Money, transports and exports - an investment frozen conflict by Russia

Editorial by Vlad Lupan: “Temporary tactics of the Transnistrian conflict”

I wrote an OpEd for the Foreign Policy Association of the Republic of Moldova on the temporary tactics of the Transnistrian conflict settlement. Why tactics and not a strategy? 

1. Tactics - under Confidence Building Measures, the Moldovan Government allowed the Russian investments in the Trans-Nistrian separatist region to get export opportunities to the West, via "neutral" number plates for their transport/carriers (that no longer have Moldova signs on it - Italy's Frattini championed the initiative, as OSCe Special Representative, based on Italian experience). Not all of those funds/investments in Transnistrian region are directly from Russia, some are local&regional and backing the separatism with funds and "kickbacks" everywhere in the region. This is not a strategic move by Moldovan Govt aiming at the negotiations format or Confidence Building, unfortunately, as the issue of Russian money laundering through the region is known to the media in Moldova and abroad. On "neutral" number plates allowing exports - it's unclear (and maybe less probable) that these export opportunities will undermine the existing sanctions against Russia via Kremlin's affiliates proxy investments in separatist areas that have export capabilities to US and EU. However the acceptance to provide Moldovan "neutral" number plates for separatists transportation is already dangerous in terms of money flows and more (the separatists are exporting most of its products to Europe, including some electricity produced on Russian gas delivered to the separatists, used by a Russian-owned power plant, and later claimed to be the debt of (billed to) the Government of Moldova - the debt amounts to billions now. No debt for plates negotiations seemed to have taken places... Also Russian's insistence on providing international "non-Moldovan/neutral" plates to separatist transport companies, where Russians have direct&indirect interests, was very high throughout the years of conflict settlement negotiations).

2. Strategy - Russian Government's strategic goals remain unchanged, from statements about 'mistaken dissolution of USSR' to challenging #USA and the West globally. Frozen & hot conflicts as in #Moldova and #Ukraine are integral to that. The fact that a conflict in #Moldova is so near #Ukraine is important to distract Kyiv's attention and resources from #Donbass. The "transfer" of initiative on the Transnistrian file from the Government to the pro-Russian President & his views, practically run against association with EU and Copenhagen Criteria - increasing the danger of "transnistrization" of Moldova, a term we know since 2003 Kozam Memorandum. Read my OpEd for the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova about the "temporary tactics of the Transnistrian conflict" and why the Russian money, through investments and exports via "neutral" Moldovan plates would actually support separatism, play along the Russian interests, and gain little in terms of the conflict resolution.

http://www.ape.md/en/2018/04/newsletter-april-2018/

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(Note that this is an expert opinion and was written in a non-political/non-partisan manner for FPA/APE from the Republic of Moldova. I have been a conflict negotiator in Joint Control Commission, in the political Five-sided format for Transnistrian conflict settlement, before it became 5+2. I dealt with Russian troops withdrawal from R.Moldova, CFE, arms control and was the Head of NATO and political-military issues Directorate. I was also a member of three OSCE Field Missions in Georgia (South Ossetia), Albania and Croatia. My last posting was as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to UN. My expertise in international security, comparative conflict resolution & post conflict rehabilitation was taken into account by FPA/APE for this short OpEd) 

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North Korean Precedent

H. Kazianis at FoxNews suggests President Trump deserves a Nobel Prise for a real #NorthKorea de-escalation, unlike Obama.

Undoubtedly President Trump did manage to de-escalate. Yet it is harmful to present US president's actions as a contest over Nobel or for partizan reasons. Conflict resolution is not a partizan contest. The final goals are not there & unfortunately:

1. #KoreanPeninsula remains divided.

2. A dictator maintains his grip on power and realities of Iran show that it's hard to believe countries' nuclear development will be restraint, when the essence of tyrants' power is threatened. This may be a reprieve, let's see what's next.

3. It is also worying that Kim gets a possible Peace Treaty: 

- peace treaties are usually signed between recognized states. Thus, #SouthKorea, depending on what will be negotiated, will face a North Korea that'll attempt to achieve a legal recognition of its statue as a separate state recognized by "all" Koreans as such. That was previously successfully avoided by South Korea, in much earlier negotiations. Hence this did not create a negative precedent in international relations & conflict resolution on recognition of division of states, when such division is abnormal, but happened for strategic and to a lesser extent ideological reasons (like Germany after WWII). 

- A Peace Treaty now can create that danger. Much caution is necessary on this!

Speaking from a post-Soviet perspective, when a communust USSR understandood well power pressures and zero-sum games, the POTUS applied the correct pressure strategy over North Korea, well understood by its counterpart (make no mistake about that) - however, for now the results are fewer/lesser than what was actually possible and there are worrysome signals for many states, even afar from Asia, as I've mentioned above.

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/04/27/after-north-korea-triumph-trump-deserves-nobel-peace-prize-not-obama.amp.html

Syria and Russian repositioning on April 10 2018

Here is another collection of quick thoughts to a question posed by James Sherr, from Chattam House (Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK) on purposes of Russian redislocations & threats on Syria.

1. I'm not going to say something new, but Russian interest to protect its sattelite Syrian regime is still valid 

- it needs to protect its naval base, 

- block potential gas routes (see gen. Ivashov), 

- let's not forget обкатка/training of its military in war situation, as well of its (new&old) equipment & military sales to Syria&Iraq&Iran (otherwise to whom?), 

- playing "danger close" with (or testing) USA on the ground - as if it's an "equal" player. 

2. Which brings me to a very mportant matter from a Russian perspective - face saving. It needs sabre rattling to show its might to its own public (power=internal legitimacy), as well as to some, rather naive, leaders in the world. Consequently, Sputnik already published the standard article of next World War again, a theme so readily picked up by certain media, a fact known to Russians.

3. Their game on nuclear aggravation (starting WW3) can only theoretically happen if they themselves use a tactical nuclear strike. This is quite unlikely, as they would only use it against a country that cannot retaliate. However, the international community will have to respond, and the current sanctions would seem a minor issue compared to that response. The fact that Russians didn't dare to move a finger when Israel destroyed an important part of Syrian Air Defences, simply annihilated the "argument" if WW3 & also of "impissibility" of no-flight zone in Syria (both Obama & Trump administrations seemed to have been careful about). So, the probability is low.

4. Thus, Russians lay the ground for a standard either-or scenario they are so "good" at:

- either detter USA from hitting certain critical infrastructure (to later present themselves as mighty saviours & continue their Syria is ours game)

- or to have an "honorable" excuse for being pushed out of Syria & their hands untied for another intervention, weapons sale & (v.importantly too) propaganda+intervention elsewhere. Ukraine is a "reserve" option for intervention all the time, but there is always something more "in reserve" around the corner: 

• Bosnia is tested for some time, for example! 

• And where do we have elections coming in some strategic location? 

(Danemark's interests abroad (inexistant) would be too far stretched, even in NS2 context, but you get my point, I am sure:)

5. In short Russians do their standard and less known in the West to the public & some decision makers chess-like "Вилка"... ("fork" - when one figure threatens two) This lays the ground for either their "save&stay" or "leave&follow up" scenarious that cannot be avoided.