Sunday, October 27, 2019

Butina’s release seen as US weakness


October 27, 2019

On October 26 media reported that Maria Butina, a Russian citizen convicted for working for the Russian government, was released from an US jail, deported and returned to Russia.[1] She walked out smiling, escorted by the Spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was met with flowers from the interviewing Russian media. She came home as a martyr, hence, in Russian thinking, as a hero.

‘Innocent because of the term’
The presence of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson is logical in Russian perception, since they have been long advocating for Butina’s release, showing her as an unsuspecting young woman, who simply wanted to help her country.[2] Her photos with an AK[3], which would not be given to her, unless authorized by the State, as well as the clear contacts revealed in the investigation and her direct confession in a clandestine influence scheme working for the Russian Government[4], are disregarded as forced confessions.[5] Yet torture is understandable in Russia, where it is used in some cases that, however, involve important money, such as Magnitsky case[6].

Hence, letting Butina go after what in Russia is considered, as a country where prison slang penetrates regular day to day language[7], a too short of a term for an actual spying activity. One of the shortest publicly known prison terms for spies was given to Sergei Skripal, due to him being exchanged for a Russian spy. Despite the exchange he was never forgiven and an assassination attempt was carried by the Russian Military Intelligence GRU in UK, where he lived in retirement.[8]

‘Foreign agent vs Foreign agent’
USA provisions on lobbying also assume that foreigners lobbying in US should register as foreign agents[9]. There is only one perception in the former USSR to the notions of “agent” and especially “foreign agent”. It will be inevitably perceived as a secret service operative, hence the idea to reciprocate in Russia had a different meaning.[10] So, from the Russian perspective Butina was not a foreign agent and her punishment was unjust to her and directed against Russia exclusively, regardless of the administration that runs the US Government.

‘Butina is no Chapman, she is to be depicted as a rightful example to follow and… recruit’
Another element is that Butina is most probably not going to be seen as a clone of Anna Chapman. Chapman was what would probably amount to a “sparrow” as depicted by in US spy movies.[11] Chapman would not necessarily strike Eastern Europeans as a particularly beautiful lady, yet she probably would be considered at least well appointed, and therefore indeed attractive, while Butina would not. Butina would probably be perceived as a young righteous geek, which is confirmed exactly by the remarks of the Russian MFA Spokesperson Zaharova “She really did no harm to anybody. She’s just a girl, she’s just a young woman. She tried to invest her youth, if you wish, her gift, her talent, into people-to-people contacts.”[12]

Releasing Butina after a very short term will result in the Russian public perception that she was not spying and she was punished “unjustly.” Butina, therefore, returns as a martyr and, in Russian perception, as a hero. The release of Butina under these circumstances created another almost spy personality in Russia, not quite Anna Chapman, to follow and be an example, just like communist children heroes[13] of old.[14] Butina has the potential to become the correct and righteous young martyr-hero for the Russian youth for further heroization and recruitment, adding to the internal narrative that the US is battling Russian in the world. This will continue to motivate Russians to believe that public US narratives are fake and they will continue to believe that they have to stave off USA, just like the Russian private military contractor commander of the infamous Vagner group that attacked US troops in Syria said.[15]

‘Russia thinks it won the info warfare’
The release will also add to the Russian reasoning that they should continue the “information warfare” against USA. EUvsDisinfo reported in 2018 that Margarita Simonyan, the Chief Editor of RT (formerly Russia Today), openly recognized that RT is needed “for about the same reason as why the country needs a Defense Ministry.” RT is capable of “conducting information war against the whole Western world,” using “the information weapon” Simonyan has explained.” [16]

Russians, including their leaders, would not care about President Trump that much, as Moscow’s media depicts him negatively as well, depending on circumstances, as one can gather from Julia Davis reports on Russian media on Twitter.[17] It does not mean that they lack interest. It means that in the long run, USA is an enemy for them, as they depict it in their media, dedicating to USA several negative or implicitly negative daily news, regardless of the President, as can be seen on their online pages.[18] They will therefore continue their war by other means.

Even with Kremlin public narrative advocating for Butina’s innocence, the public in Russia might very well choose the believe that even if Butina was an agent, which would not be disclosed in suh a case, she still managed to “fool the US” thus ensuring a victory for the US, for a small price, boosting the morale of the Russian structures and public, strengthening the confidence in their ‘master spy’, President Putin.

Such a negative trend is unfortunate and cannot inspire optimism for the future of Russia, US and particularly Europe. Butina’s case, and release without at least another round of questioning known to public, is an instance that supports the idea that Russian perceptions will continue to differ drastically from US ones, and that Russia will most probably see USA as a weak state that could not ‘properly’ punish a declared foreign agent, unlike they do via GRU poisonings, thus releasing Butina very soon, leaving Washington DC with an image of ‘US shame due to their actions’ and as a result of Kremlin’s pressure in her case and, most importantly, globally. This means that Moscow might have perceived that there still are no incentives to change, least stop, its belligerent approach towards the US and actually supplied ammunition for Kremlin’s information warfare and strengthened the internal coagulation around Putin as a current ‘right leader at the right moment’ for some time. This immediate  time span will cover the period when US will be practically disfunctional for the  next years, due to objective internal political developments, and present other international player more opportunities in the foreign policy.

V. Lupan
Independent expert





Tuesday, September 24, 2019

Ukraine starts the UN - why is it silent about US


By Vlad Lupan, former Ambassador to UN
September 24, NY

Wednesday, September 25 at UN starts with Ukraine, the #1 country in US news

1. Ukraine at UN - most probably will not speak of US issues
Following up on yesterday's post, let's have as look at UN on Wednesday that start with Ukraine, a country dragged(!) right into the middle of an electoral and ethical US scandal. There are even remarks on the Twitter that Ukrainians don't understand the importance of the recent information about the pressure on Zelenski to investigate Biden's son and the whistle-blower report. Well, Nancy Pelosy announced recently that the Democrats will start an impeachment investigation, while POTUs Trump will release a transcript of one of his conversations with President "Ze"

Obviously these continuously belittling remarks that Ukrainians (and consequently all Eastern Europeans) reminds us of the demeaning past attitudes of some Western decision makers when the Eastern Europeans had, at times, to keep silent for their reasons and other times be vocal about the Russian actions. Those very action were already once summarily dismissed by "we know better" reset-style advocates - remember Edwards Lucas', then Editor at The Economist, article in Politico explaining that? The one "Why, Oh Why, Didn’t We Listen to the Eastern Europeans? They told us this could happen" where he rights "Western countries tended to patronize and ignore the easterners. Russia was nothing like the threat of the Soviet Union, or so went the line in Brussels, London, Paris, Berlin and Washington. It was silly to pretend otherwise. The West thought the east Europeans – particularly the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles and Czechs — were traumatized by their historical experience and prone to scaremongering." 
(https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/eastern-europe-vladimir-putin-107094

Unlike US "experts", including new ones speaking zero or close to none Russian, the Eastern Europeans are on the front line, they have already seen whatever happens in the West ten times worse in their region. And, no, not everyone of them wanted to see that or deserved it (which is another "argument" quietly mentioned years ago in some private conversations).

In this case, being silent is not being 'simple' and unlike some "twitter experts', the Ukrainians lived through their more than fair share of Manforts. Remember Manafort operating to support a tycoon, who stole from Ukrainian people, to the point they went on the streets and were shot for it?

Ukrainians were first robbed with the support of a US citizen, and they are still going through an actual real war at this very moment, while receiving military support right now from the same US and at higher levels than during US Democratic Party administration. Obama's administration started a good thing, no doubt, yet the necessary hardware was released only during GOP's administration, even with the current POTUS also "trying" jis own reset, or something like that.  So, they see very well that the political situation in US is tense and the Democrats changed their opinion towards Russia far more than before, especially after the Russian involvement in US elections. They also understand that without that involvement, the Dems standing towards Russia might not have been tough, yet not as tough as it is now. 

And I would assume that they do hope that regardless(!!!) of the administration, they can get help, while they ensure a certain level of security to Europe, NATO members, without paying a dime in contribution to NATO itself, including US troops stationed there. In fact they are buying weaponry from US. So, for them, it's a temporary political game that might not end up well for their country, as one side may decide to blame them for insufficient or excessive involvement, while they need both GOP and Dems on their side, during an actual war in Ukraine. 

I already expressed my opinion on social media that dragging Eastern Europeans in US electoral battles, because "who cares, really" it's "distant country", is counterproductive to US' image as a predictable partner, not only in Ukraine or Eastern Europe, but in the world. 

To conclude the Eastern European angle for tomorrow, Romania will follow Ukraine with more or less the same regional matters, and probably mentioning Republic of Moldova and an even older separatist conflict ignited (and denied) by Russia in Eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova, just like in Ukraine, but... in 1991-1992! This is that very case of rakes of history that I was talking about, when referring to the futile appeasement of the West with an unreformed / undemocratic and even more belligerent then before Russia.

And watch Georgia a bit later, with two separatist conflicts "not started/supported by Russia", as well as Estonia later in the day, for the same regional security reasons. The people who invented Skype, one of the leaders of online electoral voting, but of course also being the part of that group "frustrated by the past" and "lacking understanding" of whatever they need to be belittled of as well, as Eastern Europeans (though actually Nordics). Hope that ex-President Ilves doesn't get upset of what I've just wrote:) Lithuania is very active and managed to import LNG terminals from US to break the with energy dependence from Russia, to follow in the afternoon and the Eastern European angle is concluded by the Central European Czech Republic and Armenia that day.

Have a good evening!

Monday, September 23, 2019

This year expectations for UN General Assembly high level segment - Tuesday


By Vlad Lupan, former Ambassador to UN
September 23, 7.43PM EST, NY

UN on Tuesday, September 24:

As the Climate Action Summit is closing at the UN, it’s hard to say that tomorrow the UN will start its high-level segment of the General Assembly (UNGA). It’s already there. The 74 session actually started earlier. It doesn’t start with the Heads of States, it does it earlier with Ambassadors to UN, and not UN Ambassadors. Those are two different groups. The Ambassadors to UN represent their counties, like US, at UN, while the others are not called UN Ambassadors, yet are, as the Special Representative of the Secretary General, UN Ambassadors.

This whole UNGA week is also not exactly a Summit, as some say, it is just a week out of a year-long session. That’s right, the General Assembly works the whole year round. However, in September all Heads of State, be it Kings and Queens, Presidents or Prime-ministers usually come to express their priorities for their countries and this world, as they see it. Imagine how the world is seen by North Korea, USA, Moldova or Brazil. Anyway, that’s why this is “just” a high-level week of a UN General Assembly 74 session, while the whole session will last till next year and change its President by then too.

Beware, the President of the General Assembly is like a Speaker of the Parliament and the Secretary General is still bound to serve at the pleasure of the member states, as, actually, a Chief Administrative Officer of the UN, and not the boss of the world. That last one, about the Head of the UN being “in charge” is another wrong assumption I hear quite often. It’s the member states and, of course, the most powerful member states, such as US, Russia, China, UK, France, have a stronger voice, unofficially, but voices of Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and others are heard quite well too. Still the UNSG can be a powerful player and at the same time it can depend on states and their five regional groups for re-elections. And the elections of the UNSG are bound to take place next year, so this session may start a bit of circling around the tiny UN meeting booths, as well as UN offices. Everyone is dancing around the idea if the current SG will run again or not.

What happens after the high-level week ends? Head of delegations are transported by their Missions to UN with lots of difficulties for both the diplomats and New York city, in which sometimes both are as frustrated as the others. The delegates will then return to negotiate the texts of climate, development, arms control agreements, and the UN Security Council (UNSC, another abbreviation) members will battle each other over Syria or North Korea and agree on other parts of the world.

Tuesday, September 24 - of course, look out for the number one attraction after Brazil that speaks first. Historically, the first UN Special session and its Second one was chaired by Brazil, hence the first speaker, though rumor has it that no one wanted to be the first speaker and Brazil was the first to go in (and get it over with apparently).

USA - anyway, the next speaker to watch is the POTUS, Donald Trump – I would not expect a serious reiteration of the Monroe doctrine, though some of its points may find the way to POTUS speech again. We should rather wait for a strong focus on Iran and references to the Saudi Arabia situation in the context. Perhaps some focus on North Korea, though I would have expected far less attention to it, due to the expected lack of results.

Usually after the POTUS speech many delegations leave. To an external viewer their departure en masse may be shocking and even disrespectful. However, this is normal due to bilateral meetings that many Heads of State have right after the introductory speeches. This year however, this dynamic will change. Not much, and yet it might, due to the next two speakers.

Egypt and Iran follow immediately after – Egypt is interesting from the Middle Eastern perspective, ISIS and regional security. Iran - for the same reasons and more, including the reply they will give to US.

Later in the day watch for the King of Jordan, who tried his horse trading between Russia and USA, as he put it in an interview where he believed that Moldova will be its object. Surprisingly, US had a coincidence of goals with Russia over Moldova, in a separate effort, with different reasons, yet with one common goal – to unseat a corrupt tycoon – an effort topped by the US Ambassador in a eight minute talk with the tycoon, who then fled Moldova. The point is that the King might not be so familiar with Moldova, yet he is familiar with US and Russia in the Middle East and one can hear from him of some of the zero-sum ideas, circling around the bigger two countries, worth paying attention to.

The South Korean President is next to watch, though with a limited and expected message of security and peace.

However, I would very carefully watch two speakers after the French President Macron, whose new and somewhat unexpected ambitions of a “reset” with Russia (ok, another one, who steps on the same rakes again) may leave some in the US and Eastern Europe extremely unsettled, for what is now a more obvious reasons, unlike during Obama’s Presidency. Also, France is quite important in Africa. Marcon is also representing a country important in the climate change movement.

In the afternoon, from my Eastern European regional concerns perspective, I would wait for Poland to speak - good speaker, clear ideas, knowledge of the area, active and strong player.

At the end of the day the Prime-Minister of New Zealand, who is also in charge of the National Security, will probably speak of the attacks and a more coordinated UN response to the spread of terrorism, including via online means. This small country has a very good, human yet practical approach to matters and sometimes they do take things into their hands at UN level and drive them well.

The evening is crowned by two very interesting or important speakers – PM Abe of Japan, with what could be an anticipated focus on North Korea and on UK’s PM Boris Johnson, who just spoke at the climate summit, on Monday, September 23, how good of a Mayor he was, when talking about understating climate change, in a semblance (to the point of smiles as well) to President Trump’s last year speech how much better the US is since he started his presidency. Yet PM Johnson is interesting to watch, in a way and UK is still a permanent member of the UNSC, with a convoluted Br-exit from the European Union that somewhat dissolves the meaning of the multilateral institutions like UN.

However, POTUS Trump, PM Abe and Pm Johnson will provide us with an insight of how the current leaders view the issues of nationalism, or even populism, and how much does this contradict, in their opinion, the multilateral institutions, such as UN.  Observe discrepancies in their views and correlate that with the internal political developments in the respective countries and even with the size of the countries as well. Coming from a region where a healthy dose of nationalism ensured independence and an unhealthy one, several wars, we are watchful of the balance.

Enjoy UN on Tuesday!

Wednesday, June 26, 2019

Returning Russia to Council of Europe lacking arguments. It will be seen as a Western weakness.

Regarding the voting on the right of Russia to return to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Court for Human Rights.

1. The argument of "return to dialogue with Russia" by Germany and France is severely lacking because:

A. Russia does not recognize that it has annexed Crimea through an armed "referendum", ie on the basis of an occupation, even if followed by a "referendum." Such armed referendums are illegal, a fact neglected by Russia, which in all other international disputes invokes the international law, yet not in this case convenient to Russia. The referendum was, however, illegal under international law, which is contrary to the concept of a rule of law invoked by Russia, local or international.

B. Also, despite the "Minsk" dialogue on Donbas/Eastern Ukraine, Russia continues to occupy Donbass and provide weapons and send troops to the region, controlling the area directly from the Kremlin (Surkov etc) and, obviously, refusing to recognize it - thus refusing dialogue.

C. Also, the dialogue on the latest events /confrontation on Georgia is absent and only threats are heard, which is contrary to the idea of ​​a return to dialogue.

D. Negotiations on the Transnistrian issue in the Republic of Moldova, even in spite of the previous Government concessions on registering the "separatist" cars with "neutral" (no Moldovan flag / marking) car plates and thus offering transport opportunities for Russian investors in the Transnistrian region, are de facto blocked by Russia. Mimicking dialogue, through the presence and direction of proxy "separatists", does not demonstrate the desire for resolutions or dialogue.

E. Russia did not modify its foreign policy and military concepts that allows it unilateral, unsanctioned by UN, intervention. 

2. The argument of Russia opening was overturned immediately after that vote by statements by Russian officials that any subsequent "threat" would have repercussions. This demonstrates not only the refusal to dialogue - rather a continued belligerent policy internally and externally. Apparently  the vote seems to have encouraged Russia and did not open it for dialogue. Taking into account that in International Relations both power politic dynamics and local "individual" factors influence the perceptions of the decision-makers, the CoE vote can be seen by the Kremlin not only as a gain. It can also be seen as a proof of what Russian leaders often propagate as a "decadence" and "weakness" of the West. The vision of "weakness" is completely neglected by the West, which in its own complacency neglects this Russian element in international relations, which is wrong, as reality proves. The same logic is applicable by Kremlin towards the individual voters (national political players) of the resolution.

3. The argument of Russia's return to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems to severely lack the factual situation - this argument suggests that such a return gives a certain percentage of ordinary Russians higher chances to benefit from ECtHR decisions - yet misses the fact that Russia has already adopted national legislation (!) through which it can neglect ECtHR decisions. Thus, this argument in favor of the vote was null ab initio. One should consider that the Kremlin will allow some minor" cases into ECtHR, without a too serious of an impact on general civic freedoms in Russia, to "demonstrate" a so-called "factual democratic attitude." Those who follow the subject understand that such unrepresentative cases are maintained, especially in relatively small numbers compared to the total number of issues, to use them against external critics, but without real impact on human rights at home, followed by "whataboutism" (diverting attention to "what about you violating the rights of... - an argumentation allowing the person/state continue violations, based on mistakes or illegal actions of others - basically, I am equal to "you", so if you stole or destroyed something, why can't I, nevermind the legal implications).

Another argument noted by Alina Polyakova in FT (if I am not mistaken) is the precedent of Russian exclusion for other cases - as, for example, this situation is closely followed by Turkey, with a high number of cases. However, if a country is to self-exclude from ECtHR, just as Russia self-excluded itself from other (military) treaties, due to violating them when those didn't fit its purposes, and blamed the West for it, this argument would not stand in all such cases.

(in absence of time, the only link I am providing is the one on Russian decision to overrule ECtHR decisions - see below)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35007059

Tuesday, April 9, 2019

Moldovan Socialists confirm Dodon's plan for Russian language in Republic of Moldova


By Vlad Lupan
New York, April 9, 2019

Today's press conference of the Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova, informally led by the Moldovan President, Igor Dodon,[i] supports the suspicion that his undeclared and denied plan to place the country under Russian control exists and is still in motion.[ii]

President Dodon returned from another trip to Moscow, after Dmitri Kiseliov, from Russia Today (RT) channel, closely affiliated with the Kremlin’s Presidential administration and on sanctions lists by the West, issued stark warnings[iii] to the Moldovan president to avoid another involvement with the Moldovan Democratic Party leadership and essentially seek a regime change, as Vlad Socor of Jamestown Foundation suggests.[iv] Kremlin dislikes the Democrats, as they played a pro-Western card for a while, even expelling Russian diplomats[v], despite being in a de-facto power sharing with the Socialists.[vi] The Democratic leadership was reported to be involved in the Russian Laundromat scheme[vii] and was also criticized by the European Parliament for state capture.[viii]

The Socialist Party press conference today was organized after RT criticism, post-negotiations with the Democrats and primarily to respond to the invitation of the self-declared pro-Western ACUM (meaning “Now”) block, to oust the Democratic Party in power until recently.[ix]

ACUM previously rejected the pro-Russian Socialist Party invitation to form a joint Government to oust Democrats. Such a Government would have been detrimental to ACUM’s image of anti-corruption and pro-Western party.[x] The block launched a counter-invitation to the Socialists to vote for a minority, ACUM headed, Government, for the same purpose. The Socialist part refused the coalition in today’s press conference and seemingly forwarded a number of conditions for any support to a future government in the Republic of Moldova.

Apparently, as a part of the post electoral positioning in Moldova, ACUM may have lured the Socialists where Dodon’s party openly requested Russian to become the "inter-ethnic" language of the Republic of Moldova, making it the only overall language in a predominantly Romanian speaking Republic of Moldova, where over 80% of the population responds that it speaks Moldovan/Romanian language[xi] (Romanian[xii] is a part of the Romance/Latin language group, where the so-called Moldovan is in fact the same language, as linguists and Encyclopedia Britannica also recognizes[xiii]).

The position of the Socialist Party voiced today, seemingly focused on several points and requests, foreign and linguistic policy related, reflecting previous concerns about Moscow’s goals:
1.      To ensure the Socialists receive the position of the Speaker of the Parliament, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and that of Defense. They also requested return of the Security and Information Service of Moldova (Intelligence Services), currently under Parliamentary oversight, back under the control of the President[xiv], who is their informal leader.
2.      The Socialists are again requesting to refrain from entry into European Union and NATO.
3.      Russian language to have the inter-ethnic tongue statute.
4.      Cancellation of the law restricting the re-broadcasting of certain Russian televisions in Moldova.[xv]
Their first request would put the Russian affiliated Socialists in complete control of both the Presidency and Parliament, Foreign affairs and Defense, as well as the intelligence community, de facto controlling the government completely.

Their objection against NATO and EU, making no distinction among the two, is in line with previous Russian opposition, for which Moldovan goods were embargoed by Moscow.[xvi] This proves that the Russian desire to recover its influence on the territory of the former USSR continues via their political proxy.[xvii]

The request for Russian language to become a tongue of inter-ethnic communication needs to consider that, in fact, the Russian language, by the law of 1989 on functioning of languages in the Republic of Moldova already has such a statute.[xviii] The Socialists, in fact, requested an upgrade to the current statute. After USSR years of linguistic domination by Russia, despite the declared equality of languages, and the consequent independence movement based on the preservation and promotion of language, such a law would mean a return to the USSR status quo and firm re-arrangement of the Latin speaking Republic of Moldova into the “Russian World” a construct for Kremlin’s domination.[xix]

The fourth point on Socialists’ agenda was reopening of the Russian propaganda channels in the Republic of Moldova. This may also indicate that the warning signals from Moscow meant that they should be prepared for early elections.

The requests advanced by the Moldovan Socialists, after the return of President Dodon from Moscow, confirm the following important developments:
i.                    The so-called anti “oligarchic”[xx] stance of the Socialists has been visibly diminished by today’s refusal to oust the Democrats, thus strengthening the perception of being under Democrats leadership control.
ii.                  The ACUM block, despite seemingly setting a trap to make such a stance transparent, might create tensions within its own pro-Western and anti-corruption electorate, due to the appeal to unite their forces with pro-Russian Socialists, involved in previous financial irregularities[xxi] as well.[xxii]
iii.                That President Dodon’s previous plan to place the Republic of Moldova, via foreign, security policy, as well as Russian linguistic dependency of the  “Russian World” firmly into Kremlin’s sphere of influence was reiterated today by other means and was real.

The unchecked Socialist government would mean the return of a “Transnistrization” plan for Republic of Moldova. It would re-attempt to place the country under Russian control, via further disingenuous con-federalization with Kremlin controlled “separatist” proxies in the East of Moldova, and possible fragmentation to the North and South. Moscow’s direct political control via internal political proxies, such as Socialists and several other forces, would:
A.    create tensions with neighboring countries, as it happened during the rule of the Party of Communists, whose members are now in Mr. Dodon’s party,
B.    place Russian military in the “separatist” Transnistrian region in a permanent legal presence mode, providing a better, more operational position in the Black Sea vicinity,
C.    allow Russian military more freedom to monitor or scout USA military installation at Deveselu Base and Costanta ports,
D.   allow Russian business via Moldovan laws on citizenship via investment to circumvent US and EU sanctions, presenting themselves as Moldovan,
E.    create a more permanent point of pressure and distraction for Ukraine, during a warm conflict in the East, in its South-West, despite initial failed attempts to create another Popular Bessarabian Republic in the South. It would lock and pull some of the military resources away from Donbass.
F.     Ukraine’s and Moldova’s voters seem to have voted in various forms for a perceived anti-corruption and democratization of their societies. It is unclear if anti-corruption electoral promises in both countries are part of the modern trend or an actual reality. However, the failure of such promises would suppress hopes for a positive outcome for a number of citizens, generating another increase in migration where elderly, socially oriented voter base, might be closer to Russia and less knowledgeable about or inclined towards change.

It is clear that Moldovan and Ukrainian elections show the willingness, supported by Kremlin’s actions, to invest in local politics, be it in Moldova’s Dodon or in the speculated support for Ukraine’s Kolomoiski and, thus, allegedly Zelensky.[xxiii] One thing is certain, Moscow is not afraid of direct financial support and investments into other countries politics, while the West seems to urge, yet not invest properly in anti-corruption and democratization efforts that people in the Eastern Europe, especially young ones, seem to vote for.