joi, 3 decembrie 2009

Sfârşit de an - început de integrare europeană

TIMPUL

SUPLIMENT - INTEGRARE EUROPEANĂ PAS CU PAS

Vineri, 27 Noiembrie 2009


http://europa.timpul.md/article/2009/11/27/1482

Sfârşit de an - început de integrare europeană

„Mimarea procesului de integrare europeană de către actuala guvernare” şi reducerea procesului „de integrare europeană doar la cooperarea cu România, făcând ţara ostaticul intereselor statului vecin”. Acestea sunt afirmaţiile din 3 noiembrie 2009 ale Partidului Comuniştilor din RM - „acuzaţii” grave pentru Alianţa pentru Integrare Europeană (AIE), aflată la guvernare, care crede că este pe calea deblocării procesului de integrare europeană a R. Moldova.

Să examinăm mai îndeaproape ce se întâmplă, totuşi, în integrarea europeană a ţării şi să vedem dacă mergem în Europa fără vize şi ce trebuie să facem pentru aceasta. Să examinăm dacă vom avea acorduri noi cu UE în locul unor planuri de acţiuni neîndeplinite sau dacă aceste presupuse „cedări” sunt într-adevăr reale sau imaginare - eventual, o parte a unei retorici electorale a PCRM.

CINE PROVOACĂ INSTABILITATE POLITICĂ ÎN MOLDOVA? În ultimii câţiva ani, guvernarea comunistă de la Chişinău a refuzat să negocieze cu Bucureştiul mai multe subiecte ce ţin de relaţiile bilaterale, dar şi de o posibilă susţinere pentru integrarea europeană a R. Moldova de către România. Mai mult, PCRM a blocat semnarea Convenţiei privind micul trafic de frontieră, motivând că nu putem semna o convenţie privind traficul la frontieră când România nu recunoaşte frontiera. Oare? În realitate, România a recunoscut R. Moldova odată cu proclamarea Independenţei sale, în cadrul frontierelor existente, aşa cum au presupus şi principiile europene reiterate în cadrul OSCE după destrămarea URSS.

Acordurile pe subiectul frontierei au fost aproape de încheiere, însă au fost blocate de PCRM prin retorica despre nerecunoaşterea ţării pentru faptul că nu este încă semnat Tratatul de bază. Dacă nu una, atunci alta... În asemenea circumstanţe era clar că afirmaţiile PCRM serveau relaţia lui electorală cu Rusia, care e atentă la orice apropiere dintre România şi R. Moldova. Acelaşi lucru se întâmplă şi acum, în noiembrie 2009 - PCRM, chiar şi după vizita liderului său la Moscova, încearcă să-şi demonstreze loialitatea faţă de Kremlin, pentru a-şi asigura susţinerea pentru presupusele alegeri anticipate, care sunt promovate de comunişti. Astfel, întrebările „cine provoacă instabilitate politică în RM?” şi „cum este utilizat subiectul european?” sunt mai mult retorice.

Din perspectiva integrării europene, însă, presupusele alegeri anticipate pot fi importante pentru PCRM şi AIE. Fostul partid de guvernământ utilizează un discurs pro-european la fel de lipsit de un conţinut clar, ca şi până acum. Drept exemplu servesc afirmaţii precum: „Actuala guvernare nu are un plan de acţiuni în procesul de integrare europeană”... În realitate, actuala guvernare a fost blocată de PCRM în parlament şi nu a avut timp să-şi organizeze activităţile interguvernamentale pe integrare europeană ori să ajungă la reformarea structurilor inerte moştenite de la PCRM, ce ar fi trebuit să se ocupe de integrarea europeană. Pe lângă acest blocaj politic şi organizaţional, prin care se încearcă deformarea procesului de europenizare a ţării, vom încerca să analizăm şi progresele concrete, ce se atestă în ciuda unor astfel de bariere.

DEPARTE DE PRINCIPIUL DE BUNĂ VECINĂTATE... Convenţia privind micul trafic de frontieră a fost un alt document nesemnat de guvernul comunist. Cetăţenii RM din zona de frontieră şi adiacentă acesteia au fost lipsiţi de guvernarea anterioară de posibilitatea de a călători în zona echivalentă din România, cel puţin, pentru a asigura un comerţ cu amănuntul necesar oamenilor simpli, sau pentru a le oferi şanse de a găsi de lucru sau a practica businessul mic. Foarte curând după învestirea noului guvern, Convenţia a fost negociată de R. Moldova şi România, oferind cetăţeanului simplu posibilitatea să găsească mai multe oportunităţi financiare pe timp de criză. PCRM a mai declarat despre Convenţie că „nu sunt cunoscute prevederile” acesteia.

În realitate, PCRM a ţinut în mână acest document chiar în perioada când refuza să-l semneze... Însă cel mai important e altceva - acest document reprezintă o Convenţie-cadru a UE, nu a României. Astfel de convenţii au fost semnate de majoritatea, dacă nu chiar de toate statele membre ale UE, reprezentând principiul de bună vecinătate pe care Uniunea îl promovează în relaţiile cu vecinii. Până la urmă, nu România, ci chiar UE le permite cetăţenilor R. Moldova să intre fără vize pe teritoriul său, spre deosebire de PCRM care îşi blocase cetăţenii, prezentând relaţia cu UE ca pe o relaţie în care România nici nu ar exista şi nici nu ar fi vecină a R. Moldova. Departe de acel principiu de bună-vecinătate caracteristic UE...
Un an în Parteneriatul de Mobilitate RM-UE

PAŞI MICI CARE REZOLVĂ PROBLEME MARI. Problema vizelor nu se rezumă la zona de frontieră. Cetăţenii R. Moldova şi noile autorităţi de la Chişinău îşi doresc să călătorească în Europa fără vize. O bună parte a electoratului activ din ţara noastră se află deja în UE. Subiectul vizelor, însă, are conotaţii mai serioase decât cel al Convenţiei privind micul trafic de frontieră. Pentru a scuti cetăţenii de vize, UE şi R. Moldova vor trebui să se concentreze pe asigurarea unor frontiere ale ţării noastre care să fie impenetrabile, pe cât e posibil, pentru traficul ilegal de orice natură. În acest sens, UE va putea să asiste R. Moldova în securizarea frontierei sale cu Ucraina, inclusiv pe sectorul transnistrean.

Astfel, Uniunea va putea să contribuie, poate pe neaşteptate, la soluţionarea conflictului transnistrean, dar şi să facă cetăţenia R. Moldova mai atractivă pentru cetăţenii noştri din această zonă. O astfel de evoluţie ar fi una într-adevăr pozitivă pentru R. Moldova, după mulţi ani de stagnare şi regrese în procesul de soluţionare transnistreană. Va fi nevoie şi de Ucraina în acest proces, astfel conectând strategic încă un vecin important pentru ţara noastră şi viitorul european. Sunt paşi înainte ce ar rezolva mai multe probleme pentru toţi cetăţenii ţării, dar care vor presupune şi eforturi, şi timp pentru realizarea acestui deziderat de călătorii fără vize şi unificare a ţării într-un spaţiu european.

RISCUL UNUI PARCURS EUROPEAN FRÂNT. În fine, credem că noua guvernare AIE a pornit la scrierea „i”-ului din procesul de integrare a noastră europeană, prin faptul că a ajuns să înceapă negocierile Acordului de Asociere cu UE. Procesul de negocieri este anevoios, va dura, dar fiind precursorul unei reforme europene adevărate, este necesar. Şi, dacă ne amintim bine, UE nu a fost pregătită să negocieze acest acord cu guvernarea anterioară, care declara UE prioritate, dar prefera „lucoarea de la răsărit”. UE a aşteptat o stabilizare relativă a situaţiei politice din R. Moldova.

Procesul de integrare europeană adevărată, prin fapte şi nu declaraţii, a început. Noul guvern a reuşit semnarea Convenţiei privind micul trafic de frontieră, au fost transmise primele semnale de parteneriat către Ucraina, UE a deblocat ajutorul financiar pentru ţara noastră, deja în octombrie Bruxellesul a invitat noua guvernare să efectueze prima sa vizită la UE, începe procesul tehnic de negociere a noului Acord cu UE.

Declaraţiile politice inflamatorii, diferite de realităţi, nu fac bine stabilităţii ţării. Alegerile parlamentare şi cele anticipate au fost deja suficiente pentru o ţară în criză. Alegerile parţial libere şi incorecte nu sunt suficient de bune pentru un stat european şi contravin ideii de europenizare. E timpul ca să mergem în Europa. O bună parte din societate, experţii şi organizaţiile din societatea civilă, speră într-o democratizare şi europenizare a R. Moldova. O astfel de democratizare, însă, nu se poate produce dacă vom fi martori ai unor blocaje constituţionale ale PCRM, al căror rezultat ar putea fi un parcurs european frânt al R. Moldova.

Vlad Lupan, expert independent

Nu mai dati click pe Read more.

marți, 17 noiembrie 2009

De ce este nevoie de o reforma constitutionala?

Constitutia din 1994 nu-i valabila, deci nici prevederile alegerii presedintelui nu sunt valabile?

Iarasi intarzii cu postarile, dar ultima vreme, dupa lucru asupra unor idei in domeniul reformei sectorului de securitate, am prins un pic de timp sa ma concentrez pe ideea Reformei Constitutionale.

Iata ca aceasta idee, care totusi nu-mi apartine, dar mi se pare interesanta, a inceput sa dea semne mai pronuntate de viata si, in rezultat, am participat la o emisiune a Mairanei Rata la Jurnal TV inca pe 11 noiembrie (vezi link la sfarsitul postarii), ca totul sa culmineze, pentru public evident, cu masa rotunda privind reforma constitutionala, organizata de IDIS-Viitorul la 13 noiembrie 2009. La eveniment, spre mirarea tuturor (sau, cine stie, poate nu chiar a tuturor), a venit si Mihai Ghimpu, Presedintele Parlamentului, dar si Alexandru Tanase, Ministrul Justitiei. Deci treaba se ingroasa - mai mult Ghimpu confirma ca aceasta discutie ne poarta in acesiasi directie cu asul lui din maneca pentru alegerea presedintelui. Totusi, atat Tanase, ok, si eu, sugeram ca reforma constitutionala este necesara indiferent de situatia politica de moment si este un element supra-momentan, daca pot sa zic asa.

Esenta ideii - Constitutia din 1994 nu a fost trecuta prin referendum, desi depuatii s-ar fi obligat sa o faca. Nu-i referendum, nu-i...

Daca e asa si tind sa cred ca este - ori daca nu au fost respectate normele constitutionale general acceptate si chiar stipulate de parlamentul din 1994, aceasta lege nu este valabila - atunci inseamna ca si prevederile privind alegerea presedinteului nici ele nu sunt valabile!

Insa pentru o noua Constitutie e nevoie de un nou Cod Electoral in primul rand. Activitatile mele de monitorizare electorala pe parcursul ultimilor 11 ani ma impun sa fiu interesat si in subiectul Codului electoral. Am anumite idei in acest sens si, iata ca aud despre faptul ca anumite propuneri deja sunt colectate in Parlament, desi nu stiu cu siguranta. Sa vedem daca pot afla.

Totusi, ca sa discutam detaliile reformei constitutionale si pentru ca sa aduc in vizor necesitatea modificarii Codului electoral, am participat la un interviu de Vasile Botnaru, evident la Europa Libera, impreuna cu Victor Popa, profesor in drept constitutional si Corneliu Ciurea, comentator politic. Pentru dialoul nostru relatat de Agentia Info-Prim Neo click pe Read More - aici ->


Info_prim Neo
http://www.info-prim.md/?x=&y=27055
Experţii admit posibilitatea modificării Constituţiei timp de un an

2009-11-16/07:27 Experţi din câteva domenii admit posibilitatea modificării actualei Constituţii a R. Moldova timp de un an, în calitate de soluţie pentru depăşirea crizei politice legate de nealegerea şefului statului de către parlament, notează Info-Prim Neo cu referire la Radio Europa Liberă.

Profesorul Victor Popa, doctor habilitat în dreptul constitutional spune că încă din anul 2000, când a fost modificată Constituţia pentru a schimba regimul de guvernare din semi-prezidenţial în parlamentar, era clar că prevederea de a alege preşedintele ţării cu 3/5 din voturile deputaţilor înseamnă o „bombă” plasată sub sistemul politic al ţării care mai devreme sau mai târziu va exploda. „Şi iată că a venit anul 2009, au venit alegerile parlamentare din aprlie, şi această bombă nu a întirziat să explodeze. Cei care pătimesc cel mai mult sunt cetăţenii. Pentru că un an întreg nu avem stabilitate în tara, nu avem preşedinte, avem un parlament instabil, poate sa pice si guvernul în cazul dacă nu se alege iarăşi preşedintele”.

Potrivit lui Victor Popa, eventuala reformă constituţională îşi găseşte justificare şi argumentare în practica internaţională. „În Germania, de exemplu, şeful statului este ales cu majoritatea de voturi date de membrii corpului electoral, să zicem aşa, pentru că la alegere participă deputaţii Bundestagului şi reprezentanţii Bundestagurilor din landuri. În Italia preşedintele se alege cu 2/3, dar în turul trei şeful statului este ales cu câte voturi a obtinut. În Grecia, dacă preşedintele nu este ales de două ori, cu doua treimi de voturi, parlamentul se dizolva. Dar noul parlament alege şeful statului cu majoritatea de voturi sau cine a obţinut mai mult. Deci, putem sa enumerăm mai multe state care stabilesc o majoritatea calificată în turul intâi, după care o scad consecutiv în turul doi şi trei ca din trei încercări şeful statului să fie ales. Este un lucru normal, firesc pentru orice democratie”.


Expertul independent Vlad Lupan spune că, de regulă, necesitatea schimbării legislaţiei apare în momente de criză. „Constituţia din 1994 a fost pregatită, practic, pentru o republică semiprezidenţială. După care în 2000 se shimbă lucrurile şi ţara este schimbată într-o republică parlamentară doar printr-un singur articol. Esenţa nu este modificată. Crizele politice care au generat acest lucru şi care au urmat, cu siguranţă au produs şi necesitatea schimbării Constituţiei. De ce acum? Pentru ca acum există acea combinaţie dintre voinţa politică, a bunei păţi a clasei poltiice şi a specialiştilor ţn domeniu”, afirmă expertul.

Politologul Corneliu Ciurea, expert specializat pe detectarea focarelor de conflicte socio-politice susţine că va trebui să fie stabilită o foaie de parcurs a felului cum poate fi modificată sau schimbată Constituţia. „Pentru că felul în care se produce astăzi referendumul nu ne permite să modificam Constituţia. Sunt doua majorităţi calificate de 60 la sută pentru participare şi pentru ca referendumul să fie valabil, e nevoie de 50 plus unu din cei înscrişi pe liste. Ceea ce în conditiile actuale este imposibil de atins. Deci, schimbarea Constituţiei va presupune şi schimbarea unui numar important de prevederi din Codul electoral. Ceea ce va însemna, de fapt, o micşorare a majorităţilor necesare pentru adoptarea Constituţiei. Ceaea ce puţin delegitimează însăşi procesul. Dar se pot face aceste sacrifii, desigur, cu condiţia ca ele să fie sprijinite de societate, în primul rând, şi de partide politice, în al doilea.

Experţii au avut un punct de vedere comun privind perioada de jumătate de an-un an în care pot fi realizate modificările în Constituţie sau schimbarea totală a ei.

Potrivit lui Victor Popa, într-o lună-două poate fi pus în discuţie noul proiect de Constituţie pornind dezbateri publice, avizarea în diferite instanţe naţionale şi internaţionale. După aceasta, parlamentul va purcede la examinarea proiectului ca, ulterior, să fie supus refernedumului, în termeni stabiliţi de Codul electoral.

Vlad Lupan afirmă că, în calitate de primă mişcare, trebuie modificat Codul electoral, pentru ca prin parlament nu se poate obţine modificarea Constituţiei. „Deci, trebuie făcut prin referendum sau prin adunarea semnăturilor. Din punct de vedere practic, pe parcursul a jumtate de an, Constituţia poate să fie gata şi pe parcursul unui an ea poate să fie si adoptată. Aceasta se va întâmpla exact în perioada în care în care am fi avut alegeri anticipate. De ce să ai alegeri anticipate, daca poti să ai o Constituţie modificată pentru a putea fi ales preşedintele?

În acelaşi timp, Corneliu Ciurea le aminteşte partidelor politice care constituie guvernarea de astăzi despre opţiunile lor din campania electorală privind alegerea şefului statului. „Nu ştiu de ce ne scapă din vedere ceea ce au declarat toate partidele aflate la guvernare. Ele vroiau un preşedinte ales de popor. Observ acum că accentele se schimbă şi virează în direcţia unui preşedinte ales în continuare de parlament, dar cu o majoritate mai mică. Ceea ce mi se pare cel putin discutabil”, declară expertul.

Si daca va mai intereseaza toate emisiunile si aveti timp, iata adresele de la JurnalTV si Radio Europa Libera la care puteti asculta interviurile in intregime si cu clarificari:

JurnalTV - versiunea video cu 2 zile inaintea prezentarii de la IDIS: Asul lui Ghimpu – o nouă Constituţie?

Versiunea scrisa a interviului la Radio Europa Libera: Amendarea punctuală a Constituţiei sau rescrierea legii fundamentale?

Versiunea audio a interviului la Radio Europa Libera: Revenirea la normalitatea constitutionala.

joi, 29 octombrie 2009

Consiliul Suprem de Securitate - propuneri noi

Pana la 7 aprilie toti se intrebau pentru ce ar fi nevoie de o reforma a sectorului de securitate in Republica Moldova. Daca avem parteneriat IPAP cu NATO pe aceasta reforma si parteneriatul este cunoscut celor din UE (este complementar planului UE-RM), atunci las' NATO sa se ocupe. de parca NATO o va face in locul nostru...

Iata ca am trecut prin 7 aprilie 2009 - sper ca nimeni nu se mai intreaba acum de ce avem o nevoie STRINGENTA de a implementa o reforma EUROPEANA a sectorului de securitate - justitia, ministerul de interne, serviciul de informare si securitate, dar si ministerul apararii.

Ma ocup de reforma fortelor armate si ulterior a sectorului de securitate din 1997. A fost una din prioritatile de serviciu pe care le-am considerat de o importanta deosebita. Mi-a trebuit 12 ani ca sa demonstrez, cu mare durere, ca nu e timp de "lasat pe maine".

Iata ca recent a avut loc sedinta Consiliului Suprem de Securitate si subiectul problemelor cu care confrunta tara noastra,a riscurilor si amenintarilor in limbajul profesionist, este din nou pe agenda noastra. Nu putem fugi de la subiecte de securitate energetica, vine iarna, nu mai putem fugi de subiectul securitaii informationale, suferim deja. E nevoie de schimbari si sa nu-mi spuna nimeni, acum, dupa 7 aprilie, ca este timp sa mai asteptam.

Iata ca societatea civila lucreaza in acest sens, ca deobicei, cu multa rabdare, dar si cu multa ingrijorare. In interviul acordat Radio Europa Libera "Vlad Lupan spune că un grup de experţi şi-a propus să elaboreze o serie de recomandări ca să ferească noul Consiliu de erorile celui precedent."

Am venit doar cu cateva hinturile despre directia in care vom lucra. Acum partidele democrate urmeaza sa se inarmeze cu rabdare si sa fie gata sa discute cu specialistii, educati mai la vest de Prut, nu cei post-URSS. Si sa vedem cum vor reactiona (alerga:) cei care deobicei sar pe spatele proiectelor noastre;). Acum click pe Read More ca sa vezi ce am zis in interviul pentru Europa Libera, sau acceseaza http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/1861594.html ->

Consiliul Suprem de Securitate întrunit în noua sa componenţă

26.10.2009

Diana Răileanu

Experţii independenţi recomandă noilor membri ai CSS să evite politizarea excesivă practicată de guvernarea precedentă

Consiliul Suprem de Securitate, în noua sa componenţă, s-a întrunit astăzi într-o primă şedinţă. Şeful interimar al statului, dar şi preşedintele Consiliului, Mihai Ghimpu a menţionat că întâlnirea este una ad-hoc, prilejuită de „actul terorist” din 14 octombrie, aşa cum au calificat autorităţile detonarea grenadei la concertul de Hramul oraşului. Din noua componenţă a Consiliului fac parte deputaţi şi miniştri, membri ai Alianţei pentru Integrare Europeană.

Ce vor întreprinde noii membri pentru a eficientiza activitatea Consiliului?

Noul Consiliu Suprem de Securitate şi întîit de toate şeful acestuia, preşedintele interimar Mihai Ghimpu, promit să nu-şi depăsească împuternicirile stabilite de lege, adică să „analizeze activitatea ministerelor şi departamentelor în domeniul securităţii naţionale şi să ofere recomandări Preşedintelui ţării”. Membrii consiliului (din care face parte şi Marian Lupu, chiar dacă nu deţine o înaltă demnitate publică), se angajează astfel să readucă la normalitate instituţia după ce ex-preşedintele ţării Vladimir Voronin, ar fi indus, aşa cum scria presa, o agenda ideologică, ceea ce a condus la asumarea de prerogative improrpii şi neacoperite de lege.

Iată un exemplu pe care de curînd l-a dat în vileag presa. În 2008 mai mulţi angajaţi ai Ministerului de Interne au fost demişi la indicaţia Consiliului Suprem de Securitate, fără să fi fost invocate şi motivaţiile. Ulterior poliţiştii au obţinut prin instanţă restabilirea în funcţii, urmând să li se plătească desbagubiri.

L-am întrebat pe Mihai Ghimpu, noul preşedinte al Consiliului, cum va asigura transparenţa activităţii noului Consiliu Suprem de Securitate

Mihai Ghimpu: „Dacă eu aveam intenţia să folosesc Consiliului pentru a semna nişte decrete, pentru a lua nişte decizii, cum s-a făcut până acum, atunci nu erau în acest consiliu persoane care reprezintă partidele componente ale Alianţei pentru Integrare Europeană. Deja aceasta înseamnă că nu pot manipula Consiliul”

Expertul independent Vlad Lupan este de părere că noul Consiliul dispune de toate condiţiile ca să promoveze o reformă a sectorului de securitate care să corespundă criteriilor europene, dacă noii membri vor evita politizarea excesivă a Consiliului.

Vlad Lupan: „Este nevoie de schimbat într-o manieră corectă şi structura lui, dar şi rolurile şi responsabilităţile. Pentru că acest consiliu în Republica Moldova este de fapt o structură care nu este deloc similară altor structuri identice din Ucraina sau România”

În alte state, spune Vlad Lupan, numărul persoanelor ce fac parte din Consiliul Suprem de Securitate ajunge până la 200 sau chiar 300 de oameni, pe când la noi pot fi număraţi pe degete: „Membrii guvernului sunt mebrii ai Consiliului. Însă pentru ca să ai un Consiliu eficient care să ştie despre ce să vorbească, pentru că nu putem să ne aşteptăm de la miniştri să cunoască toate subtilităţile în domeniul securităţii naţionale şi internaţionale, atunci ai nevoie de un set întreg de specialişti, care să promoveze aceste subiecte, să le controleze sau direcţioneze”

Vlad Lupan spune că un grup de experţi şi-a propus să elaboreze o serie de recomandări ca să ferească noul Consiliu de erorile celui precedent.

luni, 5 octombrie 2009

The usual-unusual subject - Russia

I was told by friends and people I know, told with reprimand in their voice, that my blog is not updated. Since July... That is true and it is not fair. This year I have done this mistake not once and I feel this is not right, particularly because I was not doing exactly nothing, but working. A good person said to me, after discussing the lack of time - at least provide links to interviews, Vlad. I am now taking this good advise and start with an interview I gave to Eurasian Home, a Russian analytical portal, about the relations with... Russia.

Well, this was a "message" sent to those in Moscow who (or if?) are interested to hear about Moldova, but I do have now the impression that the Kremlin is not "reading" such a messages, or should I say not "hearing"? Click on Read More to see what I mildly suggested them yet on September 30, 2009 - in Russian, of course:

«Новая власть Молдовы понимает важность отношений с Москвой»

Влад Лупан, Независимый эксперт, политический комментатор, Кишинёв

Политика нового правительства Республики Молдова в отношении России будет отличаться от политики прежних властей. Различие в том, что раньше это была политика флуктуаций – она была то пророссийской, то проевропейской, то опять пророссйиской. Внешняя политика, в основном из-за внутренних факторов, не была стабильной.

Политика новой власти не должна отличаться нестабильностью, по крайней мере, отклонений будет меньше.

Отношения с Россией очень важны для Молдовы. И это один из приоритетов нового правительства. В правительственной программе обозначены приоритеты во внешней политике. Среди них – стратегическое партнерство с Россией.

Это партнёрство важно и с точки зрения экономических связей, большой роли России в энергетическом секторе, и с точки зрения решения приднестровского вопроса. Острым остаётся вопрос вывода российских войск с территории республики.

С одной стороны, мы имеем коалицию «Альянс за европейскую интеграцию» - Кишинев обозначает курс на движение в Европу. Но в то же время новая власть понимает важность отношений с Москвой.

России в этой ситуации также стоит менять подход. На выборах в Молдове Кремль поддерживал одну силу. И эта ставка не оказалась верной. Нужно строить политику сотрудничества на основе взаимного межгосударственного уважения.

Москве надо понять, что государство может интегрироваться в ЕС и при этом иметь хорошие отношения с Россией. Такая политика будет куда результативнее, чем политика давления, включая энергетическое, и отношение к Молдове как территории собственного влияния. Когда два переговорщика сидят за столом, обе стороны должны быть удовлетворены их результатами.

Влад ЛУПАН ранее занимал должность Директора Управления НАТО в Министерстве иностранных дел Республики Молдова, был официальным переговорщиком в приднестровском урегулировании, участвовал в трех Миссиях ОБСЕ (Грузия / Ю.Осетия, Албания, Хорватия)

30 сентября 2009 г.

miercuri, 29 iulie 2009

Moldova's E-Day - not hiding the frauds anymore

Association Promo-Lex, one of the NGOs that monitors the early elections of 29 July 2009, issued today, at 18.00hrs it second report.

Out of 34 infringements reported by them in their second report, seven are mentioning problems with the misuse of mobile ballot boxes, which is a matter that involves more voters (the report is in Romanian, however, see cases no.6, 7, 17, 22, 28, 29 and 31).

Promo-Lex reported that people also vote according to the F9 form – a replacement for regular ID cards, when the ID card is missing (old expired, stolen, etc). As observers reported, the F9 form is photocopied and then the „voters” just come with photos taped on the forms and vote (multiple cases), for... (exactly).

The News Portal Azi.md reports that in Ungheni town, a private bus was contracted to transport students who are now in vacation to the Moldovan capital, so that they can vote – ahead of April 5 they were not allowed to vote in towns where thy study, for these elections the situation was “reinterpreted” and they could not vote at home. The owner of the bus was allegedly called by traffic police one day ahead of the elections and „suggested” not to transport them, otherwise he might have problems. In the morning of the Electoral Day the owner found that the registration numbers of the bus were torn down, missing and two of the wheels were completely wrecked. He called for police, which did not even show up...

In another location, local newspaper with an internet TV station (JurnalTV) reported that a voter in Codru outlet, near Chisinau, allegedly tried to stuff in the ballot box 15 ballots, all “voted” for the Communist party.

Unimedia News portal reported today, July 29, that in Sangera, Sergiu Bumbu (the son of Deputy Mayor of Sangera), who is Our Moldova Alliance political party representative, requested Communist party sympathisers to stop violations of electoral norms [unspecified]. In response, a representative of the Communist party shot Bumbu in the leg. Latest news reports say that instead of driving Sergiu Bumbu to a hospital, he was taken to the Botanica police commissariat (in Chisinau, Moldovan capital).

Media also reports that his father, deputy Mayor of Sangera, was attacked as well - an unidentified person, accompanied by two Communist District Councilors (Vasile Bulgăr and Dumitru Baciu), stroke the Deputy Mayor of Sangera, Mr. Ştefan Bumbu, with the head, over Deputy mayor's face. Police did not detain the attacker, despite the fact that they talked to the offender...

Jurnl.md report that 49,2% of people voted in the elections - the elections are valid from the point of view of turnout(Vlad Lupan Comments: recognition threshold was lowered by communist party to 33% in June 2009, although Council of Europe's Venice Commission suggested no electoral legislation should be changed six months ahead of the elections). Over 1,300,000.00 people voted by 19.00hrs. This is 3% less than on April 5. Additionally the Jurnal.md newspaper reports that 66,879.00 voters were registered on supplementary lists.

Another news speaks about a person introduced in the electoral rolls 52 times, with different ID number.

Unofficial sources report that at 18.00hrs the Communist party already gathered 47% of the votes, which is again a figure that might be questioned in the view that there are many infringements and that the polls were showing a decline of Communist party popularity, while such 47% support contradicts the polls and might be related to infringements.

See the entire Promo-Lex report, however in Romanian here at Read more: ->




COALIŢIA CIVICĂ PENTRU ALEGERI LIBERE ŞI CORECTE

ASOCIAŢIA PROMO-LEX


Raport interimar nr. 2
Monitorizarea zilei alegerilor parlamentare anticipate

Publicat la 29 iulie 2009, ora 18.00

Introducere
Monitorizarea alegerilor parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie 2009 în şapte circumscripţii electorale este un proiect realizat de Asociaţia Promo-LEX în cadrul Coaliţiei Civice pentru Alegeri Libere şi Corecte „Coaliţia 2009”. „Coaliţia 2009” este o uniune benevolă de organizaţii non-guvernamentale, care implementează proiecte întru îmbunătăţirea procesului electoral şi sporirea încrederii cetăţenilor în proces. Programele de monitorizare a alegerilor în cadrul „Coaliţiei 2009” sunt implementate atât de Promo-LEX, cît şi de alte organizaţii care fac parte din aceasta.

Al doilea raport intermediar din ziua alegerilor parlamentare anticipate din 29 iulie 2009 se referă la monitorizarea circumscripţiilor electorale Floreşti, Rezina, Dubăsari, Anenii Noi, Căuşeni, Ştefan Vodă şi regiunea transnistreană a Republicii Moldova de către peste 270 observatori. Aceste raioane mărginesc regiunea transnistreană şi găzduiesc secţii de votare speciale destinate alegătorilor cu domiciliul în regiunea transnistreană. Informaţia din raport a fost colectată de observatorii Promo-LEX în raioanele monitorizate prin observare directă, întâlniri cu interlocutori şi consultarea documentelor oficiale.

Constatările şi recomandările din prezentul raport sunt formulate cu bună credinţă şi prezentate în spiritul unei cooperări sănătoase cu toate părţile interesate în edificarea unui proces electoral transparent şi corect în Moldova. Autorii solicită persoanelor şi instituţiilor interesate să ofere informaţii, să critice sau să corecteze anumite aspecte sau recomandări incluse în Rapoartele de monitorizare a procesului electoral în circumscripţiile nominalizate. Efortul de monitorizare se ghidează de Constituţia Republicii Moldova, Codul Electoral, şi standardele şi principiile internaţionale de observare a alegerilor.

Proiectul este susţinut financiar de National Endowment for Democracy.

I. Constatări.

1. La orele 12.30 în cele 11 secţii de votare în care pot vota alegătorii din regiunea transnistreană, şi-au exercitat dreptul la vot 2346 alegatori.
2. La orele 17.30 în cele 11 secţii de votare în care pot vota alegătorii din regiunea transnistreană, şi-au exercitat dreptul la vot 3982 alegatori.
3. În municipiul Bender, au rămas plasate pe stâlpii şi blocurile de locuit afişele concurentului electoral PCRM.
4. În satul Varniţa, raionul Anenii Noi, Victor Petrov, preşedintele secţiei de votare nr. 41, intimidează observatorul Promo-LEX, interzicându-i să se deplaseze şi să stea doar pe scaun.
5. În satul Răscăieţi, raionul Ştefan Vodă, din cauza incompetenţei unui membru al biroului electoral al secţiei electorale care deservea alegătorii din regiunea transnistreană, s-a creat aglomeraţie. La intervenţia observatorului Promo-LEX, preşedintele secţiei de votare a schimbat membrul respectiv.
6. În oraşul Căuşeni, secţia de votare nr. 2, Veaceslav Nogai, preşedintele Asociaţiei de război şi muncă, a adus o listă de 26 (douăzeci şi şase) de persoane, pentru care, din nume propriu a solicitat deplasarea urnei mobile la domiciliul persoanelor respective. Cetăţeanul Iurie Arhipov, care era una din cele 26 de persoane indicate în listă, fiind inclus în lista de bază, a votat deja. Acesta a declarat observatorului Promo-LEX că nu a solicitat deplasarea urnei mobile la domiciliul său.
7. În satul Ciobanovca, Anenii Noi nu a fost întocmit procesul verbal şi, respectiv, nu le-au introdus în cele două urne mobile.
8. În satul Chircăieştii Noi, raionul Căuşeni, dnul Cericov Fiodor, reprezentant PCRM în secţia de votare nr. 16 din localitate, intimidează observatorii independenţi, interzicându-le să vorbească la telefonul mobil.
9. În satul Carahasani, raionul Ştefan Vodă, s-a permis votarea pentru doi studenţi, care au viza de reşedinţă temporară în alte localităţi.
10. În satul Gordineşti, raionul Rezina, Onu Ludmila, vice-preşedintele consiliului raional, Gobjilă Vasile, secretarul consiliului raional şi Lonichi Iulia, primarul satului Gordineşti, au stat la intrarea în secţia de votare circa 30 de minute. La secţia de votare din localitate au venit cu automobilul primăriei.
11. În satul Olăneşti, raionul Ştefan Vodă, au rămas plasate pe stâlpi şi în alte locuri neregulamentare afişele concurenţilor electorali PPCD, PCRM, PLDM, iar în satul Talmaza, acelaşi raion, ale concurentului electoral PCRM.
12. În satul Copanca, raionul Căuşeni, la secţia de votare nr. 23, dna Tihonov Zinaida (observator din partea PCRM) se deplasa prin sat şi întocmea o listă a persoanelor care vor să voteze la domiciliu. Lista a fost prezentată preşedintelui biroului electoral al secţiei de votare.
13. În satul Zaim, raionul Căuşeni, înainte de sigilarea urnei de votare au votat cel puţin 10 (zece) persoane. Procesul verbal întocmit este incomplet - nu a fost semnat, ştampilat şi nu era scris numărul buletinelor de identitate.
14. În satul Slobozia, raionul Ştefan Vodă, la ora 11.30 a dispărut fila din listele electorale ale cetăţenilor incluşi în listă numerele de ordine de la 161 până la 218 (57 persoane). În acest sens s-a întocmit un proces verbal.
15. În oraşul Căuşeni, secţia de votare nr. 2 o persoană a votat, indicându-se cu domiciliul Dimitrie Cantemir 44/2. Această adresă nu există.
16. În satul Tarasova, raionul Rezina, au votat trei persoane care au prezentat forma F 9 cu fotografia lipită cu bandă adezivă, fără a fi indicat numărul documentului.
17. Primarul satului Pârâta, raionul Dubăsari, s-a deplasat în localitate cu urna mobilă. Observatorii nu au fost informaţi de acest fapt. Respectiv, nu se cunoaşte numărul buletinelor de vot şi lista persoanelor la care acesta se va deplasa.
18. Primarul satului Feşteliţa, raionul Ştefan Vodă, pe parcursul a două ore a stat în incinta secţiei de votare. Observatorul Promo-LEX a atenţionat preşedintele secţiei de votare respective despre inadmisibilitatea faptului dat. Ultimul nu a reacţionat şi a permis staţionarea în continuare a primarului.
19. În secţia de votare nr. 42 din satul Taraclia, raionul Căuşeni, listele electorale sunt întocmite incorect, la nici o persoană nu a fost indicată seria şi numărul buletinului de identitate. Preşedintele secţiei de votare a declarat că în acest fel listele au fost primite de la primărie. Membrii biroului electoral al secţiei de votare includ seria şi numărul buletinului de identitate cu pixul. În secţia sus-indicată, urna şi draperiile sunt de culoare roşie.
20. La secţiile de votare nr. 16 din Ciobanovca şi nr. 30 Merenii Noi, ambele din raionul Anenii Noi, s-a constatat nerespectarea distanţei de 100 de m de la secţia de votare de colaboratorii de poliţie.
21. La secţia de votare nr. 2 Anenii Noi, observatorul Promo-LEX a constatat trei persoane decedate incluse în listele de bază. Este vorba de persoanele Ciumacenco Stanislav 05.09.1963 a. n., cu nr. 1534 pe lista electorală buletin de identitate A 25018197, care fiind verificat în baza de date al Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale figurează ca fiind nevalabil; Teslari Andrei 30.11.1959 a.n., cu nr.462 pe lista electorală, buletin de identitate A 25004732 care fiind verificat în baza de date al Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale figurează ca fiind nevalabil; Cobuşcean Evdochia, a.n. 20.08.1930, cu nr. 1957 pe lista electorală, paşaport IV BM 646800, verificarea în baza de date al Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale este imposibilă.
22. La secţiile de votare nr. 15 din satul Talmaza, nr. 24 din satul Antoneşti şi nr. 17 din satul Caplani din raionul Ştefan Vodă, au fost depuse cereri de solicitare a urnei mobile pentru votarea la domiciliu, care erau scrise de una şi aceiaşi persoană la calculator. Observatorii au înaintat cereri pentru a refuza înregistrarea acestor persoane în registrul persoanelor care au solicitat votarea la domiciliu prin intermediul urnei mobile.
23. În subsolul Casei de Cultură din satul Malovata Veche, raionul Dubăsari, unde este amplasată secţia de votare, funcţionează un bar în care se comercializează băuturi alcoolice. Observatorii Promo-LEX au depus o contestaţie în adresa preşedintelui biroului electoral al secţiei de votare, pentru a iniţia acţiuni în vederea scoaterii din comercializarea băuturilor alcoolice în ziua alegerilor. La momentul de faţă o decizie asupra cazului nu a fost primită.
24. La secţia de votare din satul Ţînţăreni r-ul Anenii Noi, primarul din localitate s-a aflat în apropierea secţiei de votare aproximativ 30 de minute, mai mult timp decât este necesar pentru exprimarea opţiunii de vot.
25. Sunt prezente afişe electorale ale concurenţilor electorali în localităţile Talmaza secţia de votare nr.28 (PCRM), Olăneşti (PCRM, PPCD, PL şi PLDM) şi Palanca (Palanca), raionul Ştefan Vodă
26. În satul Teliţa r-ul Anenii Noi, s-au eliberat certificate cu drept de vot la şase persoane: Mitreanu Oleg A 25062688, Ursu Andrei A 25036719, Niţorean Vitalie A 25074434, Niţorean Ştefan A 25049165, Clichici Sergiu A 25067211, Cheliminciug Serghei A 25058391. În urma verificării în baza de date a Ministerului Dezvoltării Informaţionale a acestor acte de identitate s-a constatat că buletinele de identitate A 25036719 (Ursu Andrei) şi A 25058391 (Cheliminciug Serghei) nu sunt valabile, iar buletinul de identitate A 25049165 (Niţorean Ştefan) nu este de găsit în baza de date.
27. În satul Fîrlădeni raionul Căuşeni, dna Malîi Tamara a fost surprinsă în momentul în care semna pentru alegătorul Leşan Alexei, care la acel moment nici nu se afla în incinta secţiei de votare. Doamna a explicat că persoana dată ar fi fost la secţie, i-a eliberat buletin de vot, dar ultimul a uitat să semneze în lista electorală. Incidentul se cercetează.
28. Secţia de votare nr.1 Căuşeni membrii biroului s-au pornit cu urna mobilă. Buletinele de vot au fost luate din secţie fără a fi numărate. Pe drum membrii secţiei au întocmit o nouă listă, mai mult ca atât au fost opriţi de un automobil din care membrii au primit o altă listă cu persoane care solicită urna mobilă. Nici una din listele noi nu au fost prezentate observatorilor, cu toate că au solicitat să le vadă.
29. Secţia de votare nr.8 Căplani Ştefan Vodă, la orele 14.00 a fost prezentată de către Calalb Vladimir Ilici prin care a solicitat urna mobilă pentru 17 persoane. La iniţiativa observatorilor, membrii biroului electoral al secţiei de votare nu au luat în calcul această listă şi respectiv persoanele nu au fost incluse în registrul alegătorilor care au solicitat urna mobilă.
30. Primarul satului Feşteliţa, raionul Ştefan Vodă, Tudoreanu Nicolai Gheorghe, de la orele 9.30 pînă la 16.00 aflându-se la o distanţă de circa 50 metri de la secţia de votare discută cu alegătorii care vin pentru a-şi exercita dreptul la vot. Preşedintele biroului electoral al secţiei de votare, dna Ceban Liubovi atenţionată asupra acestui fapt, a neglijat solicitările observatorilor şi nu a intervenit pentru a curma incidentul.
31. La secţia de votare nr. 5 din satul Antoneşti, raionul Ştefan Vodă, la orele 8.30 Zamă Veaceslav şi Chirilov Vladimir au venit cu cereri comune pentru 24 persoane, pentru a vota la domiciliu. La insistenţa observatorilor aceste cereri nu au fost admise.
32. La secţia de votare din satul Feşteliţa r-ul Ştefan Vodă, membrul biroului electoral al secţiei de votare, dna Galafton Natalia a eliberat buletin de vot cetăţeanului Bulhac Ivan, fără ca cel din urmă să dispună de buletin de identitate.
33. Preşedintele secţiei de votare din satul Ustia nu a oferit observatorului Promo-LEX posibilitatea de a analiza listele persoanelor care au votat în baza certificatelor pentru drept de vot.
34. În satul Teliţa în registrul persoanelor care au solicitat urna mobilă au fost înregistrate 23 persoane. Monitorizând procesul de votare petrecut de către membrii secţiei de votare cu urna mobilă, observatorii au constatat că o mare parte din persoane incluse în listă de fapt nici nu au solicitat posibilitatea să voteze la domiciliu. Astfel din cele 23 persoane incluse iniţial în listă doar 19 persoane au votat, confirmându-se astfel includerea în lista respectivă a numelor de către alte persoane decât solicitanţii indicaţi.

marți, 28 iulie 2009

11 Georgian observers are held at the airport

VL Comments:
Election non-observation: 11 Georgian observers are held at the airport, as Azi.md reports. Security and information service allegedly replied that they are not worthy of monitoring the elections, hence no accreditation. They will be "deported" from Moldova. Kyrgystan observers had the same fate...
End of comment

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Azi.md
http://www.azi.md/ro/story/4730

11 observatori georgieni sunt tinuti in aeroport

11 georgieni, membri ai Retelei Europene a Organizatiilor de Monitorizare a Alegerilor, sunt tinuti in aeroport de dimineata si nu sunt lasati sa intre in R. Moldova, informează StireaZilei.md

azi.md, 27 iulie 2009, 18:38

Serghei Tkacenko, seful misiunii de observatori REOMA, a declarat, pentru Stirea Zilei, ca nimeni nu le spune care este motivul interdictiei aplicate celor 11 georgieni.

“Li s-au luat pasapoartele si i-au izolat. Nu putem comunica cu ei. Nu au nici produse, nici macar apa. Am trimis un jurist, dar nu i s-a permis sa discute cu ei. Le-au spus doar ca vor astepta cursa de maine seara pentru a fi trimisi inapoi”, a spus Tkacenko.

Potrivit lui, Comisia Electorala Centrala urma sa le acorde astazi acreditari observatorilor europeni, dar, din motive necunoscute, aceasta chestiune nici nu a fost pusa in discutii la sedinta.

“Saptamana trecuta am cerut acreditarea a 140 de observatori din diferite tari, iar CEC a formulat invitatii pentru toate persoanele. Ulterior, comisia a decis sa ofere acreditari doar pentru 53 de observatori, iar, in forma verbala, ni s-a spus ca Serviciul de Informatii si Securitate a decis ca ceilalti “nu sunt demni pentru a observa alegerile din Republica Moldova”. Am sperat ca la sedinta de astazi a CEC incidentul se va rezolva, iar observatorii deja au pornit spre Moldova”, a spus seful misiunii REOMA.

Potrivit lui, nu au primit acreditari observatorii din Georgia si cei din Kargastan.

Comisia Electorala Centrala si Serviciul Vamal nu au oferit, deocamdata, explicatii pe marginea acestui caz.

miercuri, 8 iulie 2009

Mr. Obama - Reset the reset button

In case of Russia - Reset The Reset Button, Mr. President

My (Vlad Lupan's) comment: I am posting less and less on my blog recently - that's because of a project I work on in the Moldovan electoral context.

However, I wanted to call an expert yesterday and ask him if he had an opportunity to follow and write about US-Russia Summit. Meanwhile STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com/), an American geopolitics site, sent their analysis on the event.

My interest is, of course, the post-Soviet space - Moldova now being one of the players for Russian money and interests, in time of elections. One should understand, though, that I am not the one to believe that Moldovan issues are crucial in the past-USSR area. My country is just another subject or object in the game - however, if you are a Government and know that, you can play that game too. Use the possibilities, interests and play them as much as you can. A small country that does not have natural resources, should have a very good diplomacy...

Leaving aside the matter of Moldovan diplomacy, which deserves a particular posting, which will come in due time, the main issue is the observation of Stratfor - links and arrangements on the former-USSR.

Strafor brings up Obama's speech to prove the US President did not give up on Ukraine and Georgia during the Summit - STRATFOR: In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.”

Stratfor also suggests that "Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement."

However, in terms of US and Russian perceptions, the Russian press indeed most probably focused on two things:
1. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to.
2. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.

These two things are not negligible, since the Russian press reflects Kremlin thinking as well. Although Strafor believes that President Obama did not give clear signs of freeze towards post-Soviet space and that the Summit was routine, which is good, the official Russian perception may differ from US President's intentions.

Thus:
1. The first point (majority of people must choose) would be interpreted by Kremlin as follows - Russia with Germany and France, for various reasons, managed to confirm that without a NATO referendum in Ukraine nothing will be finally decided on NATO enlargement to this country. This, in Kremlin's perception, means it has a free hand to work through Russian mass media and Ukrainian political parties to deter a pro-NATO scenario (referendum, etc) - thus at all preventing or delaying this decision and turning things in its favour. Russian media is one of the most popular in the former Soviet space - hence Ukraine is, to an exaggerated, however generally true sense, left in an area with a more assertive Russia (close to Russia's mercy).

2. When an American President places the "referendum" issue, so much sought by Russia, in the same context and in the same speech with the following phrase: "And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation." - it can and probably will be easily perceived in the post-USSR space and particularly in Russia, as - US does not want to have any complaints about Russian behaviour in the post-Soviet space from NIS. Former Soviet republics must be careful (close to Russia's mercy), while Russia is freer to act in this area, carefully, of course.

Hence, as much as the US leadership and experts wanted to prove that no major concession was made in the post-USSR area, their perception will not be shared by Kremlin, and worse, by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

If the intention of the US administration was not to send such messages to Russia, it will take US diplomacy some time to persuade Kremlin about it, as well as much effort to convince the Newly Independent States, which are more difficult to be let persuaded by "after-words".

The President Obama was viewed as a new beginning in Europe. However, in Eastern Europe, the realities are not like in Western Europe. The two often do not understand each other. They live in two different dimensions - one of inter-state relations, and another of Russian realpolitik, whether one likes it or not. From a country in Eastern Europe that faces the harsh side of the Russian realpolitik for several months now, I would suggest to President Obama that we live here in the world of realities, not expectations. Russia will not change its approach, it will adapt it - however, Russia is no longer a super-power, for the very reasons Stratfor mentions it (who cares about how many warheads are reduced - the topic is not about the deterrence anymore).

I thought I would be able to write a post ahead of Russia-US summit - the only thing I wrote was a very brief comment to President Obama - In case of Russia, Reset the reset button, Mr. President!

P.S. Lets see if people will read to the end. To those who know me, disregard this Post Scriptum, while to those who don't know me - I am NOT an anti-American or anti-Obama;) Now I wonder how many will ask me over e-mail or (less) on comments if I am an anti-american...

Read the entire STRAFOR analysis at:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090707_routine_u_s_russian_summit?utm_source=GWeeklyS&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=090707&utm_content=readmore

or just click on Read More that follows here ->


The U.S.-Russian Summit Turns Routine
July 7, 2009 | 1941 GMT

By George Friedman
Related Special Topic Page

* Special Summit Coverage

The Moscow summit between U.S. President Barack Obama, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has ended. As is almost always the case, the atmospherics were good, with the proper things said on all sides and statements and gestures of deep sincerity made. And as with all summits, those atmospherics are like the air: insubstantial and ultimately invisible. While there were indications of substantial movement, you would have needed a microscope to see them.

An agreement was reached on what an agreement on nuclear arms reduction might look like, but we do not regard this as a strategic matter. The number of strategic warheads and delivery vehicles is a Cold War issue that concerned the security of each side’s nuclear deterrent. We do not mean to argue that removing a thousand or so nuclear weapons is unimportant, but instead that no one is deterring anyone these days, and the risk of accidental launch is as large or as small whether there are 500 or 5,000 launchers or warheads. Either way, nuclear arms’ strategic significance remains unchanged. The summit perhaps has created a process that could lead to some degree of confidence. It is not lack of confidence dividing the two countries, however, but rather divisions on fundamental geopolitical issues that don’t intersect with the missile question.

The Fundamental Issues

There are dozens of contentious issues between the United States and Russia, but in our mind three issues are fundamental.

First, there is the question of whether Poland will become a base from which the United States can contain Russian power, or from the Russian point of view, threaten the former Soviet Union. The ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that the United States has slated for Poland does not directly affect that issue, though it symbolizes it. It represents the U.S. use of Polish territory for strategic purposes, and it is something the Russians oppose not so much for the system’s direct or specific threat — which is minimal — but for what it symbolizes about the Americans’ status in Poland. The Russians hoped to get Obama to follow the policy at the summit that he alluded to during his campaign for the U.S. presidency: namely, removing the BMD program from Poland to reduce tensions with Russia.

Second, there is the question of Iran. This is a strategic matter for the United States, perhaps even more pressing since the recent Iranian election. The United States badly needs to isolate Iran effectively, something impossible without Russian cooperation. Moscow has refused to join Washington on this issue, in part because it is so important to the United States. Given its importance to the Americans, the Russians see Iran as a lever with which they can try to control U.S. actions elsewhere. The Americans do not want to see Russian support, and particularly arms sales, to Iran. Given that, the Russians don’t want to close off the possibility of supporting Iran. The United States wanted to see some Russian commitments on Iran at the summit.

And third, there is the question of U.S. relations with former Soviet countries other than Russia, and the expressed U.S. desire to see NATO expand to include Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians insist that any such expansion threatens Russian national security and understandings with previous U.S. administrations. The United States insists that no such understandings exist, that NATO expansion doesn’t threaten Russia, and that the expansion will continue. The Russians were hoping the Americans would back off on this issue at the summit.

Of some importance, but not as fundamental as the previous issues, was the question of whether Russia will allow U.S. arms shipments to Afghanistan through Russian territory. This issue became important last winter when Taliban attacks on U.S. supply routes through Pakistan intensified, putting the viability of those routes in question. In recent months the Russians have accepted the transit of nonlethal materiel through Russia, but not arms.

Even before the summit, the Russians made a concession on this point, giving the United States the right to transit military equipment via Russian airspace. This was a significant policy change designed to demonstrate Russia’s flexibility. At the same time, the step is not as significant as it appeared. The move cost the Russians little under the circumstances, and is easily revoked. And while the United States might use the route, the route is always subject to Russian pressure, meaning the United States is not going to allow a strategic dependence to develop. Moreover, the U.S. need is not as apparent now as it was a few months ago. And finally, a Talibanized Afghanistan is not in the Russian interest. That Russia did not grant the U.S. request last February merely reveals how bad U.S.-Russian relations were at the time. Conversely, the Russian concession on the issue signals that U.S.-Russian relations have improved. The concession was all the more significant in that it came after Obama praised Medvedev for his openness and criticized Putin as having one foot in the Cold War, clearly an attempt to play the two Russian leaders off each other.

What the Summit Produced

Much more significantly, the United States did not agree to withdraw the BMD system from Poland at the summit. Washington did not say that removal is impossible, but instead delayed that discussion until at least September, when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Moscow. A joint review of all of the world’s missile capabilities was established at the summit, and this joint review will consider Iranian — and North Korean — missiles. The Polish BMD system will be addressed in that context. In other words, Washington did not concede on the point, but it did not close off discussions. The Russians accordingly did not get what they wanted on the missiles at the summit; they got even less of what they wanted in the broader strategic sense of a neutralized Poland.

The Russians in turn made no visible concessions on Iran. Apart from studying the Iranians’ missile systems, the Russians made no pledge to join in sanctions on Iran, nor did they join in any criticism of the current crackdown in Iran. The United States had once offered to trade Polish BMDs for Russian cooperation on Iran, an idea rejected by the Russians since the BMD system in Poland wasn’t worth the leverage Moscow has with Iran. Certainly without the Polish BMD withdrawal, there was going to be no movement on Iran.

NATO expansion is where some U.S. concession might have emerged. In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.”

On the surface, this reiterated the old U.S. position, which was that NATO expansion was between NATO and individual nations of the former Soviet Union, and did not — and should not — concern Moscow. The terms of expanding, reforming and contributing to NATO remained the same. But immediately after the Obama-Putin meeting, Russian sources began claiming that an understanding on NATO expansion was reached, and that the Americans conceded the point. We see some evidence for this in the speech — the U.S. public position almost never has included mention of public support or reforms.

In many ways, however, this is splitting hairs. The French and Germans have long insisted that any NATO expansion should be limited to countries with strong public support for expansion, and which meet certain military thresholds that Georgia and Ukraine clearly do not meet (and could not meet even with a decade of hard work). Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement.

Therefore, we come away with the sense that the summit changed little, but that it certainly didn’t cause any deterioration, which could have happened. Having a summit that causes no damage is an achievement in itself.

The Kennedy Trap

Perhaps the most important part of the summit was that Obama does not seem to have fallen into the Kennedy trap. Part of the lack of serious resolutions at the summit undoubtedly resulted from Obama’s unwillingness to be excessively accommodating to the Russians. With all of the comparisons to the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev summit being bruited about, Obama clearly had at least one overriding goal in Moscow: to not be weak. Obama tried to show his skills even before the summit, playing Medvedev and Putin against each other. No matter how obvious and clumsy that might have been, it served a public purpose by making it clear that Obama was not in awe of either of them. Creating processes rather than solutions also was part of that strategy.

It appears, however, that the Russians did fall into the Kennedy trap a bit. The eagerness of Putin’s advisers to tout U.S. concession on Ukraine and Georgia after their meeting in spite of scant public evidence of such concessions gives us the sense that Putin wanted to show that he achieved something Medvedev couldn’t. There may well be a growing rivalry between Medvedev and Putin, and Obama might well have played off it.

But that is for the gossip columns. The important news from the summit was as follows: First, no one screwed up, and second, U.S.-Russian relations did not get worse — and might actually have improved.

No far-reaching strategic agreements were attained, but strategic improvements in the future were not excluded. Obama played his role without faltering, and there may be some smidgen of tension between the two personalities running Russia. As far as summits go, we have seen far worse and much better. But given the vitriol of past U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, routine is hardly a negative outcome.

In the meantime, BMD remains under development in Poland, there is no U.S.-Russian agreement on Iran and, as far as we can confirm at present, no major shift in U.S. policy on Ukraine and Georgia has occurred. This summit will not be long remembered, but then Obama did not want the word “disastrous” attached to this summit as it had been to Kennedy’s first Soviet summit.

We wish there were more exciting things to report about the summit, but sometimes there simply aren’t. And sometimes the routine might turn out significant, but we doubt that in this case. The geopolitical divide between the United States and Russia is as deep as ever, even if some of the sharper edges have been rounded. Ultimately, little progress was made in finding ways to bridge the two countries’ divergent interests. And the burning issues — particularly Poland and Iran — continue to burn.

marți, 30 iunie 2009

Louis O'Neill - Moscow Plays It Smart In Moldova, As Others Dither

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Commentary

Moscow Plays It Smart In Moldova, As Others Dither

------------------------------------------------
A brief comment by Vlad Lupan to this article of Louis O'Neill, published by RFE/RL on June 29, 2009:

Russia proves again it can move fast to support the people they need in the former USSR space in electoral situations. Kremlin does it for its ends, of course. Should we watch and be "careful" (in my dictionary this means do as little as possible). Russian involvement was seen in previous elections in Ukraine and is repeatedly the case in Moldova. The EU reacted in Ukraine, US as well. Why Moldova is different? We do remember Ukraine's neighbours coming to visit Moldova's eastern neighbour. Moldova now is itself an Eastern Neighbour of EU - the Eastern Partnership was just launched and... In US everyone is still on the "reset" button.

Louis O'Neill gives us his perception on how the Moldovan Communist party, EU and US are acting under such circumstances, and gives us food-for-thought on what should be done.

I agree with this perception and I allow myself to say two things:

1. Moldova is an EU neighbour and no one can hide from that. EU can still make a difference in Moldova, at least to avoid a headache and avoid a second Belarus, or "belarussisation" of Moldova. Is it not EU's interest or perhaps other interests like Russia prevail?

2. Mr. Obama - reset the reset button! Its already time to face the realities, not expectations.


------------------------------------------------

Read O'Neill article in full on Radio Free Europe at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/Moscow_Plays_It_Smart_In_Moldova_As_Others_Dither/1765163.html

Or, to read it on my blog, just click on Read More there ->.
June 29, 2009

By Louis O'Neill

The "Big Daddy" of U.S. Democratic Party politics in the 1960s and '70s, Jesse Unruh, had a wonderfully ribald saying about the role of money and influence in the business of government: "If you can't drink a lobbyist's whiskey, take his money, sleep with his women, and still vote against him in the morning, you don't belong in politics."

Moldova's Big Daddy, acting President Vladimir Voronin, recently held meetings in Moscow with vastly bigger daddies: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Voronin expressed gratitude for the Kremlin's singular support of Moldova's Communists following the chaos and violence after the April 5 elections and reiterated his view that "colored revolutions" and "foreign interference" have no place in the Republic of Moldova.

In return for this seeming fealty, Voronin arrived home to announce massive Russian financial support for Moldova just one month before the controversial repeat parliamentary elections scheduled there for July 29.

Voronin described the half-billion-dollar loan as a "political decision" by Moscow. Although the details will be "discussed by experts" later on, Voronin quickly suggested the money would go to repairing and building roads, gas grids, irrigation networks, and "finishing houses," whatever that might mean.

For his part, Putin said, "We believe it's possible...the first tranche [of $150 million] could reach Moldova within the next six weeks or two months." At the same time, Putin made a powerfully symbolic gesture in granting $20 million for the reconstruction of Moldova's burned-out parliament, the destruction of which during the April postelection rioting angered Moldovans of all political persuasions. And as a bonus, Russia apparently lifted all previous restrictions on agricultural exports from Moldova.

EU Outmaneuvered

Voronin and Putin have used this visit and this announcement to tactically outmaneuver their respective rivals once again. Just as before the April elections, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov bucked up the Moldovan Communists with his first visit to Chisinau in eight years, with this trip Voronin has shown himself to average voters as a man of action who is respected by serious leaders and brings home the bacon.

No matter that the first dollar won't be dispatched, if at all, until after the Moldovan elections, because the implicit hint to the electorate is that "if you vote for the Communists, you will get your house finished."

By conditioning the money on the outcome of the vote, Moscow has essentially secured a free option on Voronin and his Communists' mini-vertical of power, while at the same time blowing wind into their sails for the campaign.

If they win, the Russian money flows and then the Kremlin exacts its yet-unknown price, which may include something as comprehensive as a Transdniester settlement along the lines of the 2003 Kozak memorandum or piecemeal elements like military basing rights in Transdniester, Russian as an official state language in Moldova, or assurances that under no conditions will the European Union Border Assistance Monitoring Mission be renewed. If the opposition somehow prevails, then the money spigot is turned off and both Voronin and Putin blame the policies of the new government for alienating Russian help.

Much as in Pikalyovo recently, Putin has swooped in to save the day with timely financial intervention. Only this time the whipping boy was not a down-on-his-luck oligarch strangling a one-company town, but, by implication, the EU's entire brand-new Eastern Partnership, launched on May 7. Russia has shown itself to be far more flexible and responsive to "eastern partner" Moldova than Brussels, and without all those vexing human rights obligations and endless EU technical reporting requirements to file.

Faced with the biggest upheaval in Moldova since the Transdniester conflict itself, the EU has essentially ceded the field. While Putin has offered loans equaling about 12 percent of Moldova's gross domestic product during the depths of a world economic crisis, the best the EU could muster recently was encouragement that Moldova continue to reform its legal system. While without doubt a vital step, such "concrete ideas for enhancing our relationship" (as the Eastern Partnership website contemplates) need to be matched with equally concrete, sustained, hands-on help.

Turning East, For Now

Putin's bold financial move also contrasted dramatically with the departure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from Moldova in early June. Citing "instability" in the country and the "provisional character" of the current government, the IMF decided to postpone until fall negotiations on a new financial program for Moldova.

Voronin, with Russian aid securely in his pocket, let loose with the kind of earthy comments that are increasingly characterizing his public statements. He claimed that the IMF left Moldova "as a woman leaves her husband who is acting badly," adding that "this is the second time that they are going.... They left in 2001 and then they returned in 2004 and asked how we achieved such success. We managed because you were not here. They thought we'd just roll over and die. Someone else here is calling the shots."

This last comment was a parting slap not only at Brussels, but at Washington, which has also been remarkably quiet on Moldova. This appears to be due to delays in assembling President Barack Obama's foreign-policy team, the rhetoric of "reset," and careful calibration in advance of the Obama-Medvedev meeting in Moscow in July. Whatever the reason, the Kremlin has noticed it and is acting accordingly.

But anyone who thinks Voronin's latest turn to the east portends a permanent shift should take a close look at recent history. In the last eight years, Voronin has already tacked back and forth several times between Russian orientation and European integration. He was elected in 2001 on a pro-Russian platform that included joining a joint customs union, making Russian an official state language, and several positions that would surface in the Kozak memorandum.

Then in late 2003, under great pressure from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's chairmanship and others, he killed the Kozak memorandum -- a very difficult decision that likely went against his instincts and preferences. This led to several years of pro-European jaw-boning as Russian troop and armament withdrawals stopped.

But there was little concrete action on reform as Chisinau shopped around its own comprehensive "package" plan for Transdniester settlement to the Kremlin. When it became abundantly clear that this approach wasn't going to fly and with elections approaching, Voronin, ever mindful of remaining relevant in the face of term limits, bent again toward Moscow.

So if Voronin stays in power, it shouldn't be surprising if down the road he changes vectors again. After all, as the Kremlin often reminds, it is a multipolar world. Time will tell whether, like Big Daddy Unruh, Vladimir Voronin has the fortitude to look a man square in the eye, take his money, and then vote against him."

Louis O’Neill was White House fellow to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2004 to 2005 and OSCE ambassador and head of mission to Moldova from 2006 to 2008. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

Stiffening Moldova's judiciary

Louis O'Neill, 29 - 06 - 2009

openDemocracy and the author have released the content if this article under a Creative Commons license.

Moldova's byzantine politics needs disciplining. If the courts were bolder, they could do it. But how to create an independent judiciary? Louis O'Neill has suggestions

Read this article at OpenDemocracy:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/article/stiffening-moldovas-judiciary






vineri, 29 mai 2009

После событий 7 апреля ПКРМ трудно получить «золотой голос» оппозиции

Внимание! Этот блог-пост был опубликован еще 27 мая и думаю остается актуальным, особенно перед вторым раундом голосований перенесенным на 3 июня 2009 г. А ведь сейчас столько спекуляций по поводу того что вот-вот найдется "предатель". Почему мне кажется что его не будет (все мы можем ошибатся, но...) читайте в этом коментарии:

Евразийский Дом
Информационно-Аналитический Портал

http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026

После событий 7 апреля ПКРМ трудно получить «золотой голос» оппозиции

Влад Лупан, Независимый эксперт, политический комментатор, Кишинев

Евразийский Дом: «Почему правящей Партии коммунистов не удалось привлечь на свою сторону часть оппозиции (получить «золотой голос») для избрания своего кандидата Президентом Республики Молдова?»

Очень сложно сегодня говорить о возможности «привлечения» молдавской оппозиции на сторону коммунистов. Вероятность такого сценария очень мала, особенно после выборов 2005 года, когда Коммунистическая партия доказала, что она неспособна ни к демократическому правлению, ни к политическим компромиссам. Четыре года назад несколько партий проголосовали за коммунистов, поставив перед ПКРМ 10 условий для реализации процесса демократизации. Однако эти условия выполнены не были, а партии, согласившиеся пойти на компромисс с ПКРМ, или стали практически филиалами Компартии, или не прошли в парламент после выборов в апреле 2009 г.

После 2005 г. в Республике Молдова была установлена вертикаль власти, что подтвердило подозрения оппозиции о том, что Компартия применяет российскую практику подчинения разных политических партий одной платформе. Установление контроля над силовыми структурами, а также финансовая и пропагандистская «война», которую развязала Компартия Молдовы после 2005 г. против тех партий, которые не вошли в ее коалицию, довела страну до ситуации, когда общество сильно поляризовалось до выборов в 2009 г.

Пытки, устроенные полицией над арестованными участниками демонстрации 7 апреля, а также угроза в адрес лидеров оппозиции, которых обвиняют в попытке организации путча, тюремным заключением в 25 лет – все это доказывает, что Компартия не готова идти ни на демократизацию, ни на политические уступки.

--------------------------------
Продолжение на портале:
"Евразийский Дом"
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026

Или жмите Read More далее и читайте все->:

-------------------------------

После пыток тех, кто проголосовал за либеральные партии на выборах 5 апреля, любая из трех партий, которая бы проголосовала за коммунистического кандидата, потеряла бы свой электорат, как это произошло с партиями, которые пошли на коалицию с Компартией после выборов 2005 г. Когда три либеральные партии говорят о серьезных фальсификациях на последних парламентских выборах, для них также встает вопрос о легитимности этих выборов и их результатов.

Еще в 2005 г. я спрашивал одного из организаторов тех переговоров: «Каковы гарантии того, что Компартия выполнит условия по демократизации, так как выход из такой коалиции будет проблематичным?». Поведение коммунистов показало, что они рассчитывали именно на такой среднесрочный сценарий. Условия не были выполнены, что послужило еще одним сигналом того, что и переговоры в 2009 г. между ПКРМ и оппозицией не будут результативными для последней.

Картина не будет полной, если не упомянуть того факта, что Компартия попыталась подкупить, а затем и запугать некоторых либеральных парламентариев. Сейчас эти парламентарии говорят о том, что после 28 мая они объявят данные о давлении на детей некоторых депутатов. В сложившейся моральной и соответственно политической ситуации в стране такой подход Компартии контрпродуктивен.

Ситуация сплотила ряды либералов, и они защитили своих партийных товарищей. В одном из случаев, предположительно, одного из либеральных депутатов и его семью коллеги вывезли за пределы Молдовы. Это является показателем того, что либералы не видят другого выхода из ситуации, а также осознают, что при жестком и бескомпромиссном подходе со стороны Компартии их единственный выход – сплотить ряды и добиваться досрочных выборов.

Евразийский Дом: «Возможен ли компромисс 28 мая между коммунистами и оппозицией? Или все-таки вероятен вариант досрочных выборов?»

Компартия попытается перетянуть одну из либеральных фракций на свою сторону 28 мая. Предположительно, должность президента могла быть предметом торга между ПКРМ и этой фракцией. При этом понятно, что лидер коммунистов Владимир Воронин намерен уменьшить прерогативы будущего президента, сделав его незначительной фигурой. Таким образом, позиция президента не является важной, а для такой партии либералов лучшей альтернативой является ее слияние с другой либеральной партией. Компартия своим поведением может подвигнуть к такому слиянию и усилить либеральный электорат перед досрочными выборами.

Таким образом, компромисс, скорее всего, невозможен, так как коммунисты не оставили либералам лазейки, чистого морального политического выхода, который был бы приемлем для либеральных выборщиков.

Также остается открытым вопрос гарантий, отсутствие конкретного и работающего механизма таковых. Без гарантий не может быть договора ни 28 мая, ни после. Так как 28 мая компромисс, скорее всего, не будет достигнут, такой механизм мог бы быть создан в ситуации досрочных выборов, вероятно, с помощью Европейского Союза. ЕС мог бы посодействовать выходу из сложившейся ситуации, отправив специального посредника высокого ранга для ведения переговоров после 28 мая.

Евразийский Дом: «В случае досрочных выборов, чьи шансы – оппозиции или коммунистов – перспективнее?»

Здесь важными являются несколько факторов:

1. Компартия не будет рисковать второй раз, фальсифицируя результаты досрочных выборов. Соответственно, результаты ПКРМ могут быть, вплоть до десятка процентов, ниже.

2. С другой стороны, коммунисты успешно используют пропагандистскую машину – медиа-холдинг, в который входит в том числе и Молдавское национальное телевидение со 100%-ным покрытием территории страны и большим доверием. Такая ситуация может частично компенсировать потери ПКРМ.

3. С другой стороны, все больше людей получают информацию из других источников информации. Процентное соотношение людей, которые верят в то, что Компартия виновата в беспорядках 7 апреля, растет довольно быстро. Это опять может снизить процент популярности коммунистов.

4. Экономический кризис, вероятно, ударит по стране уже в июне 2009 г. Люди вспомнят осенние заявления премьер-министра о том, что в Молдове кризиса нет и не будет. Ответственность за отсутствие антикризисной программы ляжет на Компартию. С другой стороны, Компартия попытается переложить вину на Запад и на либералов, a последних обвинят в том, что они блокируют политические решения в условиях экономического краха. В то же время, вероятнее всего, Компартия утвердит новый состав правительства, прежде чем будет распущен парламент. Эта ситуация все-таки может изменить процентное соотношение в пользу либералов.

5. Компартия попытается использовать государственные финансовые ресурсы для своей кампании. Это даст ей определенное, хотя и небольшое, преимущество.

6. Есть еще один фактор – явка на выборах. Предыдущий опыт показывает, что добиться высокой явки на выборах летом очень проблематично. Возможно, встанет вопрос о проведении досрочных выборов осенью, хотя это и противоречит закону. Чем больше времени пройдет до новых выборов, тем больше либералы успеют распространить информацию о событиях 7 апреля, даже при сильной медиа-пропаганде коммунистов.

С другой стороны, в Молдове досрочные выборы могут быть проведены только один раз в год. Если новые выборы не будут признаны из-за неявки избирателей или по другим причинам, существует опасность что коммунистический Президент Владимир Воронин останется без парламента в течение полугода. Однако этот сценарий неприемлем ни для кого, даже для Компартии, так как тогда отношения с европейскими структурами испортятся окончательно. В принципе, маловероятно, что такое развитие ситуации будет одобрено Европой или США.

Можно привести еще несколько факторов, а также сценариев развития ситуации, в зависимости от вовлеченности Европейского Союза или России в дела Молдовы. Тем не менее, серьезно возрастает вероятность того, что в случае проведения повторных выборов в парламент коммунисты и оппозиционные партии разделят голоса избирателей поровну.

Влад ЛУПАН ранее занимал должность Директора Управления НАТО в Министерстве иностранных дел Республики Молдова, был официальным переговорщиком в приднестровском урегулировании, участвовал в трех Миссиях ОБСЕ (Грузия/Ю.Осетия, Албания, Хорватия)

27 мая 2009 г
.

joi, 21 mai 2009

Ahead of EU-Russia summit - tit-for-tat comments on Moldova by Russian Presidenetial advisor Prihodko

Ahead of EU-Russia summit - comments on Moldova by Russian Presidential advisor Prihodko - messages show tit-for-tat, sphere of influence, scaring EU, distracting attention

How Russia is achieving its goals?

1. By supporting the Communist party in Moldova that showed sufficient devotion to Kremlin. Link that to the spheres of influence speeches by Lavrov and in times of Eastern Partnership, as well as discussion with Polish foreign minister. Are Moldovan communists convenient in terms of maintaining tense relations with Romania, one of the EU country, as well as maintaining the necessary situation in Transnistria, as well as in its relations with Ukraine - the answer is a clear yes, in my opinion.

2. By distracting the attention from Moldova's affairs to Romania. That's Russian perception, well fed by the Moldovan Communist party, that Moldova is under threat from Romania. Exaggerating the Romanian statement makes things easier in exaggerated approach to negotiations - one raises the level of requests and basically knows there will be a some form of excuse for Romanian president's statements - very good for Russia, EU thus recognising its "guilt", as Kremlin usually interprets such promises.

3. Relations with EU and the sphere of influence is still in place - Russia conditions the discussion of Moldovan (via Romanian topic) affairs against EU suggestions to discuss Georgia-Russia relations. Trade-off politics that I mentioned as main Russian foreign policy, on whatever topic.

Distracting the attention from real Moldovan problems, somehow warning against any intervention in Moldova - Russian sphere of influence, conditioning the discussion of the questions regarding the area, etc, supporting negative implications on regional and international level - that's what Russia does well.

EU and its soft power? I think I don't have to wait the results of this Khabarovsk summit to predict.

Vlad Lupan

P.S. Click on Read more to see the news in Russian with Prihodko's statements:
РИА Новости. Главные новости часа.
Рубрика: Политика
Сюжет: Саммит Россия - ЕС в Хабаровске
Россия на саммите РФ-ЕС обсудит поддержку Западом политики Саакашвили
20/05/200918:44

МОСКВА, 20 мая - РИА Новости. Россия на предстоящем 21-22 мая в Хабаровске саммите Россия-ЕС намерена обсудить проблему поддержки со стороны Запада политики президента Грузии Михаила Саакашвили и вопрос ответственности Евросоюза за внешнюю политику его отдельных стран, которые нарушают единые стандарты, сообщил в среду журналистам помощник президента РФ Сергей Приходько.


По его словам, представители ЕС предложили поднять на саммите тему ситуации на Кавказе и обсудить отношения России и Грузии. Российская сторона не против обсудить эти вопросы, сказал Приходько.


"У нас есть что у них спросить: во что материализуется длительная безоглядная поддержка товарища Саакашвили? Что они по этому вопросу думают? Тем более что оппозиционное движение в Грузии отчетливо продемонстрировало степень невосприятия его политики, как внутренней, так и внешней", - сказал он.


Грузинские войска в ночь на 8 августа 2008 года развязали боевые действия в Южной Осетии. Цхинвали был практически разрушен, погибли мирные жители, миротворцы. Россия была вынуждена ответить Грузии силой, а затем признала независимость Южной Осетии и другой бывшей грузинской автономии - Абхазии. Тбилиси объявил Абхазию и Южную Осетию оккупированными территориями и разорвал дипотношения с Россией. Сейчас российские пограничники, согласно двусторонним договоренностям с каждой из республик, приступают к охране их границ с Грузией.


По словам Приходько, на саммите при обсуждении международных вопросов планируется обменяться мнениями о конфликтах в Европе, в том числе по вопросам кипрского урегулирования и косовской проблеме. Кроме того, по его данным, в этом блоке вопросов планируется обсудить проблемы, связанные с Молдавией и Приднестровьем.


"У нас тоже есть вопросы к нашим коллегам", - сказал он.


Помощник президента РФ напомнил о недавних событиях в Кишиневе, когда после однозначного признания международными наблюдателями легитимности прошедших там выборов, "Румыния по сути целенаправленно, не стесняясь, подливая масло в огонь, спровоцировала выступления молодежных групп и движений, которые вылились в погромы".


"Мы спрашивали и будем спрашивать партнеров из Евросоюза, несут ли они ответственность за то, что их отдельные члены делают, ставя под вопрос послевоенное мироустройство и границы", - сказал помощник главы государства.


Приходько пояснил, что российская сторона имеет право поднимать этот вопрос точно так же, как Запад - проблему отношений России с Грузией.


"Нам не нравится очень, что против одного из государств СНГ, с которым у нас дружеские отношения, (велась подобная политика)... они так, стыдливо потупив очи, смотрели, как румынские спецслужбы, используя различные методы, стимулировали эти различные безобразия", - сказал помощник президента РФ.


"Готов ли нести Евросоюз ответственность за внешнюю политику, или только будут спрашивать нас про Иран, про другие проблемы? А здесь, в Европе, они готовы с такими же стандартами относиться к недопустимым действиям?", - сказал он.


Приходько подчеркнул, что российская сторона не нацелена на конфронтацию, но хотела бы серьезно обсудить эти вопросы.
http://www.rian.ru/politics/20090520/171728749.html

Ярослава Романчук - МЕЖДУ КОЛБАСОЙ И СВОБОДОЙ?

Блог: Ярослава Романчука май 2009

МЕЖДУ КОЛБАСОЙ И СВОБОДОЙ.

В ПОИСКАХ БАЛАНСА ИСТИНЫ


Если между колбасой и свободой народ
выбирает колбасу, он не получает ни того, ни другого.
М. Жванецкий


Либерализм – это когда интересы каждого человека выше,
чем интересы бюрократии – вот, что такое либерализм.
И я термин «разгул либерализма» не пойму никогда.
Если мы жизнь, здоровье, благосостояние людей
ни во что не ставим - вот это катастрофа.
...
Борис Немцов, ноябрь 2007г.


...Колбаса и свобода: рождение матрицы

Дилемма «колбаса – свобода» родилась в советской тоталитарной системе...

...инструментов массового зомбирования населения с одной стороны и дискредитации аксеологического Запада (т. е. его ценностей) с другой. Его использовали для демонстрации преимуществ социалистической системы, ее пресловутой духовности, высокой нравственности, солидарности и гуманизма.

Ссылкы на начало этой статьи можете найти на блоге Ярослава Романчука здесь (а если дочитаете мой блог-пост то найдете ссылку на полную статью):

Блог Ярослава Романчука. Между колбасой и свободой. В поисках баланса истины

20 мая 2009 ОтКлик
TUT.BY

"Если между колбасой и свободой народ выбирает колбасу, он не получает ни того, ни другого". Читать дальше


-----------------
Аннотация Влада Лупан, то есть... мой комментарий:)
Наследство СССР или либерализм, основные потребности или ценности свободы. Насколько мы свободны? Насколько СCСР сделал нас несвободными еще на многие годы после своего распада? Может быть это зависит от ценностей которые мы разделяем или всетаки от тех ценностей которые нам "влили" в наши головы? Сколько людей применяют критическое мышелние - в пропорциональном отношении к числу населения? Как могут люди которые не видели других ценностей сравнить свободу с примарными инстинктами к выживанию и довольству, или всетаки свобода это один из таких инстинктов и мошет быть свобода дает каждому шанс выжить и процветать?

Этот блог-пост/статья Ярослава Романчука, очень интересен во времена когда и в Республике Молдова мы становимся свидетелями так называемой диллемы сегоднешнего политческого кризиса в Республике Молдова или диллемы между свободой и ценностями с одной стороны и призывами к так-называемой "стабильности" которю здесь, у нас, проповедует Коммунистическая партия Молдовы. Но ведь не зря эту "стабильность" один из политических комментаторов Молдовы назвал за глаза (уж извините) "СТАБИЛИЗЕЦ"?

Я рекомендую вам прочесть этот блог-пост Ярослава Романчука о Беларусской интерпретации диллемы котоую он очень хорошо охарактеризовал как "колбаса-свобода" - вот только почему же эта диллема становится все более видимой в Молдове, а ведь может быть и не только? Шестого апреля я уже назвал после-выборную ситуацию у нас - беларуссизацией Молдовы...

Конечно же, мнение автора может не совпадать с мнением "редакции", и.т.д. и.т.п. ;) хотя...
-----------------
Ну что-ж, вот и добрались до прямой ссылки на всю статью Я. Романчука:
http://21.by/u.php?u=http://news.tut.by/otklik/137661.html

vineri, 15 mai 2009

Synthesized vision over the Transnistrian issue

The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation

Institute for Public Policy


Synthesized vision over the Transnistrian issue


14 April 2009

In this document the events that took place during 27 November 2008 – 14 April 2009 are analyzed.

From the beginning it has to be mentioned that the events that took place during this period of time run counter to cornerstone principles of the “Package Deal” on the grounds of which, from the fall of 2006, the Republic of Moldova leadership intended to solve the problem of the Transnistrian conflict.

On 5 December 2008, in Helsinki, took place the XVI-th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council. Andrei Stratan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova in his statement reiterated the appeal to all involved actors for an active participation in discussions on replacement of the military contingent from the Security Zone with a multinational civil mission under international mandate. Andrei Stratan restated the Republic of Moldova stand on complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all military forces and ammunitions of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in compliance with the obligations undertaken in the framework of the OSCE Summits, thus, setting up the necessary foundation for the ratification by the Republic of Moldova of the Adapted CFE Treaty.

Due to the stance of the Russian Federation it was impossible to adopt either the Ministerial Declaration, or a Declaration on Moldova for the sixth consecutive year.

1. Problem of holding elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova in the eastern region of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria) and participation of the Republic of Moldova citizens with permanent residence in Transnistria, in 5 April 2009 elections.


Eugen Shtirbu, Chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC), on 3 December 2008 declared that in Transnistia would be opened 500 polling stations for holding elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova (5 April 2009). It is necessary to mention that the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on 2 December 2007 and elections of the President of the Russian Federation on 2 March 2008 took place in Transnistria as on the territory of Russia.

In fact, the Tiraspol administration did not allow opening of any polling stations on the territory of Transnistria. Vladimir Iastrebceak, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria, on 11 December 2008, declared that the Republic of Moldova could establish polling stations in Transnistria only as an electoral district abroad. For that official institutions of Moldova had to address to the Transnistrian MFA and CEC as if to institutions of another state. Thus, it would have meant that the Republic of Moldova had recognized that Transnistria was a subject separate from the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, on 5 April 2009 citizens of the Republic of Moldova de facto were deprived of the right to participate in the elections for the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. On the election day the Transnistrian militia did everything in order to impede the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, residing in localities from Transnistria to go to the polling stations established in localities under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova.

Another difficult issue in relations between Chişinău and Tiraspol is Corjevo village. Chişinău considers it a settlement under the Chişinău jurisdiction. Accordingly, it means that on 5 April, in Corjevo were due the elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, Corjevo village is the native village of President Vladimir Voronin.

In its turn, the Tiraspol administration considers Corjevo a “mini-quarter” of Dubăsari town and part of the territory of the “tmr”. Thus, Tiraspol considers that in Corjevo cannot be hold any elections to the “Parliament of the neighbor state”. Finally, the Tiraspol administration did not allow holding of elections in Corjevo village and did everything possible to make the citizens of the Republic of Moldova residing in Transnistria feel humiliated, frustrated and deprived of the possibility to take part in the elections on the 5th of April 2009.

These events have demonstrated that the Tiraspol administration continues to have a tough position in relations with the Republic of Moldova and that negotiations of Vladimir Voronin with Kremlin have not brought any positive change.

2. Negotiations process

The events that took place in the examined time frame clearly contravene to the logic of the “package deal”, through which the Republic of Moldova leadership intended to obtain the settlement of the Transnistrian problem, from the beginning of the fall of 2006. We remind that the “package deal” is based on the following fundamental elements:

1. Settlement of the Transnistrian problem had to be achieved without a modification of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, based on the Law on fundamental regulations of the special legal status of settlements on the Left Bank of the River Nistru (Transnistria), adopted on 22 July 2005 by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova;

2. Settlement of the Transnistrian problem had to be achieved in the framework of Chişinău – Kremlin dialogue, without involvement and request of opinion of the Transnistrian administration;

3. Republic of Moldova had to recognize the property rights over economic assets in Transnistria, previously illegally privatized by Russian public and private capital only after a political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

First of all, Moscow refused to negotiate with the Republic of Moldova leadership on settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and brought Chişinău back to the negotiation table with Igor Smirnov. Thus, Vladimir Voronin was forced to come back to direct contacts with Igor Smirnov, on terms dictated by the latter.

Vladimir Voronin – Igor Smirnov meeting

The meeting on 24 December 2008, took place in Tiraspol and unfolded in accordance with a scenario prepared by Igor Smirnov’s team. First part of the meeting took place in an open format, in the presence of about 50 mass-media representatives. Igor Smirnov took this opportunity for launching a propagandistic attack on the Republic of Moldova and particularly on Vladnimir Voronin. Already in a traditional manner Igor Smirnov accused the Republic of Moldova of “nonobservance of previously agreed arrangements” and asked Vladimir Voronin to express his attitude towards the draft “Treaty on friendship and cooperation between TMR and RM”, handed over to Vladimir Voronin during 11 April 2008 meeting. Igor Smirnov refused to answer Vladimir Voronin’s question about the readiness of Transnistria to come back to the negotiations process in the “5+2” format, declaring that this format is a consultative one and that real negotiations should take place “between TMR and Moldova”.

The second part of the meeting took place with closed doors. After the two came to the press Vladimir Voronin declared that “the very fact of the meeting is a performance in itself”. Within the same meeting on 24 December 2008 Vladimir Voronin handed over to Igor Smirnov the fundamental proposals for the demilitarization of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, as well as a draft Law on Transnistria autonomy.

Igor Smirnov, in his turn, handed over to Vladimir Voronin official results of 17 September 2006 “referendum” and the package of documents, where it has been developed key elements of how to apply the principle of non use of force in the framework of Moldovan-Transnistrian settlement. Therefore, the stands of “parties” fixed in these draft documents were traditionally incompatible.

The only issue on which the sides had a common ground was their intention to meet again in March 2009. This common position of both leaders could have been interpreted as a proof that Vladimir Voronin still hoped achieving a progress in the problem of Transnistrian conflict, as a result of the expected meeting in the „2+1” format (Dmitrii Medvedev + Igor Smirnov – Vladimir Voronin). Probably, due to the same reason the CPRM group in the Parliament did not adopt the decision on fixing the parliamentary elections day on 5 March 2009, contrary to many politicians’ expectations.

On 16 February 2009, during a press briefing Alexandr Malearciuk, „deputy foreign minister” of Transnistria presented the Transnistrian position on the documents handed over to Igor Smirnov by Vladimir Voronin on 24 December 2008. Tiraspol bluntly rejected the draft Law of the Republic of Moldova on the status of Transnistria and the Joint Political Declaration. Arguments put forward had a traditional nature – the Republic of Moldova ignores the “will of Transnistrian people, expressed in 17 September 2006 referendum”; the Republic of Moldova tries to impose unilateral decisions, ignoring TMR as an equal part of the settlement process etc.

„2+1” format meeting

From the perspective of 18 March 2009 meeting Vladimir Voronin gave an interview to the Russian newspaper „Kommersant”. From the interview can be drawn the following conclusions:

- Vladimir Voronin considers the expected Moscow meeting as “consultations on steps to be undertaken in order to resume the negotiations”.

- Vladimir Voronin wants to hear from Russia the assessment of the Law of 22 July 2005 on the special legal status of the Transnistrian region, which “until now has not been officially stated neither by Russia, nor by Transnistria”.

- Voronin declares that he has nothing to propose for signing during the tripartite meeting.

- Vladimir Voronin compares the “Eastern Partnership” Program initiated by EU with a sort of CIS-2 which resembles to a cordon (belt) around Russia.

- Talking about the desirable for the CPRM result of 5 April elections, Vladimir Voronin declares that CPRM strives, in an ideal situation, for a constitutional majority, because “from the Transnistrian conflict settlement perspective it will be necessary to introduce serious amendments to the fundamental law”.

From this interview a number of conclusions can be drawn. First of all, it is to be mentioned that the Republic of Moldova expects an “assessment of the Law on the status of Transnistria” at least from 22 June 2007 when Vladimir Voronin had a meeting Vladimir Putin. During that meeting, which lasted three hours Vladimir Voronin had a possibility to present in details all elements of the “package deal”. Lack of any feedback from Kremlin is a clear answer of Kremlin – Moscow does not accept the “package deal”. Moreover, also after 22 June 2007 the Russian MFA on several occasions made official declarations, from which it was clear that Russia insisted on “observance of all previously signed arrangements”. First of all, it refers to the Memorandum on normalization of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, signed on 8 May 1997, in Moscow. However, in the Memorandum there are a number of provisions which imply that the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict should be achieved by creating a confederative “common state” of two equal in rights parties – the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria. Additionally, the firm rejection by Transnistria on 16 February 2009 of the documents drafted by the Moldovan side was, for sure, coordinated with the Russian Federation.

This means that Vladimr Voronin’s affirmation that he expects an assessment from Russia of the Law on fundamental regulations of the legal status of settlements from the Left Bank of the River Nistru, adopted on 22 June 2005 is in clear contradiction with the position of Russia, which is absolutely categorical and incompatible with the Republic of Moldova sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The “Eastern Partnership” Program assessment by Vladimir Voronin is, probably, part of a number of declarations of this political figure determined by immediate circumstances. In prospect of the Moscow visit and 5 April elections Vladimir Voronin wanted to position himself for the Kremlin adminsitration as a pro-Russian politician. The Republic of Moldova chairmanship of CIS, assumed after the CIS November 2008 Chişinău Summit is part of the same scenario.

Here can be pointed out that just due to the involvement of EU, the EU Border Assistance Mission was set up. It has had a deep impact on the situation in the Transnistrian region. On 4 June 2005 within a working meeting of Vladimir Voronin with the Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko was signed a joint letter addressed to the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, calling for EU support in control of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Beginning of the EU Border Assistance Mission activities on 3 March 2006 was interpreted by the Russian Federation as an “economic blockade” etc. Inclusively, for the prevention of a “humanitarian catastrophe” to Transnistria were sent convoys with “humanitarian aid” etc. These actions in partnership with EU were undertaken by Vladimir Voronin when he positioned himself as a pro-European leader. On the other hand, on the eve of 5 April 2009 elections retention of power by the CPRM, in Vladimir Voronin’s opinion, needed a display of rapprochement with Russia.

Vladimir Voronin’s statement that “from the Transnistrian conflict settlement perspective it will be necessary to introduce serious amendments to the fundamental law” is in evident contradiction with key elements of the “package deal”. Indeed the “package deal” envisaged a separation of competences between Chişinău and Tiraspol more characteristic to a federative state rather than a unitary one (de facto federalization of the Republic of Moldova). Yet, the “package deal” does not contain the notion “federation” (de jure federalization). Therefore, the “package deal” did not envisaged amendment of the Constitution. Moreover, Article 142 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova provides that “Provisions regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the State may be revised only by referendum based on a majority vote of registered voting citizens”. It means that an eventual federalization of the Republic of Moldova can be carried out only through a referendum, even if such a modification would be voted by the Parliament.

There is only one vulnerable point left, fixed in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova i.e. prohibition of foreign military presence on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. It could be assumed that talking about a “serious modification” of the Constitution Vladimir Voronin meant abrogation of point 2 of Article 11 – “The Republic of Moldova will not admit stationing of any foreign military troops”. Abrogation of this point formally does not affect the status of permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova and implicitly does not need its approbation through a referendum. At the same time, this modification of the Constitution will allow permanent presence of the Russian Federation troops on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, as envisaged by the Kozak Memorandum.

18 March 2009 meeting, in a tripartite format resulted in signing of a Joint Declaration meaning that, as long as in his interview of 27 February Vladimir Voronin denied that there had been any draft document for signing, it was imposed by the Russian Federation. The content of this document is fully in accordance with the Russian Federation stand. The Republic of Moldova and Transnistria as “parties” declare their intention to continue direct contacts in order to reinvigorate the negotiations process; declare that they will set up conditions for an earliest resumption of activities in the „5+2” format, possibly in the first half of 2009 etc. In point 4 of the same Declaration “the parties mention the stabilizing role of the present peacekeeping operation in the region and proceed from the advisability of transforming it into a peace guaranteeing operation under the aegis of the OSCE following a Transdniestrian settlement”.

This Declaration entirely runs counter the cornerstone principles of the “package deal” and brings no progress to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Point 4 of the Declaration one more time confirms the legitimacy of the existing peacekeeping format, thus, confirming the legitimacy of the Transnistrian regime paramilitary troops. This Declaration categorically contradicts the position of the Republic of Moldova, stated by Mr. Andrei Stratan during the XVI-th OSCE Ministerial Council. Probably, this approach is part of the Chişinău policy to shape its position depending of the geographical location where it is expressed. Vladimir Vononin’s commitment, in his capacity of President of the Republic of Moldova to transform the same format of the peacekeeping operation with the same Transnistrian paramilitary troops into a “peace-guaranteeing” operation as a result of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict raises question marks about the legal form of the supposed settlement. It is certain that continuous presence of the Transnistrian paramilitary troops after the settlement of the conflict is incompatible with the notion of reintegrated state (even if federative).

After the 18 March “2+1” meeting there was announced another meeting between Igor Smirnov and Vladmir Voronin, planned for 25 March. However, on the eve, on 24 March, Igor Smirnov announced that EU Special Representative in Moldova Kalman Mizsei, USA Ambassador in Moldova Asif Chaudhry and Czech Ambassador in Moldova Petr Kypr were declared persona non grata in Transnistria.

On this background the meeting between Igor Smirnov and Vladimir Voronin, scheduled for 25 March 2009 was cancelled by the Moldovan side.

3. Energy security of the Republic of Moldova

On 23 December 2008 Cuciurgan Heat and Power Plant (CHP), as a subunit of the Russian “Inter RAO ES” Company concluded a contract on delivery of electric power to the Republic of Moldova with “Energocom” Joint-Stock Company, from 1 January 2009 to 31 March 2010. The volume of contacted power (250 million kWt x hour) covers the entire consumption of the Republic of Moldova, which meant that the Republic of Moldova discontinued electric power supply from Ukraine.

On its turn, on 25 December 2008, State-Owned Company „Ukrinterenergo” offered “Energocom” Company to buy in 2009 electric power at a price of 52 USD per 1 Mwt x hour, comparing to 56 USD offered by the Cucuirgan CHP. Yet, Chişinăul has not cancelled the contract with the Cucuirgan CHP. As a result of this policy the Republic of Moldova discontinued power supply from Ukraine and has become dependant on power supply form Transnistria. In the conditions of the 2009 gas crisis Cuciurgani CHP had no gas. Subsequently, in order to produce electric power in volumes contracted by customers Cuciurgan CHP was forced to switch over to coal and fuel oil. However, in the situation when Ukraine banned export of fuel oil on the background of the conflict with „GAZPROM”, Cuciurgan CHP had no safe functioning perspectives.

On 24 December 2008 a meeting between Igor Smirnov and Deputy Chairman of „GAZPROM” Management Committee Valerii Golubev took place. During the meeting it was declared that in the first half of 2009 it was foreseen a structural reorganization of „Moldova-Gaz” and separation of „Tiraspoltransgaz-Transnitria” into a separate unit. Similarly, it was announced that in 2009 the Transnistrian debt to „GAZPROM” would mount to 2 billion USD. Tiraspol refuses to discuss the problem of transferring the debt for the Russian gas consumed in Transnistria from „Moldovagaz” to the Transnistrian administration.

4. Conclusions

The steps undertaken by the Republic of Moldova leadership in the analyzed time frame (27 November 2008 – 14 April 2009) have not resulted in consolidation of the Republic of Moldova position in the problem of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict;

The Russian Federation and Tiraspol attitudes prove a complete and unambiguous rejection of the “package deal” based on which, from the fall of 2006, the Republic of Moldova leadership intended to solve the problem of the Transnistrian conflict;

The Joint Declaration signed on 18 March 2009 in Moscow is a serious concession of the Republic of Moldova leadership concerning the principles of implementation of the peacekeeping operation and is in clear contradiction with the previously announced position of the Republic of Moldova.;

The situation in the energy field is a clear and serious threat to the Republic of Moldova national security. The agreements signed in this field are not transparent and what can be concluded from available information – do not have an economic support. It is not clear how the problem of the Transnistrian debt to “GAZPROM” is going to be solved (about 2 billion USD).

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Dr. Arcadie Barbaroşie, Executive Director, Institute for Public Policy

Oazu Nantoi, Program Director, Institute for Public Policy

Dr. Igor Boţan, Executive Director, Association for Participatory Democracy

Dr. Anatol Gremalschi, Program Director, Institute for Public Policy

Vlad Lupan, Independent Expert

Dr. Viorel Cibotaru, Executive Director, European Institute for Political Studies of Moldova

Eugen Revenco, Moldovan-Lithuanian Foundation “European Integration Studies Center”

Dumitru Mînzărari, Researcher on foreign policy and security issues IDIS „Viitorul”

Radu Vrabie, Program coordinator, Foreign Policy Association (APE).