Friday, August 29, 2008
Or read further:
What Russia will do next
Aug 28th 2008
A secret e-mail to Mr Putin reaches our columnist
ESTEEMED Vladimir Vladimirovich!
As director of the operational task-force of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, I present my compliments to you personally at the conclusion of the initial military-political phase of Operation “Return”.
The penetration by this service and its sister organisations of decision-making structures in the enemy camp has long given us advance warning of European Union and NATO plans, and a substantial ability to influence them. Even we, however, did not expect such torpor and weakness from the enemy. We see empty words but no readiness for serious resistance. Indeed, some western commentators and politicians have praised our actions as justified, including in some cases those who have received no payment or other inducements. We can proceed confidently.
As we underline the disadvantages of bad relations and highlight the advantages of good ones, our main ally is the electoral cycle. Voters, politicians and other decision-makers will become increasingly aware that if they resist us, they will pay a heavy price; but if they cooperate, they will benefit.
We will extend the intimidation, harassment and expropriation of British, American, Polish and Czech companies active in our domestic market and as energy customers, while at the same time offering further preferential treatment to those from countries that are politically friendly, especially France, Italy and Germany. Are big European companies willing to sacrifice billions of euros in lost exports or higher energy costs by indulging their politicians’ desire to grandstand and moralise? We think not.
We should visibly intensify our activity in non-western financial centres, chiefly Dubai, Mumbai and Shanghai, to show western capital markets, particularly London and New York, the loss of business that they face by their governments’ intransigent behaviour.
Similarly, the next American president will face a stark choice between the imminent prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran or the wasting asset of involvement in a Europe that does not wish to defend itself.
The electoral cycle in the enemy camp in coming months should deliver great victories to our side: by the year-end we expect Ukraine and Lithuania to abandon the enemy camp. But plans for further escalation are ready as needed. In Crimea, Islamic extremists, guided by our colleagues in Teheran and Damascus, can attack Russian passport-holders. The Ukrainian authorities, partly due to their own incompetence and partly thanks to our disruptive activities, will be unable to stop these atrocities. Our agents in the local population can therefore set up armed self-defence militias. These will clash with the Ukrainian police and army. Our forces can then intervene as peacekeepers, recreating the scenario that has played out so successfully in Georgia.
In the Baltic, provocations will be by nationalist hooligan gangs, supposedly acting as patriots, demanding ethnic cleansing of all Russian-speakers from Estonia and Latvia. Our compatriots there will also establish self-defence militias, which will appeal to us for protection from both the hooligans and from the organs of state power. In the case of Lithuania, our sponsored extremist groups can mount terrorist attacks on military transit to the Kaliningrad region, giving us the chance to demand, and provide, suitable security protection to them.
We can also launch deniable cyber-attacks against Poland and the Czech Republic, crippling official websites and disrupting the banking system.
There remains only the problem of certain propagandists in the enemy media who
Editor’s note: “Shutnik”—the surname of the author of this email—is the Russian word for “Joker”. Whether this affects the authenticity of the above material is for readers to decide.
Thursday, August 28, 2008
Georgian Crisis on the Republic of Moldova
The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia has produced a major political-military crisis capable of generating profound transformations in the system of international relations. Rapid and fundamental degradation of institutional cooperation mechanisms and relations between Russia , on the one part, and the European Union and NATO, on the other, marks the beginning of a new period of confrontation, with serious implications for regional security and stability.
The Georgian crisis threatens stability of many post-Soviet countries that Russia unilaterally perceives as being part of its paramount sphere of interests. These countries face separatist conflicts that have been initiated and supported politically, economically and militarily by the Russian Federation . The armed conflict between Georgia and Russia has clearly demonstrated the role of Russia as a party in these conflicts and highlighted the limitations of the existing system for ensuring stability in the frozen conflict zones.
Considering the important changes appearing in the context of international relations, Moldova should thoroughly and comprehensively analyze the significance of these developments, assess their impact on its interests and make necessary adjustments to its foreign and domestic policies.
Wishing to contribute to this effort of analysis and adaptation, representatives of the community of foreign and security policy experts from the Republic of Moldova held a series of consultations, having agreed upon the following points:
- By launching a major military operation, including attacks on non-military targets and occupying parts of the Georgian territory, the Russian Federation has violated the basic principles of international law and has committed an act of aggression against an independent country member of the UN.
- Through its actions, Russia has irreversibly undermined its position of a peacekeeper and mediator in the settlement of conflicts in Georgia . It has confirmed its role as a party to the conflict and demonstrated that the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are rather conflicts between Russia and Georgia . The nature of Russia ’s involvement in the Transnistrian conflict is similar to that in Georgia and this could adversely affect the prospects for a lasting settlement.
- Russia’s decision to use military force demonstrates its determination to apply all means to thwart the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Georgia and, indirectly, those of Ukraine and possibly Moldova .
- The decision to use military force for promoting its interests, even by seriously undermining its image in the world, shows that Moscow places greater importance on blocking further NATO enlargement to the East and keeping post-Soviet states in its sphere of absolute control rather than build partnership relations with the European Union and the United States .
- The fact that this military incursion was partially explained by the need to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia and Abkhazia creates a worrying precedent, given that many post-Soviet states still have a large population of Russian citizens and Russia could at any time intervene in other places to allegedly defend them.
- The aggression of one CIS member against another member of this community demolishes the concept of cooperation among equal and independent states of this organization and takes things back to soviet times when the center dominated through the use of force.
- Against the backdrop of the war in Georgia , one could expect Russia to attempt to demonstrate its capacity to peacefully solve conflicts in the CIS area, proposing a pro forma solution of the Transnistrian conflict that actually would lead to the consolidation of Russian influence in Moldova and block our country’s aspirations for European integration.
- Considering the radicalisation of Russia ’s towards full support for the separatist regions of Georgia and actions aimed at recognizing their independence, it is not realistic to expect that Russia would adopt an opposite approach in the Transnistrian conflict and support its viable settlement.
- The format of the “peacekeeping” forces deployed in the security zone on the basis of the Moldovan-Russian Agreement signed on July 21, 1992, is similar to that in South Ossetia and hence, Russia could use the precedent set in South Caucasus to hinder Moldova ’s advance towards the European Union and its greater cooperation with NATO.
- The events in Georgia once again show that Ukraine could represent a real “strategic shelter” for the Republic of Moldova and therefore, Moldova is vitally interested in the success of Ukraine ’s Euro-Atlantic integration and in developing a strategic partnership with its neighbor.
- Following the military conflict between Russia and Georgia , the European Union demonstrates greater openness to play a more active role in the resolution of frozen conflicts, and to send clearer signals to the countries of its Eastern Neighborhood, encouraging their aspirations for European integration. This development could represent a major opportunity for Moldova ’s EU prospects.
Considering the above, we believe that Moldova should:
- Show greater caution with regard to any possible Russian initiatives to solve the Transnistrian conflict outside the framework set by the Law of July 22, 2005 “About the basic principles of the status of Transnistria”.
- Intensify efforts aimed at replacing the current “peacekeeping arrangement” in the security zone with an international mission of civil and police observers.
- Together with the authorities in Kiev and Bucharest , identify as soon as possible compromise formulas, as needed to solve existing problems that hold back the development of a strategic partnership between the Republic of Moldova and its neighbors.
- Undertake a fundamental cost-benefit analysis of maintaining its position as a CIS member, closely coordinating any potential adjustments with Ukraine ’s position.
- Set up a format of permanent consultations with Ukraine in the areas of European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation.
- Consolidate its cooperation in the framework of regional organizations in which Ukraine is also taking part, and in particular in the framework of GUAM .
- Take advantage of the renegotiation of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO to include common actions aimed at consolidating the security of the Republic of Moldova .
- Further urge the European Union to adopt as soon as possible the mandate for the negotiation of a new framework agreement with Moldova , without linking this decision to the electoral calendar in the Republic of Moldova .
- Insist that this document confirms the EU membership prospects for the Republic of Moldova and contains a solidarity clause, through which EU would commit to support Moldova in case its sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened.
- Deepen reforms, and first of all those aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, and ensure that future parliamentary elections are conducted in full compliance with international norms and standards.
The undersigned experts:
- express their availability to discuss broadly these recommendations with relevant institutions from the Republic of Moldova , including under the existing forms of cooperation with the civil society,
- propose the organization of consultations and debates regarding the impact of ongoing changes on the security situation and national interests of the Republic of Moldova, with the participation of civil society experts, decision-makers and political parties,
- agreed to initiate a comprehensive study on the security options for the Republic of Moldova in the new international context.
Chisinau, August 26, 2008
Arcadie Barbarosie, Executive Director, Institute for Public Policy of Moldova (IPP)
Igor Botan, Executive Director, Association for Participative Democracy (ADEPT)
Eugen Carpov, Ambassador, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Viorel Cibotaru, Director, NATO Information and Documentation Center, European Institute for Political Studies in Moldova
Victor Chirila, Programs Director, Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (APE)
Stefan Gorda, Member of the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (APE)
Iulian Fruntasu, Director, European Initiatives Programme, Soros Foundation - Moldova
Iurie Leanca, Ambassador, Vice-President of the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (APE)
Vlad Lupan, Independent expert
Dumitru Minzarari, Foreign and security policy analyst, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS „Viitorul”)
Igor Munteanu, Executive Director, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS „Viitorul”)
Oazu Nantoi, Programs Director, Institute for Public Policy of Moldova (IPP)
Vasile Nedelciuc, Member of the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (APE)
Iurie Pintea, Program Director, Institute for Public Policy of Moldova (IPP)
Nicu Popescu, Research Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), London
Andrei Popov, Executive Director, Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (APE)
Eugen Revenco, Executive Director, Moldovan-Lithuanian Foundation „European Integration Studies Center”, Programs Director, Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (APE)
Oleg Serebrian, Chairman of the European Moovement in Moldova
Vlad Spanu, President, „Moldova Foundation”, Washington, D.C.
Anatol Taranu, Director, Institute for Political and Military Studies of Moldova
Liliana Vitu, Independent Analist
Radu Vrabie, Programs Coordinator, Foreign Policy Association of Moldova (APE)
Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Distribuita oficial astazi la agentia de presa Infotag, la 14.00
Poziţia unui grup de experţi cu privire la
impactul crizei din Georgia asupra Republicii Moldova
Conflictul armat ruso-georgian a generat o criză politico-militară de proporţii de natură să provoace transformări profunde în sistemul relaţiilor internaţionale.
Degradarea rapidă şi fundamentală a mecanismelor instituţionale de cooperare şi a raporturilor dintre Rusia, pe de o parte, şi UE şi NATO, pe de altă parte, marchează începutul unei noi perioade de confruntare, cu implicaţii serioase asupra securităţii si stabilităţii regionale.
Criza georgiană periclitează stabilitatea mai multor state din spaţiul ex-sovietic, percepute unilateral de Rusia ca fiind o zonă a intereselor sale primordiale şi care se confruntă cu conflicte secesioniste, iniţiate şi sprijinite politic, economic şi militar de Federaţia Rusă. Conflictul armat ruso-georgian a demonstrat clar rolul Rusiei de parte în aceste conflicte şi limitele actualului sistem de asigurare a stabilităţii în zonele de conflicte îngheţate.
Avînd in vedere schimbările importante care se prefigurează în contextul internaţional, este necesar ca Republica Moldova să întreprindă o analiză temeinică şi complexă a semnificaţiei acestor evoluţii, să evalueze impactul lor asupra intereselor sale şi să opereze ajustările de rigoare în politica sa externă şi internă.
Dorind să-şi aducă contribuţia la acest demers de analiză şi adaptare, reprezentanţii comunităţii de experţi în probleme de politică externă şi securitate internaţională din Republica Moldova au avut o serie de consultări, convenind asupra următoarelor poziţii:
· Prin declanşarea unei operaţiuni militare de proporţii, atacarea unor obiecte civile şi ocuparea unei părţi din teritoriul Georgiei, Federaţia Rusă a încălcat principiile de bază ale dreptului internaţional şi a comis un act de agresiune împotriva unui stat independent membru ONU.
· Prin acţiunile sale, Rusia şi-a compromis definitiv poziţia de pacificator şi mediator în soluţionarea conflictelor din Georgia, confirmînd rolul său de parte în conflict şi caracterul inter-statal al diferendului ruso-georgian în Abhazia şi Osetia de Sud. Implicarea Rusiei în conflictul transnistrean este similară situaţiei din Georgia şi poate avea consecinţe negative pentru soluţionarea acestuia.
· Decizia de a recurge la folosirea forţei demonstrează determinarea Rusiei de a utiliza toate mijloacele pentru a contracara aspiraţiile de integrare euro-atlantică ale Georgiei şi, indirect, ale Ucrainei, precum şi posibil, ale Republicii Moldova.
· Decizia de a utiliza forţa pentru a-şi promova interesele chiar şi cu preţul unor prejudicii grave pentru imaginea sa în lume, denotă faptul că pentru Moscova oprirea extinderii NATO spre Est şi menţinerea în zona sa de control total a statelor din spaţiul post-sovietic constituie obiective mai importante decît edificarea unor relaţii de parteneriat cu UE şi SUA.
· Faptul că această incursiune militară a fost parţial explicată prin nevoia de a proteja cetăţenii ruşi din Osetia de Sud şi Abhazia creează un precedent îngrijorător în condiţiile în care mai multe state post-sovietice au un număr substanţial de cetăţeni ruşi, iar Rusia poate oricînd interveni şi în alte cazuri, sub pretextul apărării propriilor cetăţeni.
· Agresiunea unui stat-membru al CSI împotriva unui alt stat-membru al acestei comunităţi răstoarnă conceptul cooperării dintre state egale şi independente în cadrul acestei organizaţii şi readuce situaţia la ecuaţia dominării prin forţă a centrului, caracteristică perioadei sovietice.
· Pe fundalul războiului din Georgia, se poate anticipa că Moscova ar putea încerca să demonstreze capacitatea sa de reglementare paşnică a conflictelor din spaţiul CSI, propunînd o soluţie de forma pentru reglementarea conflictului transnistrean, dar care în esenţă ar conduce la consolidarea influenţei Rusiei în Moldova şi blocarea aspiraţiilor de integrare europeană ale ţării noastre.
· In condiţiile radicalizării poziţiei Moscovei cu privire la susţinerea totală a regiunilor separatiste din Georgia şi acţiunilor întreprinse pentru recunoaşterea independenţei acestora, nu este realist de aşteptat ca în cazul conflictului transnistrean Rusia să vina cu o abordare opusă, susţinînd o reglementare viabilă.
· Formatul forţelor de „pacificare” din zona de securitate, instituit în baza Acordului moldo-rus din 22 iulie 1992, este asemănător cu cel din Osetia de Sud, deci Rusia ar putea folosi precedentul creat în Caucazul de Sud acelaşi scenariu pentru a împiedica accederea Republicii Moldova la UE şi intensificarea cooperării cu NATO.
· Evenimentele din Georgia au scos în evidenţă faptul că Ucraina ar putea reprezenta un veritabil „adăpost strategic” pentru Republica Moldova. Moldova este vital interesată în succesul eforturilor de integrare euro-atlantică a Ucrainei şi în dezvoltarea unei relaţii de parteneriat strategic cu statul vecin.
· Urmare a conflictului militar ruso-georgian, Uniunea Europeană manifestă o disponibilitate mai mare de a se angaja activ în soluţionarea conflictelor îngheţate şi de a transmite semnale mai clare de încurajare a aspiraţiilor de integrare europeană pentru statele din vecinătatea sa estică. Evoluţia respectivă reprezintă o oportunitate majoră şi pentru şansele de apropiere a Moldovei de Uniunea Europeană.
Pornind de la cele expuse, considerăm că Republica Moldova trebuie să:
· manifeste prudenţă sporită faţă de posibilele iniţiative ale Federaţiei Ruse privind soluţionarea conflictului transnistrean în afara cadrului stabilit de Legea din 22 iulie 2005 privind principiile de bază ale statutului regiunii transnistrene.
· intensifice eforturile vizînd înlocuirea actualului „aranjament de menţinere a păcii” din zona de securitate cu o misiune internaţională de observatori civili şi de poliţie.
· identifice cît mai rapid posibil împreună cu autorităţile de la Kiev şi Bucureşti formule de compromis în vederea depăşirii problemelor care împiedică edificarea unei relaţii de parteneriat strategic dintre Republica Moldova şi vecinii săi.
· întreprindă o reevaluare fundamentală a beneficiilor şi costurilor menţinerii poziţiei sale de membru CSI, coordonînd strîns eventualele ajustări cu poziţia Ucrainei.
· instituie un format de consultări permanente dintre Ucraina şi Republica Moldova în domeniul cooperării europene şi euro-atlantice.
· consolideze colaborarea în cadrul organizaţiilor regionale din care face parte şi Ucraina, in primul rînd în cadrul GUAM.
· iniţieze renegocierea Planului Individual de Acţiuni al Parteneriatului cu NATO (IPAP) pentru a include acţiuni comune de natură să consolideze securitatea Republicii Moldova.
· solicite în continuare ca UE să adopte cît mai curînd posibil mandatul de negociere privind noul cadru juridic dintre Republica Moldova şi UE, fără a lega această decizie de calendarul electoral din Republica Moldova.
· insiste ca acest document să confirme perspectiva de aderare la UE pentru Republica Moldova şi să conţină o clauză de solidaritate, prin care UE s-ar obliga să sprijine Moldova în cazul în care suveranitatea şi integritatea sa teritorială vor fi ameninţate.
· aprofundeze reformele, în primul rînd orientate spre consolidarea instituţiilor democratice, şi să asigure desfăşurarea viitoarelor alegeri parlamentare în deplină corespundere cu standardele şi normele internaţionale.
· Îşi exprimă disponibilitatea de a discuta pe larg aceste recomandări cu instituţiile abilitate din Republica Moldova, inclusiv în cadrul formatelor existente de colaborare cu societatea civilă,
· Lansează iniţiativa desfăşurării unor consultări şi dezbateri largi privind impactul schimbărilor actuale asupra securităţii şi intereselor naţionale ale Republicii Moldova cu participarea experţilor din societatea civilă, a factorilor de decizie şi a partidelor politice,
· Au convenit asupra iniţierii unui studiu complex privind opţiunile de securitate ale Republicii Moldova în noul context internaţional.
Chisinau, 26 august 2008
Arcadie Barbaroşie, Director Executiv, Institutul de Politici Publice din Moldova (IPP)
Igor Boţan, Director Executiv, Asociaţia pentru Democraţie Participativă (ADEPT)
Eugen Carpov, Ambasador, ex-Viceministru al Afacerilor Externe, fost Şef al Misiunii Permanente al Republicii Moldova pe lîngă Uniunea Europeană
Viorel Cibotaru, Director, Centrul de Informare şi Documentare NATO în Moldova, Institutul European de Studii Politice din Moldova
Victor Chirilă, Director de Programe, Asociaţia pentru Politică Externă (APE)
Ştefan Gorda, Membru al Consiliului de Administraţie APE
Iulian Fruntaşu, Director, Programul Iniţiative Europene, Fundaţia Soros Moldova
Iurie Leancă, Ambasador, Vice-Preşedintele Asociaţiei pentru Politică Externă (APE)
Vlad Lupan, Expert independent
Dumitru Mînzărari, Analist pe probleme de politică externă şi securitate, IDIS „Viitorul”
Igor Munteanu, Director Executiv, Institutul pentru Dezvoltare şi Iniţiative Sociale, IDIS „Viitorul”
Oazu Nantoi, Director de Programe, Institutul de Politici Publice (IPP)
Vasile Nedelciuc, Membru al Consiliului de Administraţie APE
Iurie Pîntea, Director de programe, Institutul de Politici Publice (IPP)
Nicu Popescu, Cercetător, Consiliul European pentru Politică Externă (ECFR), Londra
Andrei Popov, Director Executiv, Asociaţia pentru Politică Externă (APE)
Eugen Revenco, Director de Programe, Asociaţia pentru Politică Externă (APE), Fundatia Moldo-Lituaniană „Centrul de Studii al Integrării Europene”
Oleg Serebrian, Preşedintele Mişcării Europene din Moldova
Vlad Spînu, Preşedintele Fundaţiei Moldova, Washington, D.C.
Anatol Ţăranu, Director, Institutul pentru Studii Politice si Militare din Moldova
Liliana Viţu, Analist independent, Magistru in Studii Europene
Radu Vrabie, Coordonator de Programe, Asociaţia pentru Politică Externă (APE)
Friday, August 15, 2008
The civil society in Moldova was the first to react. Within the civil society there are two main sets of views over who started the armed conflict (while about its conduct and results - below). One is the view that Georgia started a miscalculated campaign to regain South Ossetia, which seems quite unlikely, although, of course, one can see elements of such an assessment in the military campaign that unfolded later. It is difficult to share this point of view because it is voiced by people, majority of whom are less familiar with Georgia, although have contacts with Georgians and, most importantly, are recognized experts on Moldova. It might seem that some of such statements are based on the Russian propaganda, which such analysts normally distrust. From the logical point of view it is difficult to argue that Georgia attacked South Ossetia thinking that Russia would not react - such a scenario where Georgians were "not thinking" is impossible and should be disregarded.
Experts reactions prove that there is a limited amount of independent information on Georgia in Moldova and it is mainly supplied to the media by the same civil society actors, mentioned above - which makes it a closed circle.
There is another view within the civil society and finally political parties, Transnistrian separatists and Gagauz autonomy in the south of Moldova also reacted, last two in favour of South Ossetia, of course:
Another civil society view is that Russia, who was preparing the destabilization of Georgia for a while, as Abkhazian events unfolded, provoked the Georgians and used the opportunity to "punish" Tbilisi for their NATO bid. It also used another opportunity - the one to ensure that the image of Georgia as a energy transit corridor is damaged and further unilateral dependency on Russian energy blackmail is further ensured. This was quoted by a most of the experts. This point of view was supported in my Monday article in the local (opposition) newspaper Timpul that has most impact in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau. I also inform the Moldovan political parties there and the civil society that at least in Lithuania and Latvia the civil society is actively demonstrating in front of the Russian Embassies. A call to set up a bank account for Georgia is also in the article, although, of course, it is clear that such an initiative would be difficult since Moldova was hit by an extremely severe flooding that devastated the North and the South of the country and people, who live in the poorest country of Europe, already transferred money to the local calamities account. That diminishes the possibilities to raise money for Georgia, although a simple set up of an account could at least send a positive signal to Tbilisi.
The civil society conclusions is that regardless of the view on who started the conflict, both groups of the civil society analysts who spoke on the Georgian topic (and representing the majority of political analysts in Moldova), share the same opinion that Russia did not have the right to military intervene in Georgia. Its reaction was not legitimate and the actions were unjustified and exaggerated.
Within the Moldovan political scene, two political parties picketed the Russian Embassy. One is the Liberal Party (PL) of the current Chisinau Mayor (with some, although limited, prospects to enter the Parliament in 2009) and the other party is People's Christian-Democrats Party (PPCD), which supports the Governing Communist party. The fact that this party (PPCD) reacted is interesting due to their close relationship with party in power. PPCD however is used with meetings of protests, as it is an inheritor of the National Front Movement of 80's and later used this tactics to gain political points. Currently in decline, some can argue that PPCD's reaction is either populist or represents a principled decision. It seems, though, that there is a close feeling for Georgia in PPCD. However, the decision to picket the Russian Embassy might indeed use the opportunity and incorporates both support for Georgia and making needed political points in an already familiar and recognizable stile before 2009 elections. At the same time, it also might mean that the governing party allows PPCD such actions since these parties are not comfortable with the Georgian military defeat and Russian actions. We are aware that Russia allegedly warned Moldova in 2006-2008 to be more obedient, which should be, in Moscow's view, a positive step in the light of "future events", which will prove that a more moderate stance of Moldova would pay off. It is clear that Russian warnings, if true, meant that Moscow was preparing a destabilization in Georgia, including a military campaign. That was not a scenario that Moldova would like or support.
Consequently the official State position was expressed by the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which issued a careful statement, only on 11 August, in which it aligns itself, as usual, with the French Presidency of the EU statement made by France on EU's behalf in Vienna, at the OSCE Permanent Council on 8 August 2008. The three days delay shows the indecision and confusion of the Moldovan leadership with regard to what position Moldova should take. It was understood by the governance that Georgian precedent can have an extremely negative impact on Moldova, which faces a Russian controlled separatist conflict as well. It was also understood that now, when Russia did not respond to Moldovan initiative up to this moment, the Moldovan position in negotiation with Moscow on Transnistrian conflict, particularly before 2009 elections, would weaken even more. The governance, through this rather weak statement, shows that they still hope for the "mercy" of Moscow and would not make harsh statements before 2009 elections. It is not clear yet, how they would react further - would they finally and completely give in, or rather start preparations to ensure more autonomy from Russia.
It is very much worth mentioning that Transnistrian separatist leadership already next day, on 12 August, announced that they are withdrawing from conflict resolution negotiations that have just restarted after several years of blockage from Transnistrian side. The separatists conditioned their return to the talks by a Moldovan condemnation of Georgian aggression over South Ossetia. Previously, in April 2008, the Transnistrian leadership launched a precondition to restart negotiations - Moldova should sign an Agreement/Treaty between two countries (Moldova and Moldovan Transnistrian Republic). Moldova did not react to the Transnistrian draft Agreement/Treaty. However, after Georgian events, in the above mentioned 12 August Transnistrian statement, the separatists also stated that they "examine the opportunity to draft and sign a new agreement regarding the guarantees of peace, security and stability in the region, which would correspond to the real situation". Transnistrian leader also reminds the people of Transnistrian and South Ossetia that they voted for independence in 2006 referendums (see text in Russian on the website of the "Transnistrian Presidency": http://presidentpmr.org/material/659.html). That confirms that conflict resolution negotiations in Moldova might be seriously damaged, despite governmental hopes. Transnistrian leadership is casually used by Moscow to block negotiations to extract more concessions from Moldova, or West. The most probable scenario, therefore, is that Russia will now use the "tougher stand" of Transnistrian separatists to attempt extracting more concessions out of Moldova, US and UE. As a first prove of that is the answer of the Moldovan Government delivered on on 14 August, according to which the separatist decision to withdraw from negotiations is groundless, however their return to negotiations will not be preconditioned by Chisinau (see Azi.md, 14 August, in English http://www.azi.md/news?ID=50637).
Another worrying statement comes from the Russia oriented Gagauz autonomy located in the south of Moldova, where they deplore South Ossetian victims, but not Georgian victims whatsoever.
Probably, again on the local political scene, a sign of worry for the governing communist party that is not sure yet whether it is supported by Moscow or not yet is the 13 August reaction of the semi-communist/semi-Russian ethnic Movement "Ravnopravie" (Equality) that is alleged to be directly supported by Kremlin and by the Russian Embassy. The leader of that movement, usually voicing Moscow's stance, declared that 31 volunteers addressed his movement with a request to fight on South Ossetian side and that Presidents Saakashvili and Bush should be trialed for genocide, while, most importantly, he called for the withdrawal of Moldova from GUAM.
The leader of the main opposition party Our Moldova Alliance (AMN) made a statement condemning the genocide made by Georgians in South Ossetia(NB), which seems to be exactly the words of Ravnopravie Movement. Despite the fact that he also condemns Moscow in his statement for its reaction, this clear piece of Russian propaganda restated by Urecehan raises a number of serious questions with regard to his affiliation, or his and his staff qualification. The issue of pro-Moscow affiliation already was raised in 2005 elections when he was allowed by Moscow to preferentially meet with the Transnistrian separatist leader right before 2005 elections, while Communists were rejected. The issue of AMN non-European orientation was further aggravated by serious allegations that he received Russian funds and PR specialists from Moscow in 2005. However, it still remains unclear if this Russian-made statement shows his renewed affiliation to Kremlin or simply reflects the lack of professional staff in his team, a very serious problem that he and other parties face in Moldova. Nevertheless, such a statement from an experienced politician is politically unforgivable under current circumstances.
The issue of withdrawing from CIS has floated immediately after Georgian statements of withdrawal from this organization. Communist governance is not reacting in any way, while one pro-governmental party (Democrats Party - PD) is suggesting this will not happen as Moldova is not in the same situation as Georgia and it should wait and see how west will support Georgia and if Russians will withdraw. A similar stance has AMN leader Urechean. The other two important opposition parties Liberal Party (PL), which holds the municipality, and Liberal Democrat Party, which is drawing heavy criticism from the Communist governance, and whose leader’s financial assets were allegedly taken over by the communists recently, are basically against CIS.
The reactions of Ukraine and Romania were of interest as well.
The tougher stance of Ukraine was probably welcomed not only by the Moldovan civil society. I was probably deemed positive by the communist party in power, as they understand that Ukraine could provide the necessary buffer with Russia. Ukraine was a country that was swinging in time between support to Moscow in negotiations and support to Moldova, although permanently declaring its good intentions towards Chisinau, and, I would dare suggest towards Moscow as well, probably. It is my impression that at this point it would be better for Ukraine to change it’s very soft, if not even supportive, stance towards Transnistrian separatist leadership and come closer to Moldova. It will be difficult to do, since Moldova is not clear yet how to proceed, as it seems. The planned visit by the Ukrainian President would probably clear some issues; however such high level contacts between Kiev and Chisinau should intensify dramatically to ensure coordination and support to each other, which is absolutely necessary, in my opinion.
Another country with which the relations are rather bad is Romania that is, with Russian pressure, accused by Moldovan authorities of imperial revisionism, which is far from being truth. More intense contacts with historically supportive Bucharest would have been very important for Chisinau, instead of quarreling on Moscow's request with Romania to prove loyalty to Russia in order to dissipate fear of reunification with Romania. The Romanian reaction, although voiced by a more populist and popular President is also interesting. Romanian President Traian Basescu answered to a question from a student from the Republic of Moldova that the situation in Moldova is far different from Georgia, as it does not border Russia, and due to the fact that it borders Romania, a NATO member. Most importantly the Romanian president stated that the task of Bucharest is to protect Romanian citizens wherever they live, as in Moldova there are a very high number of Romanian citizens. That statement comes after years of handing over Romanian passports in Moldova to the population whose parents only 60 years ago were all Romanian citizens. However, most importantly, this statement repeats Moscow's rhetoric of right of intervention to protect Russian citizens abroad, quoted in the case of South Ossetia.
The discussions on the Georgian issue are continuing both in the political, State and civil society sectors of Moldova, although the intensity of these discussions is diminishing with the armed conflict in Georgia slowing down. The two most important views probably exist now in Moldova – one may be reflecting the official way of not annoying Russia and Moldovan submissions to Moscow might be presented again as an anti-Georgia, good way, of doing business with Moscow by the pro-governmental mass-media, which controls the entire national TV broadcast and rural newspaper readers. Another point of view comes from within the civil society – it is considered that there is a new political and geopolitical reality emerging in relations between EU and US on one side, and Russian on the other – these new relations are no longer in favor of Moscow, which showed its real intentions, both in terms of cutting alternatives for European energy and being a rising neo-colonial empire. This should be used for Moldova’s advantage. Hopefully this point of view would be finally embraced, silently and with a great delay, as usual, by the State.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Salut reactia partidelor politice din Republica Moldova, care au condamnat atacurile asupra Georgiei. In particular sunt placut surprins de organizarea actiunilor de protest de catre acele partide, care sunt in contact cu guvernarea si care pana la urma, au demonstrat impotriva actiunilor Federatiei Ruse in Georgia. Sper ca asemenea actiuni sa nu fie folosite in lupta politica interne, pentru ca nu ar fi in nici un caz in interesul Georgiei!
Iata inceputul argumentarii si cei care doresc sa vada mai multe urmeaza sa apese pe linkul "Read More" de la sfarsitul postarii.
GEORGIA IN STATE OF WAR WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Note: This is a brief document that summarizes the facts that took place during the last days on the territory of Georgia. This paper focuses on the qualification of the current facts with respect to the situation between Russian Federation and Georgia as of August 9, 2008. This document represent a copyright of a small group of Students from Georgia, who remain solely responsible to all interpretation given to the facts in context of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and does not represent an official opinion of any Government, Institution or Agency.
In the last couple of days the situation in Georgia has dramatically changed. Currently Georgia is in State of War. Namely, in violation with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the Russian Federation has used force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, thus forcing Georgia to act in self-defense in accordance with requirements given in article 51 of the UN Charter. It is also contended, that Georgia is in situation of an international armed conflict with the Russian Federation which governed by the relevant rules of the International Humanitarian Law and unfortunately, the Russian Federation is committing grave violation of the rules of humanitarian law by targeting civilian population and cities, rather than directing its attacks against military objective.
Factual Situation on Grounds
From early hours of August 8, the armed attack was launched against Georgia by Russian Federation. The territory next to South Ossetia (Tskinvali Regions) in particular cities of Gori, Kareli and nearby villages, were bombed. In particular two SU 24 type fighter jets violated the airspace, intruded into the territory of Georgia from Russian Federation and bombed radar station located in Gori region. A missile was also dropped in the village of Variani as a result of which 7 persons were injured. Around 11:30 a.m. four SU 24 fighter jets entered the airspace of Georgia. 2 bombs were dropped at the police office building in Kareli, as a result of which several persons were injured.
Moreover since the 7th of August 2008, 3 columns consisting of hundreds of armed personnel as well as tens of heavy armed vehicles were entering region of Georgia - South Ossetia, via Rocki tunnel, from the Russian Federation.
From the second part of the day (8th of August 2008), following cities have been bombed by the fighter jets entering territory of Georgia from the Russian Federation:
- City of Gori and nearby areas;
- Black Sea Port Poti;
- Upper Abkhazian territory;
- Villages such as Senaki, Khoni and Oni;
There are casualties among civilian population in all the aforementioned places, as the bombing has been directed towards the cities and villages per se indiscriminately. Currently, according to official information 57 civilians had been killed in course of the hostilities.
The aforementioned facts have been preceded by an escalated situation in the Tskhinvali Region of Georgia from 1st of August 2008, when the attacks have been carried out by the representatives of the Separatist regime of South Ossetia (Tskinvali Region). Georgian villages – Upper and Lower Niqozi, Avnevi, Ergneti and Eredvi were subjected to the heavy fire from machine-guns and grenades. The fire was lead in the direction of check-points of Georgian peacekeepers and police. As a result of an intensive shelling, 6 civilians were injured, houses destroyed. Attacks continued on 5-6 of August, when fire from machineguns and grenades were opened at Georgian village Nulli and Georgia and police checkpoint respectively. On August 7 separatists once again attacked Georgian villages Eredvi, Frisi, Avnevi, dvani and Nulli, as a result of which 2 Georgian peacekeepers were wounded. Later that day the attacks were continued.
The Russian Federation under the pretext of its right to “self-defense of its nationals abroad” decided to enter the territory of Georgia from early hours of 8 of August 2008. Its claims are based on the fact, that the population of the Tskhinvali Region in recent hears has received the citizenship of the Russian Federation. However, currently, as noted above, the military operation by the Russian armed forces are carried out outside the Tskhinvali region and include bombing of the cities of Georgia near the capital Tbilisi as well as of cities and villages that are hundreds of kilometers away from the Tskhinvali Region.
PART ON JUS AD BELLUM
The Russian Federation has violated the Principles on the Prohibition of the Use of Force and has carried out Acts of AGRESSION
1. Russia Violated the Principles of the UN Charter and carried out Act of Aggression
The Russian has argued in the course of last two days that it has been acting in accordance with the principles of international law, namely it has been acting in self-defense and entered to territory of Georgia in order to defend its citizens/nationals on the territory of South Ossetia, Georgia. It shall be noted, that South Ossetia (Tkshinvali Region) is part of Georgia that has been under control of the separatist regime supported by the Russian Federation.
First it is retained that acts of the Russian Federation constitute violation of the prohibition of the use of force ad constitutes act of an agreesion. And second, the acts of the Russian Federation cannot be justified under the self-defense, either under the treaty law or customary rules of international law.
Article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter stipulates that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” As it is clarified by authoritative scholar Simma in A Commentary to the UN Charter, the prohibition includes any use of armed force, even small and temporary operations that do not result in any deprivation of territory. The Russian Federation has been carrying out armed attack against Georgia since early morning of 8 August 2008, by carry out targeted bombing of various regions of Georgia.
It is noteworthy that there are certain exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force strictly defined by the UN Charter. Namely, the legitimate use of Self-defence under Article 51 is one of such exceptions. Another exception is actions mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The former is argued by Russian as a lawful ground for use of force and the legal arguments are given below. The latter is not relevant to the given facts and thus not discussed.
In addition, it represents a typical example of intervention that goes against the territorial integrity and political independence of Georgia .
According to the Article 1 of the 1974 Resolution 3314 on the Definition of Aggression, “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”. The definition almost repeats the wording of article 2.4 of the UN Charter. The difference lies within the term “armed force” inserted and the “threat” of use of force omitted. It is thus evident that according to the definition proposed by the resolution, unlike article 2.4 of the UN charter, aggression takes place only in case an “armed force” is used and the “threat of use of force” does not constitute aggression under international law.
The Resolution contains seven provisions defined as aggression:
o Invasion or attack by armed forces of one State upon another State, occupation or annexation resulting from this;
o Bombardment or the use of any weapons by one State against another State;
o Blockade of ports or coasts of one State by armed forces of another State.
o Attack on armed forces of one State by armed forces of another State;
o Using a State’s armed forces within another State, when this presence is with the agreement of the receiving State, but when the usage is contrary to the terms agreed upon or the presence is for a longer time period than agreed upon;
o One State allowing another State to use its territory for perpetrating acts of aggression against a third State;
o Sending armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries into another State to carry out acts of force amounting to acts of aggression as they are defined above or substantial involvement therein.
The acts listed in article 3 are not exhaustive and according to the article 4 the SC has discretion to consider other acts as acts of aggression under the provisions of the UN Charter.
It is evident from the current situation in the territory of Georgia that the actions of the Russian Federation clearly amount to the acts of aggression. From early hours of August 8 territory next to South Ossetia in particular cities of Gori, Kareli and nearby villages, were bombed. The Russian Federation’s clear aggression leads to the sorrowful results for Georgia Moreover, even today, when Georgia is still ready for the peaceful negotiations, the Russian Federation continues bombing Georgian territory
2. Russian can not lawfully invoke right of self-defense as legal grounds for intervention in Georgia
Under treaty law, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of self-defence. The right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 applies to cases where an “armed attack” occurs against a Member of the United Nations. The exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack. Existence of prior armed attack carried out by state against a state is essential. In order to be legitimate, a military action carried out in self-defence must meet the requirements of necessity (no other alternative action is possible) and proportionality (the response is proportionate to redress the initial attack).
Not all violations of article 2.4 of the UN Charter constitute an “armed attack”. The latter only exists when force is used on a relatively large scale and with substantial effect. ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case: “[...] an armed attack must be [...] of such gravity as to amount to” an actual armed attack”
It is argued that the Russian Federation may not invoke the principle of self-defence since the incidents in the region of South Ossetia, which constitutes an integral part of Georgia and is recognized as such by the international community, did not constitute an “armed attack” of Georgia against the Russian Federation. In addition, it is submitted that the military action of the Russian Federation did not meet the requisite of necessity since other diplomatic means were available in order to redress the issue and of proportionality, as far as the military operation carried out by the Russian Federation affected and caused damage to the whole territory of Georgia on which casualties were fixed among the civilian population and civilian objects.
Self-defense in customary international law is based on the "Caroline Doctrine," which established the state's right to use force in order to defend itself against real and imminent threats that require immediate response in circumstances where all peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been exhausted and the response is essential and proportional to the threat .
It is argued that the Russian Federation cannot invoke its customary right to self-defence since:
o The Russian Federation has not faced the real and imminent threat leading to self-defence. The confrontations in the region of South Ossetia, which was caused by the Russian Federation itself, posed real and imminent threat to Georgia;
o Even if there existed any kind of threat to the Russian Federation, it has not exhausted all peaceful means for the settlement of the dispute, as far as even today, when Georgia is ready for the peaceful negotiations, the Russian Federation continues bombing Georgian territory.
3. Russian can not justify its act under the pretext of “Protection of Its National Abroad”
Russian Federation has been threatening Georgia to use force “for the protection of its nationals” in the Georgian two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region.
It is argued, that international law does not recognize the legality of use of force for the protection of the “nationals abroad” as such and existing practice shows that, States have argued the right to protection nationals abroad within the context of the right of self-defence .
Furthermore, the International Law Commission in its First Report on Diplomatic Protection of 2000, approved by the General Assembly by its resolution, emphasized that the state practice in combination with the prohibition of use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter outlaws use of force under the pretexts of diplomatic protection. The only exception to this provision, permitting the unilateral use of force by States, is Article 51, which deals with the right of self-defense . The illegality of Russia’s possible invocation of the right to self-defense has been discussed above.
Thus, any use of force by the Russian Federation against Georgia can only be categorized as an illegal armed reprisal, which is clearly prohibited under international law .
PART ON JUS IN BELLO
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is Applicable to the State of War in Georgia and Parties to the Conflict Should Comply with Respective Rules of IHL
1. IHL is Applicable to the Current State of War whatever the Argument of the Russian Federation can be under the Rules of Jus Ad Bellum
It is contends that the on-going activities fall under the legal frameworks of the law of armed conflicts, i.e. international humanitarian law (IHL) and the treatment of the persons as well as conduct of hostilities are regulated by the well defined rules and principles of IHL.
In addition it shall be noted that the purpose of IHL is to limit the suffering caused by war by protecting and assisting its victims as far as possible. IHL also known under the term Jus in Bello therefore addresses the reality of a conflict without considering the reasons for or legality of resorting to force. It regulates only those aspects of the conflict which are of humanitarian concern. IHL applies irrespective of the reasons for the conflict – whether the force used was legitimate in accordance with the principles of UN Charter (under law of Jus ad Bellum).
IHL is intended to protect war victims and their fundamental rights, no matter to which party they belong. That is why IHL (Jus In Bello) must remain independent of law on the use of force or law on the prevention of war (Jus Ad Bellum).
2. Applicable Regime under IHL governing situation between Georgia and the Russian Federation is the Laws of an International Armed Conflict
It is argued that the existing situation, since August 7 2008 amounts to an international armed conflict as defined and governed by Common Article 2 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Paragraph 1 of the Common Article 2 declares “…the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”. Formally, Common Article 2 determines two requirements for the application of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1947. First, that there shall be an armed conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties – that is between States that are parties (ratified/acceded) to the Geneva Conventions. And second, there is no need for formal declaration of war. Therefore, any declaration on behalf of the Russian authorities that there is no
As to what amount actually to an armed conflict the respectful Commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as Opinion Paper issued by the International Commission of the Red Cross in March 2008 noted, that international armed conflict occurs when one or more States have recourse to armed force against another States regardless of the reasons and intensity of the confrontation. It depends on the factual conditions – what actually happens on the ground .
In addition, according to the well-established practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State” . The Commentators and Legal experts also concerted that “…as soon as the armed forces of one State find themselves with wounded or surrendering members of the armed forces or civilians of another State on their hands, as soon as they detain prisoners or have actual control over a part of the territory of the enemy State, then they must comply with the relevant convention" .
There is an international armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 between Georgia and the Russian Federation due to the factual circumstances on the ground cited above. The aforementioned facts clearly indicate direct involvement of the Russian armed forces into the conduct of hostilities on the territory of Georgia that constitutes an international armed conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation and triggers application of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which both Georgia and the Russian Federation are parties to .
3. Persons shall be Protected in accordance with the IHL
According to IHL, the persons in situation of an international armed conflict fall under protection of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, namely:
o Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field;
o Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea;
o Geneva Convention III Relative for the Treatment of Prisoner of War;
o Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War;
o As well as Additional Protocol I of 1977;
Under international humanitarian law, no one has an intermediate status – everyone in enemy hands must have some definite status, either a "prisoner-of-war…covered by the Third Geneva Convention," or a "civilian covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention."
4. Parties to the Conflict shall Abide to the Principles and Rules Governing Conduct of Hostilities in accordance with IHL – Russian Federation violates Principles of Distinction
The law governing the conduct of hostilities regulates military operations by prohibiting or limiting certain attacks as well as the use of certain arms. The law of conduct of hostilities is based on a certain number of general rules codified in Additional Protocol I as well as regarded part of customary law.
First, the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose means and methods of warfare is not unlimited . Second, the means and methods of combat of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited . And third, the respect for principle of distinction shall be upheld. Namely :
o Distinction between civilians and combatants;
o Distinction between civilian objects and military objectives;
o Prohibition of indiscriminate attacks;
o Proportionality in attack;
o Precautions in attack;
o Precautions against the effects of attacks.
In addition all participants to an armed conflict to retain following:
o The prohibition on declaring that no quarter will be given, or that there will be no survivors.
o Prohibition of attacks against persons hors de combat, or those no longer participating in hostilities;
o The prohibition of perfidy;
The facts on the ground already show that the Russian Air Forces have violated the fundamental principles governing the conduct of hostilities as the bombing has been carried out with respect to the civilian objects. Hence, during last two days the main target of attack have been cities and villages populated by civilians and not representing military objects. As a result of these attacks houses and other property have been destroyed and tens of casualties among civilians are registered. These activities represent a flagrant violation of the principles mentioned above.
5. All Parties to an International Armed Conflict should comply with the rules and principles of International Humanitarian Law and with the Requirements of Humanity
We call upon all parties to an international armed conflict as well as members of the international community “to respect and ensure respect of application” of IHL norms in the conflict region in accordance with the requirements of the Common Article 1 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the State Parties to the said Conventions are under a legal obligation to implement in a good faith .
In particular, we urge all parties apart from the specific rights and obligations envisaged in the relevant articles of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, it would comply with the fundamental guarantees enshrined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common article 3 is like a “convention in miniature”, frequently sited list includes basic rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict , known as “elementary consideration of humanity” deriving from the “principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience” embedded in Common Article 3 , which has been recently categorized as minimum core of mandatory rules… reflecting the most universally recognized humanitarian principles .
Paragraph I of the Common Article 3 provides in imperative manner humane treatment without discrimination to all persons taking no active part in hostilities, including the members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those places hors de combat by sickness, wound, detention or any other cause. This paragraph includes list of acts that shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place with respect to abovementioned persons - as such, it allows no deviation from the following minimum prohibition:
- the violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
- taking of hostages;
- outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
- the passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Paragraph II in general terms notes the obligation to collect and care for wounded and sick.