах. Предыдущий опыт показывает, что добиться высокой явки на выборах летом очень проблематично. Возможно, встанет вопрос о проведении досрочных выборов осенью, хотя это и противоречит закону. Чем больше времени пройдет до новых выборов, тем больше либералы успеют распространить информацию о событиях 7 апреля, даже при сильной медиа-пропаганде коммунистов.
С другой стороны, в Молдове досрочные выборы могут быть проведены только один раз в год. Если новые выборы не будут признаны из-за неявки избирателей или по другим причинам, существует опасность что коммунистический Президент Владимир Воронин останется без парламента в течение полугода. Однако этот сценарий неприемлем ни для кого, даже для Компартии, так как тогда отношения с европейскими структурами испортятся окончательно. В принципе, маловероятно, что такое развитие ситуации будет одобрено Европой или США.
Можно привести еще несколько факторов, а также сценариев развития ситуации, в зависимости от вовлеченности Европейского Союза или России в дела Молдовы. Тем не менее, серьезно возрастает вероятность того, что в случае проведения повторных выборов в парламент коммунисты и оппозиционные партии разделят голоса избирателей поровну.
Влад ЛУПАН ранее занимал должность Директора Управления НАТО в Министерстве иностранных дел Республики Молдова, был официальным переговорщиком в приднестровском урегулировании, участвовал в трех Миссиях ОБСЕ (Грузия/Ю.Осетия, Албания, Хорватия)
27 мая 2009 г.
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Ahead of EU-Russia summit - tit-for-tat comments on Moldova by Russian Presidenetial advisor Prihodko
Ahead of EU-Russia summit - comments on Moldova by Russian Presidential advisor Prihodko - messages show tit-for-tat, sphere of influence, scaring EU, distracting attention
How Russia is achieving its goals?
1. By supporting the Communist party in Moldova that showed sufficient devotion to Kremlin. Link that to the spheres of influence speeches by Lavrov and in times of Eastern Partnership, as well as discussion with Polish foreign minister. Are Moldovan communists convenient in terms of maintaining tense relations with Romania, one of the EU country, as well as maintaining the necessary situation in Transnistria, as well as in its relations with Ukraine - the answer is a clear yes, in my opinion.
2. By distracting the attention from Moldova's affairs to Romania. That's Russian perception, well fed by the Moldovan Communist party, that Moldova is under threat from Romania. Exaggerating the Romanian statement makes things easier in exaggerated approach to negotiations - one raises the level of requests and basically knows there will be a some form of excuse for Romanian president's statements - very good for Russia, EU thus recognising its "guilt", as Kremlin usually interprets such promises.
3. Relations with EU and the sphere of influence is still in place - Russia conditions the discussion of Moldovan (via Romanian topic) affairs against EU suggestions to discuss Georgia-Russia relations. Trade-off politics that I mentioned as main Russian foreign policy, on whatever topic.
Distracting the attention from real Moldovan problems, somehow warning against any intervention in Moldova - Russian sphere of influence, conditioning the discussion of the questions regarding the area, etc, supporting negative implications on regional and international level - that's what Russia does well.
EU and its soft power? I think I don't have to wait the results of this Khabarovsk summit to predict.
Vlad Lupan
P.S. Click on Read more to see the news in Russian with Prihodko's statements:
РИА Новости. Главные новости часа.
Рубрика: Политика
Сюжет: Саммит Россия - ЕС в Хабаровске
Россия на саммите РФ-ЕС обсудит поддержку Западом политики Саакашвили
20/05/200918:44
МОСКВА, 20 мая - РИА Новости. Россия на предстоящем 21-22 мая в Хабаровске саммите Россия-ЕС намерена обсудить проблему поддержки со стороны Запада политики президента Грузии Михаила Саакашвили и вопрос ответственности Евросоюза за внешнюю политику его отдельных стран, которые нарушают единые стандарты, сообщил в среду журналистам помощник президента РФ Сергей Приходько.
По его словам, представители ЕС предложили поднять на саммите тему ситуации на Кавказе и обсудить отношения России и Грузии. Российская сторона не против обсудить эти вопросы, сказал Приходько.
"У нас есть что у них спросить: во что материализуется длительная безоглядная поддержка товарища Саакашвили? Что они по этому вопросу думают? Тем более что оппозиционное движение в Грузии отчетливо продемонстрировало степень невосприятия его политики, как внутренней, так и внешней", - сказал он.
Грузинские войска в ночь на 8 августа 2008 года развязали боевые действия в Южной Осетии. Цхинвали был практически разрушен, погибли мирные жители, миротворцы. Россия была вынуждена ответить Грузии силой, а затем признала независимость Южной Осетии и другой бывшей грузинской автономии - Абхазии. Тбилиси объявил Абхазию и Южную Осетию оккупированными территориями и разорвал дипотношения с Россией. Сейчас российские пограничники, согласно двусторонним договоренностям с каждой из республик, приступают к охране их границ с Грузией.
По словам Приходько, на саммите при обсуждении международных вопросов планируется обменяться мнениями о конфликтах в Европе, в том числе по вопросам кипрского урегулирования и косовской проблеме. Кроме того, по его данным, в этом блоке вопросов планируется обсудить проблемы, связанные с Молдавией и Приднестровьем.
"У нас тоже есть вопросы к нашим коллегам", - сказал он.
Помощник президента РФ напомнил о недавних событиях в Кишиневе, когда после однозначного признания международными наблюдателями легитимности прошедших там выборов, "Румыния по сути целенаправленно, не стесняясь, подливая масло в огонь, спровоцировала выступления молодежных групп и движений, которые вылились в погромы".
"Мы спрашивали и будем спрашивать партнеров из Евросоюза, несут ли они ответственность за то, что их отдельные члены делают, ставя под вопрос послевоенное мироустройство и границы", - сказал помощник главы государства.
Приходько пояснил, что российская сторона имеет право поднимать этот вопрос точно так же, как Запад - проблему отношений России с Грузией.
"Нам не нравится очень, что против одного из государств СНГ, с которым у нас дружеские отношения, (велась подобная политика)... они так, стыдливо потупив очи, смотрели, как румынские спецслужбы, используя различные методы, стимулировали эти различные безобразия", - сказал помощник президента РФ.
"Готов ли нести Евросоюз ответственность за внешнюю политику, или только будут спрашивать нас про Иран, про другие проблемы? А здесь, в Европе, они готовы с такими же стандартами относиться к недопустимым действиям?", - сказал он.
Приходько подчеркнул, что российская сторона не нацелена на конфронтацию, но хотела бы серьезно обсудить эти вопросы.
http://www.rian.ru/politics/20090520/171728749.html
How Russia is achieving its goals?
1. By supporting the Communist party in Moldova that showed sufficient devotion to Kremlin. Link that to the spheres of influence speeches by Lavrov and in times of Eastern Partnership, as well as discussion with Polish foreign minister. Are Moldovan communists convenient in terms of maintaining tense relations with Romania, one of the EU country, as well as maintaining the necessary situation in Transnistria, as well as in its relations with Ukraine - the answer is a clear yes, in my opinion.
2. By distracting the attention from Moldova's affairs to Romania. That's Russian perception, well fed by the Moldovan Communist party, that Moldova is under threat from Romania. Exaggerating the Romanian statement makes things easier in exaggerated approach to negotiations - one raises the level of requests and basically knows there will be a some form of excuse for Romanian president's statements - very good for Russia, EU thus recognising its "guilt", as Kremlin usually interprets such promises.
3. Relations with EU and the sphere of influence is still in place - Russia conditions the discussion of Moldovan (via Romanian topic) affairs against EU suggestions to discuss Georgia-Russia relations. Trade-off politics that I mentioned as main Russian foreign policy, on whatever topic.
Distracting the attention from real Moldovan problems, somehow warning against any intervention in Moldova - Russian sphere of influence, conditioning the discussion of the questions regarding the area, etc, supporting negative implications on regional and international level - that's what Russia does well.
EU and its soft power? I think I don't have to wait the results of this Khabarovsk summit to predict.
Vlad Lupan
P.S. Click on Read more to see the news in Russian with Prihodko's statements:
РИА Новости. Главные новости часа.
Рубрика: Политика
Сюжет: Саммит Россия - ЕС в Хабаровске
Россия на саммите РФ-ЕС обсудит поддержку Западом политики Саакашвили
20/05/200918:44
МОСКВА, 20 мая - РИА Новости. Россия на предстоящем 21-22 мая в Хабаровске саммите Россия-ЕС намерена обсудить проблему поддержки со стороны Запада политики президента Грузии Михаила Саакашвили и вопрос ответственности Евросоюза за внешнюю политику его отдельных стран, которые нарушают единые стандарты, сообщил в среду журналистам помощник президента РФ Сергей Приходько.
По его словам, представители ЕС предложили поднять на саммите тему ситуации на Кавказе и обсудить отношения России и Грузии. Российская сторона не против обсудить эти вопросы, сказал Приходько.
"У нас есть что у них спросить: во что материализуется длительная безоглядная поддержка товарища Саакашвили? Что они по этому вопросу думают? Тем более что оппозиционное движение в Грузии отчетливо продемонстрировало степень невосприятия его политики, как внутренней, так и внешней", - сказал он.
Грузинские войска в ночь на 8 августа 2008 года развязали боевые действия в Южной Осетии. Цхинвали был практически разрушен, погибли мирные жители, миротворцы. Россия была вынуждена ответить Грузии силой, а затем признала независимость Южной Осетии и другой бывшей грузинской автономии - Абхазии. Тбилиси объявил Абхазию и Южную Осетию оккупированными территориями и разорвал дипотношения с Россией. Сейчас российские пограничники, согласно двусторонним договоренностям с каждой из республик, приступают к охране их границ с Грузией.
По словам Приходько, на саммите при обсуждении международных вопросов планируется обменяться мнениями о конфликтах в Европе, в том числе по вопросам кипрского урегулирования и косовской проблеме. Кроме того, по его данным, в этом блоке вопросов планируется обсудить проблемы, связанные с Молдавией и Приднестровьем.
"У нас тоже есть вопросы к нашим коллегам", - сказал он.
Помощник президента РФ напомнил о недавних событиях в Кишиневе, когда после однозначного признания международными наблюдателями легитимности прошедших там выборов, "Румыния по сути целенаправленно, не стесняясь, подливая масло в огонь, спровоцировала выступления молодежных групп и движений, которые вылились в погромы".
"Мы спрашивали и будем спрашивать партнеров из Евросоюза, несут ли они ответственность за то, что их отдельные члены делают, ставя под вопрос послевоенное мироустройство и границы", - сказал помощник главы государства.
Приходько пояснил, что российская сторона имеет право поднимать этот вопрос точно так же, как Запад - проблему отношений России с Грузией.
"Нам не нравится очень, что против одного из государств СНГ, с которым у нас дружеские отношения, (велась подобная политика)... они так, стыдливо потупив очи, смотрели, как румынские спецслужбы, используя различные методы, стимулировали эти различные безобразия", - сказал помощник президента РФ.
"Готов ли нести Евросоюз ответственность за внешнюю политику, или только будут спрашивать нас про Иран, про другие проблемы? А здесь, в Европе, они готовы с такими же стандартами относиться к недопустимым действиям?", - сказал он.
Приходько подчеркнул, что российская сторона не нацелена на конфронтацию, но хотела бы серьезно обсудить эти вопросы.
http://www.rian.ru/politics/20090520/171728749.html
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