Moldova elections - 99.35% polling stations reports counted, but results are clear, if Agora's math is correct:
PSRM 18+17=35
PD 13+17=30
ACUM 14+12=26
Sor 5+2=7
Independent 3
Scenario 1 - PD+Sor+Independents would again "buy" missing MPs from other parties. The quantity is high & therefore such an action seems problematic for now.
Scenario 2a & 2b (disingenious PD negotiations with ACUM that would probably reject such an offer, so that PD can justify an alliance with PSRM):
2a return to govern with PSRM covertly,
2b return to govern with PSRM this time openly,
EDIT: 2c - totally forgot the third option, Dodon may "borrow" sone MPs to Dems, but deny it in public.
In the meantime he already suggested early elections (it may be his tactical positioning ahead of negotiations)
Scenario 3 would be early elections, which cannot be ruled out.
Democrats+Sor are missing at least 14-17 MPs (17 if we consider that Independents are not related to DP). In 2009 parties resisted the attempts by the Communists (with DP's Plahotniuc & Dodon with the communist party) to buy one MP. That resistance provoked early elections. The 2009 change was in different conditions, however. Now in 2019 PSRM probably already calculated if it is worth going to new elections or not, as the results of early elections may not necessarily change too much, under current circumstances, despite 2009 precedent. Thus scenarios 2a&b seem to regain ground, as a group of 11 experts noted in a 2018-2019 overview. However nothing is yet written in stone. PSRM may decide a war by attrition and go into early elections. If they don't join forces with PD the probability of early elections may raise significantly. Let's see which scenario happens in 2019.
For other elements of these elections please see Stanislav Secrieru and Dionis Cenusa competentcpompet on their Facebook accounts.
By V.Lupan
February 25, 2019,
New York, USA.
Monday, February 25, 2019
Saturday, February 23, 2019
Moldovan elections with a kompromat twist
Moldovan elections 2019
A new “idea” to get rid of the governing oligarch,
Vladimir Plahotniuc, is flawed – there are simpler ways.
Instead this idea looks like a kompromat construct.
By Vlad
Lupan,
February
23, 2019
Moldovan Parliamentary elections will take
place tomorrow, February 24, 2019. The battle is mainly taking place between three
actors - the governing Democratic Party led by Vladimir Plahotniuc, the Party
of Socialists, previously led by the current Moldovan President, Igor Dodon, and
the ACUM (“Now”) Block jointly led by the previous reformist Education Minister,
Maia Sandu, and a former prosecutor and lawyer, Andrei Nastase. According to,
what I believe to be the least susceptible to internal meddling, IRI opinion
poll, conducted in December 2018 - January 2019 by Gallup and local Magenta
Consulting polling, these are the three parties to certainly enter the
parliament, with perhaps one more addition of Sor Party (read from here further Shor), led by the controversial businessman
involved in the theft of $1bln from the Moldovan banking system.[i]
Moldovan observers consider that the
currently governing Democrats share an uneasy coalition with the pro-Russian
socialists, which is called “Binom”, while Transparency International called a power-sharing
arrangement.[ii]
I previously suggested that this arrangement has a “good cop-bad cop”[iii] play in it, for the
distribution of spheres of influences between these two political players to
win the support of the West and East alike. Mr. Dodon Socialists nominally
oppose the Democrats and consult with President Putin, while the Democrats sometimes
expel Russian military and propaganda media. ACUM block at one moment participated
together with Mr. Dodon in protests against the Democrats, whom they believe to
be corrupt, and also are at odds with Mr. Dodon over Russian influence in Moldova.
The most recent idea appeared in a Russian
language media outlet, is that after elections Dodon’s Socialists and ACUM center-right
pro-EU/US should unite and oust corrupt Plahotniuc’s party from the governing positions,
and then organize clean elections. This line of argument is substantially flawed,
as we will show later, after a short backgrounder.
Basic
background
Mr. Shor’s party grew up
from “Ravnopravie” movement, which previously advocated for union with Russia[iv], while now only continues
to maintain a center-left, socially oriented program.[v] Yet this party is seemingly
a member of the Alliance of Conservatives and
Reformists in Europe (ACRE) - Mr. Shor, convicted in the first level court for his
involvement in the banking fraud, continues to run in elections, and managed to
register two European MPs outside the joint European Parliament election observation
effort, where ACRE is present.[vi]
This generated a rebuttal from MEPs, stating that theirs is the only European
Parliament observation mission officially registered for these elections.[vii]
Mr. Plahotniuc is also known as the former major
contributor to the Communist Party finances up to 2009.[viii] And although Russia and
its Interior Ministry identified him as a Russian citizen and one of the
perpetrators of the Russian Laundromat[ix], which leads me to believe
that they want to help Mr. Dodon in current elections – such an involvement,
with his relative, the current Spekaer of thee Palriament, Mr. Candu, was actually
reported by the RISE-Moldova investigative journalism group that exposed the
Russian Laundromat and other schemes[x]. RISE-Moldova is a reputable
institution. Hence, the electoral context is exposing an actual situation.
In his turn, Mr. Dodon’s Socialists finances do not seem to be in order as well,
according to the same RISE-Moldova.[xi] Mr. Dodon returned from
his recent trip to Moscow with a Gazprom flight.[xii] Though, to my knowledge,
nobody put an official request, such a trip provided by a foreign company
linked to a Government, amounts to passive corruption at least and is against
Moldovan legislation. He also recently launched a renewed version of the originally
Russian drafted Kozak plan that would plant Moldova firmly into the Russian
World/Russki Mir.[xiii]
His office denied the veracity of the document, suggesting another set of
document would be provided after elections.
ACUM
block
– an anti-corruption, pro-democracy, hence pro-European and Pro-Western block,
is formed by two younger persons. Maia Sandu and Andrei Nasase, with limited
previous political experience.
-
The
main criticism directed towards Maia
Sandu is for her membership in the Alliance for European Integration Government
and the failure to object in the governmental sessions (in a Government led by
the Liberal-Democrats, with the participation of the Democrats and Liberals), to
the $1bln theft and the sale of the Moldovan Airport to what initially turned out
to be an ex-KGB operative, who later transferred the business to Mr. Shor (see
above for Shor Party). Ms. Sandu was the Minister of Education in that coalition
Government.[xiv]
-
The
other ACUM leader is Andrei Nastase.
He is criticized for receiving money from off-shore accounts, possibly linked
to two Moldovan businessmen, both with the same family name Topa (unrelated,
yet partners), involved in a long-term business battle with Mr. Plahotniuc. They
were convicted of blackmail and money laundering by the Moldovan justice system,
often reported to be politically influenced and flew to Germany. Mr. Plahtoniuc
ousted the two Topa from the Moldovan VictoriaBank, while Plahontiuc’s previous
boss, the Communist President, Vladimir Voronin, nationalized Air Moldova
company after they invested in it and lost $7mln. The two businessmen are
criticized for presenting their case in an incomplete manner to the European
Court of Human Rights, which ruled in their favor and gave them $7ml in
compensation, while being represented by Andrei Nastase.[xv] Mr. Nastase also won Moldovan
capital, Chisinau, mayoral elections against the Socialist Party candidate, and
Presidential adviser to Mr Dodon[xvi], which was cancelled by
the Moldovan justice system, reported to be largely subordinated to Mr Plahotniuc.[xvii] Both EU and US issued
strong condemnations to such a development.[xviii]
A
new idea – Socialists and ACUM to vote Plahotniuc down and organize early “clean”
elections
A new idea to get rid of the governing oligarch,
Vladimir Plahotniuc, was launched on a Russian language website.[xix] It suggests that
Pro-Putin Socialists and pro-Western ACUM block, despite being in disagreement,
should vote down the government controlled by the corrupt governing oligarch
and then organize new “clean” early elections. While ridding Moldova of
corruption is a necessary development, the plan is fatally flawed and should
not be supported, for the following reasons:
1.
Mr. Plahotniuc doesn't necessarily need the
administrative resources of the State to effectively participate in new elections.
For his party it is good to have have them, yet not a must. Plahotniuc can handle
the elections with his own money. The vote down, may indeed send a signal to
the "field" that he is no longer in charge – still, there are other
barriers that make it less relevant.
2.
To organize new "clean" elections
one would need to change the Central Electoral Commission - that's impossible,
per Moldovan legislation during elections. As a secondary matter, I would add
that changing the electoral law back, would be generally good – however, it
would be against the Coucnil of Europe (Venice Commission) and OSCE practice,
which is invoked as the best practice by at least ACUM.
3.
Same limitations go for the Audio-Visual
Council.
4.
No one will be able to take away Plahotniuc's
media overwhelmingly present in Moldovan houses. They broadcast popular Russian
channels, however, with his news inserted. These will probably work double time
for his campaign in the media.
5.
An ACUM alliance with Dodon, despite previous
joint protests against Plahotniuc, is a whole different matter. Such an
alliance may annihilate ACUM's credibility with its voters right ahead of early
elections. ACUM voters are staunchly anti-Dodon and wary of Russian interests
in Moldova.
And, predictably, ACUM just
"signed" a public promise that they won't do such an alliance.
6.
An ACUM alliance with Dodon, would also
undermine ACUM's credibility with the Western factors. Mr. Plahotniuc payed considerable
amounts of money to lobby in USA a image of Dodon’s controller and of ACUM
being partners to Russian controlled Dodon in their joint protests against
Plahotniuc.
7.
The issue of believing Dodon – we are talking
about the President who was elected on a wave of fake news, using own &
Russian support for such fake news, who "imported" money via off
shore companies from "unknown" sources and travels to coordinate with
Putin as often as he needs to, returning with a Gazprom flight. There is little
doubt that after dealing with Mr. Plahotniuc, he might not be the right person
to trust in organizing "clean" elections.
However
the most important argument is - if Mr. Dodon wants early elections, he simply
doesn't have to form a coalition with Plahotniuc. Without such a coalition, and
with ACUM determination to avoid a political suicide via a coalition either
with Dodon or Plahotniuc there will be early elections, to which President
Dodon publicly called many times. If ACUM is not needed for early elections, and
because taking down Plahotniuc’s government solves little, then such a joint
action will only play to reinforce Plahotniuc’s claim that he is the only
pro-Western player in Moldova,, despite his suggested involvement in the
Russian laundromat.
All these factors, together, do not support such a scenario, in fact they undermine only one specific party - ACUM block.
My current projections show that at this point both Plahotniuc and Dodon will expect election results to either go into early elections or actually form a new "non"existent coalition (the old "Binom" again) between their parties. The Binom may function according to the old true and tried formula, when Demacrats would play the "pro-Western" card and "attempt controlling" Dodon, while the President would continue his Russian connection.
Additionally,
they have been shifting toward what they called a "pro-Moldova" position,
as the Democrats declared after being criticized by EU, which would argue that
they a smart play between the West and East in necessary and more realistic for
Moldova’s survival. I’d argue that Moldova agonizes between the Putin’s style “Sovereign
Democracy” and EU for over 20 years and the pro-Moldova stance just delays the democratic
development of the country, justifying Russian laundromats and endemic corruption.
Wednesday, February 20, 2019
Moldovan pro-Russian President secret plan for Transnistrian conflict settlement leaked
Moldovan pro-Russian President secret plan
for
Transnistrian conflict settlement - leaked
by Vlad Lupan,
New York, February 20, 2019
According to a number of private discussions with Moldovan
experts, we knew that the pro-Russian President Dododn was preparing a set of documents
for Transnistrian conflict settlement. Moldovan media reported about my
previous information on his plan for a neutrality resolution at UN, a document that
was brought to my attention before the Moldovan authorities even considered to prepare
a UN resolution for Russian troops withdrawal (Independent.md, June 5, 2017).[i]
According to another private discussion this fall with one of the
Moldovan experts from IDIS-Viitorul, an attempt to pitch a plan for Transnistrian
conflict settlement was done by President Dodon’s team, during a visit to USA
and possible to other Western governments. There was no confirmation that they
had meetings with the US State Department, though such a rumor did circulate.
Several days ago, one of the Russian language news portals from
Moldova denied that President Dodon was invited to Munich Security Conference. He
travelled there nonetheless to use the opportunity to have some meetings on the
margin of the MSC2019 to pitch his plan again (OMG Media Group, February 15,
2019)[ii]
The situation somewhat resembles the 2003 developments with Kozak
Memorandum, when the Moldovan (Communist) President Voronin asked Moscow to
step in and facilitated a “shuttle diplomacy” effort by President Putin’s Chief
of Staff, Special Envoy Dmitri Kozak. The plan was supposed to ensure the
s-called federalization of the Republic of Moldova, however, via separatists’
veto powers against any foreign policy decisions of Moldova, a veto in
Constitutional Court, as well as a Russian military base to stay until 2020
with the possibility of unlimited extension (Maria Levchenko, OpenDemocracy, February 25, 2016). [iii] As such provisions prove,
such a plan would not mean federalization. It was rather a form of Russian protectorate,
via proxies, over the rest of the Republic of Moldova, and the Moldovan experts
called it the “Transnistrization of the Republic of Moldova.”
Current President Dodon and the current leader of governing
Democrats were the Minister of Economy in Voronin’s Government and one of the
financiers of the Communist party respectively, at the time of 2003, when the
so-called Kozak Memorandum was prevented.
A “Transnistrization” of
Moldova in the works again
The new “plan” comes after repeated visits to Russia of the
President Dodon, the opening of the so-called Transnistrian representation in Moscow
without an adequate response form the Government, and after a set of international
transportation and export concession by the Moldovan governing Democrats to
Russian businesses in Transnistrian region.
After these actions Russia nominated again the same Dmitry Kozak,
of 2003 Memorandum, to lead Moscow’s efforts in Transnistrian conflict
settlement. Such a nomination presumes an “opportunity to resurrect the issue of
federalization” in exchange
for the Russian, possibly indirect, support to both President Dodon and
governing Democrats (Dumitru Minzarari,
Jamestown Foundation, July 23, 2018).[iv] We have indicated that the
nomination of Mr. Kozak would presume another attempt of Tranistrization.
Despite the facy that the plan is speaking about the post-settlement
Moldovan having one international status, several provisions in the preamble
contradict that- the plan presumes a split of the Republic of Moldova in two
legal subjects, with separate armies, coin and, foreign ministries. Moreover, as
per previous negotiations on Transnistrian conflict settlement, any
negotiations on the so-called federalization of Moldova usually evolve in discussions
about a trilateral or quadrilateral “federation” and later “confederation” etc.
Opening this Pandora box, the President Dodon, who has a previous Chief
Negotiator of the Transnistrian problem on his team, knows very well that the already
existing Gagauz Autonomy will require an identical status, possibly with
external support from Turkey and Russia, while the last would be expected to
foment the somewhat mixed North of the Republic of Moldova, politically sympathetic
to Moscow.
The old problem of linguistic
dependency and the myth of “multi-nationalism”
The struggle for independence in the Republic of Moldova also
meant the return to Latin alphabet at the end of USSR, in 1989, since Soviet “Moldovan”
was in fact Romanian language written in Cyrillic alphabet. For many Moldovans
the language was a sign of their independence. One of the first laws the new
multi-party Parliament inacted in 1989 was to return the Moldovan schooling
system returned to Latin script. As of 1992, the Ministry of Education curricula,
compulsory for all the schools, confirmed the declaration of independence on
Romanian language and decreed that pupils in schools only studied Romanian
language and literature, not Moldovan. From 1992 till 2019 this provision is still
in force. Therefore, another return to Cyrillic after 28 years of Latin script despite
being a nuisance, it in an important symbolic gesture towards the Soviet past and
loyalties to Russia. Such a step would also ground the populace linguistically
into the Russian space (Русский Мир).
The USSR experience of a dominant Russian language
and the functioning of the Transnistrian separatist “republic” showed that
while Russian, “Moldovan” and Ukrainian languages were declared as “official”
in Moldovan SSR and in that “separatist” region after 1992, the Russian language
dominated and its users undermined others, suffocating other two. Therefore,
the existing body of experience shows that the linguistic dependency would lead
to another round of russification.
The past USSR and current Transnistrian linguistic
practices are indicators as to how the so-called multi-national state would be
constructed in the Russian World.
Dangerous provisions
The document is fraught with conflicting and interpretable provisions.
Since the provisions are prepared and presented to the Western actors since
September 2018, these do not seem to be mistakes. Such points may indicate
contradictions stemming from the conflict between original more Russian interests-oriented
provisions and attempt to adjust the paper with some red lines from Western
actors.
1. Contradictions - the draft on page one refers in preamble to a unitary state
with two equal subjects with equal powers (полномочия) in foreign policy,
defense, security, currency. It also speaks in General Provisions of a unitary
multinational neutral state, in para 1 and 5. Yet para 6 states that “The equality
of “Moldova-Transnistria” sides in negotiations process on the Transnistrian
conflict settlement does not lead to their equal legal status/powers (правосубьектность)”.
2. Removing the 2005 law - the most contentious for Russia Moldovan 2005 law that determines
that the Transnistrian conflict resolution would be done in accordance with the
Moldovan Constitution and international law provisions is eliminated on page 2,
para 9 of General provisions, clearing the way for a construct similar to one
in 2003.
3. The return to 2003 Kozak “federalization” memorandum provision
of a bicameral Parliament and exclusive presence of Transnistrian representatives
in Moldovan Government, justice system and Constitutional court can be found again
on page 2, para 3 and 10. However, a mirroring process of ensuring some sort of
a guarantee by placing trusted Moldovan officials in the Transnistrian
structures is absent. The previous Kozak Memorandum veto powers granted to Transnistrians, who are almost
entirely Russian citizens, are not mentioned on this page. These are present,
however, in the document and relocated to sections and paras on page3.
4. On page 1 in the Basic Parameters chapter,
on page 2 para 9 the document requires to return to the Moldovan language with the
Cyrillic script, denying the populace of Moldova hard earned linguistic independence
and placing a fractured “reunited” Moldova back into the Cyrillic space of the Russian
World, as noted in the chapter on linguistic
dependency.
5. A precedent
- a combination of elements from the previous 2001-2003 federalization talks and
current Gagauz Autonomy parliamentary right, can be found in para 4, on page 2.
Among other things this will create a precedent for Gagauz autonomy to request
a similar upgrade federal status, as noted above.
6. Para 7 on page 2, as well as the entire set
of provisions in the Chapter on Guarantees
on page 3 speaks about guarantees, without providing a legal ground and compulsory
measures to guaranteeing actors to maintain those promises. The Budapest
Memorandum of 1994 on de-nuclearization of Ukraine proved that the lack of repercussions
is convenient to Russia. The fact that OSCE is called to guarantee these
provisions, is relevant – the OSCE does not have leverages and is dependent on
the rule of consensus. The rule of consensus was successfully misused by the
Russian Federation as a veto in OSCE and other international consensus
organizations before. Without appropriate leverages such a language and
provisions on guarantees is meaningless.
7. The UN
does not have a mechanism of guarantees to ensure all sides’ compliance,
if one of the interested parties is a member of the UN Security Council and even
less in case of OSCE and other organizations (Dangers of Vetocracy, Ukrinfo,
February 12, 2019).[v]
The suggestion of OSCE to handle the conflictual provisions, if those may
arise, goes against the fact that OSCE has only a political, yet no legal body
to settle disputes. It resembles the requirement of Russia to conduct a UN peacekeeping
operation in Ukraine only to protect OSCE observers, not to actually implement
the Minsk agreements, violated by Russia itself and its proxies.
8. Another dangerous provision is to related
to the old Russian position on the synchronization
of the political settlement with Russian troops withdrawal from Moldova according
to the formula “no settlement the way Russia wants it, no withdrawal”. The para3
on Internal Guarantees on page 3 speaks about the demilitarization of both sides,
while para 3 on Neutrality – a Russian demand often repeated in the media for
the last 20 years – is directly making a reference to the idea. Such a
development confirms the previous attempt from the governing Democrats to
manage Russia by refusing to request a compete withdrawal of Russian troops,
including the so-called peacekeepers and ask for their replacement with an
international force, in the UN resolution of June 2018, as we noted at that
time. Such a language allows the entire contingent to stay, and while is not
identical, it is in substance sufficiently similar to Kozak 2003 Memorandum
requirement for stationing of the Russian troops over extended period of times (DW,
July 16, 2018).[vi]
The deadline of 2040 for the settlement confirms the approach.
There are more provisions worth mentioning. However, the already
pointed out provisions seems to prove that this draft is an edited and
rearranged, sometimes poorly, version of the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, making another
attempt at Moldova’s “Transnistrization” and firmly placing it this time in the
sphere of influence of the Russian
Federation, the Russian World.
No mandate - the “wrong”
document?
While the leaked document was received from Munchen, from one of
the participants to the Conference, who got hold of the draft distributed there,
it is rumored that the presidency quickly denied its veracity. This could not
be yet confirmed. The photographed document came to Moldova after Dodon
presented it there. There is little doubt that this the actual document
prepared by President Dodon’s office. Its quick denial suggests the lack of
comfort and confidence that this document would not have the support of Moldovan
citizens, just like the Kozak Memorandum in 2003 drove people out to protest it
en masse. Yet his draft claims the people support it. While Kozak Memorandum
was drafted by the Russian envoy, it would be interesting to find out where the
2018-2019 paper was drafted.
One year ago, we wrote that the acceptance
by the Governance to transfer the Transnistrian file to the President Dodon does
not go in line with its declared pro-European and pro-US stance. At that time
we noted that a “truly pro-European government cannot afford the luxury of
transferring this political case almost exclusively to the President of the
Republic of Moldova and should block such developments.” Unfortunately, this
did not happen (Foreign Policy
Association of Moldova, Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, April 2018, issue
nr.2).[vii]
One year later, today, the reaction of the opposition seems to underline the
cooperation of the President with the governing Democrats in the matter of
Russian involvement and interest of both Moldovan actors to settle with Russia (Unimedia, February 20, 2019).[viii]
The set of measures on Transnistrian settlement that we have mentioned before
could not have been implemented without a coordinated approach between the
government and the President. Moldovan Parliamentary elections are going to
happen in five days. It is unclear if the undeclared coalition between the
Democrats and Socialists would coalition after the elections, since it depends on
their results and possible legal actions that the political players, including
the opposition may take against them. The danger of such a coalition was rated
high in a study written in the fall of 2018 and published in Ukraine in January
2019 (Elections in Moldova, Ukrainian
Prism, January 2019).[ix]
What comes after 2019
elections in Moldova, on the South Western flank of Ukraine
While President Dodon quick, though unconfirmed, denial may create
the impression that he is not going to follow up on the new Transnistrian plan,
we would presume that he would wait for a better timing, after February 24
elections, to have more freedom to act. It would depend on the post-electoral
coalitions or even early elections. Therefore, the life of this document may not
be over and we can expect new developments in 2019. In 2003 the US Ambassador, EU,
OSCE and NATO officials criticized the Kozak plan as failing to reflect the
interests of the Moldovans or gather consensus within their membership, thus placing
Moldovan leadership under pressure, and saving Moldova from disintegrating (RFE/RL-Moldova, August 13, 2016)[x] and becoming a precedent
in Eastern Europe political takeover by Russia and its proxies. In 2019 there
are two actors playing for this plan – the purported pro-US Democrats and Dodon’s
Socialists, distributing their “spheres of influence” among themselves. It is time
for the Western actors to stop supporting the open and covert pro-Russian or
opportunistic forces in the Republic of Moldova, ready to play along with
Kremlin. Otherwise they risk to help create a negative precedent ahead of
Ukraine elections and a hostile area on Ukraine South-Western flank.
The "Plan":
Tuesday, February 19, 2019
CU CINE SA VOTEZ IN ALEGERILE DIN 24 FEBRUARIE?
This is a blog entry in Romanian
regarding my personal view on the vote
in 51st Electoral District of the Republic of Moldova
(for USA and Canada) for
24 February 2019 Parliamentary elections*
February 19, 2019
*apologies for typos
CU CINE SA VOTEZ IN ALEGERILE DIN 24 FEBRUARIE?
Am auzit sau
citit aceasta intrebare de mai multe ori in circumscriptia 51 SUA si Canada. Voi
incerca sa vin cu opinia mea, asa, ca un fost observator la alegeri din 4
state, dintre care unul era chiar Republica Moldova, in baza de calcule, poate
ceva logica si alte considerente “strasnice” si “neacceptabile” sau “obostiroare”,
de argumente “deja auzite”. Numai ca nu, nu am vazut aceste argumente puse la
rand si “auzite”.
Sa fie clar, eu
nu voi vota PSRM si PD, sau Sor
sau “independenti” care au continuat capturarea structurilor de stat de catre o
grupare politica, care actioneaza ca un criminala si in genere toti nazdravanii
legati diredt sau indirect de Moscova si Tiraspol. Si nu-mi voi irosi votul, care
se va pierde altfel. Da, situatia e “rahat cu perje” cum zicea nanul meu, fie-i
tarana usoara, dar daca imi bag capul in nisip ea nu va disparea! Deci, sa
scoatem capul si sa gandim drept.
Povestea cu “nu am cu cine vota, viata-i grea, omatul…
au furat si murat…” Ok, politicienii de acum nu sunt ceea ce mi-as dori, dar votul
meu nu-l dau prin redistributie altcuiva si mai rau. Ce fel de redistributie? Si
in genere ce se intampla? Eu asa cred:
“Nu credem nimanui” – asta deseori e un procedeu
de manipulare (pe acest fundal nu votati voi, “voteaza ai mei (PSRM/PD)” si ati
peridut, cei nevotanti, merci!)
1.
Inainte
de toate - unul din procedeele de manipulare a maselor, invatate de mine la post-grad
la SNSPA, iar ulterior la un MA in Comunicare Publica (PR) si observate de experti
in cazul Rusiei este sa creeze situatia “toti sunt rai si nu putem avea
incredere in nici unul”. Asa se pregateste terenul pentru altceva sau altcineva.
De acord, politica moldoveneasca a demonstrat cat de pastorali sau corupti sunt
majoritatea deputatilor si liderilor nostri, pe care… tot noi i-am ales. Ok. Insa
daca nu votez acum, in 2019 - doi se bat, al treailea castiga. Cine? Sigur va
dati seama.
Mitul “Stric votul si el nu merge nimanui” – poveste foarte convenabila,
pentru ca distributie de locuri in Parlament de fapt se face conform “coeficientului
electoral” catre partidul, care a primit majoritatea votulrilor, deci… PSRM si
PD. Voi poate stricati votul, eu nu, ca sa nu-mi stric capul pe urma.
2.
Sa
fie clar, locurile nefolosite in parlament se redistribuie intre partide, conform
unui “coefficient electoral” dupa ce independentii isi iau locurile. Asa spun
Articolele 87 si 88 ale Codului Electoral schimbat, printr-un vot comun al PD
si PSRM, impotriva recomandarilor Comisei de la Venezia al Consiliului Europei.
Eu nu vreau sa dau votul meu netutilizat prin neparticipare sau “stricat” sau
prin alte idei nastrusnice, la distributia locurilor pentru un partid pe care
nu-l voi sustine nici intr-un caz. Parca vrem sa schimab Moldova sau ce? Prin neparticipare
si cadonare de vot catre car o strica si vand?
Amageala “Cu asa politicieni ca in Moldova (candidate
in SUA, etc, etc) ce sa fac? Cum sa-I votez, ca toti sunt rai. Nu am cu cine
vota” Dar… poate mai citesc o data ce e scris mai sus?
3.
Da, situatia
cu politicienii din Republica Moldova nu e buna deloc.
a.
Initial
miliardul era scos de PCRM cu Greceanii, Dodon si Plahotniuc care erau intr-un
fel sau altul cu PCRM, ca ulterior schema sa se dezvolte inspre Filat si Sor.
b.
Filat
are pentru ce sedea. Nu stiu de altii din PLDM, nu am auzit acuzatii.
c.
Dar Sor
nu e la inchisoare... Ba invers, e protejat si de politie. Aha…
d.
Iar
Plahontiuc neaga ca e implicat in Laundromatul Rusesc, fapt dovedit de catre
RISE-Moldova (grup anti-coruptie, parte dintr-o retea respectata de reporteri anti-couptie
din regiune), pe care eu ii cred in orcie secunda, deoarece ei sunt obligati sa
prezinte probe la ce zic, comparativ cu orice Plahotniuci et Co sau alti genii,
care si-au cumparat vile in Geneva prin firma implicata in Laundromatul lui bratva,
legat de FSB. Ok?
e.
Maia Sandu
era in partid cu Filat si argumentul central impotriva ei este ca NU a furat(!!!),
dar… nu s-a opus. Ok, putea sa voteze Maia in guvern altfel? Stiind nu din
auzite cum functioneaza guvernele, as zice ca macar ceva informatie avea, dar sigur
era incomplete intentionat - nu stiu cat din ce se intampla cu adevarat stia
Maia Sandu. Faptul ca nu a votat impotriva a cateva proiecte ma descurajeaza,
pe mine, dar nu o discrediteaza definitiv pe Maia Sandu.
Unionistii vor aminti si de alt pacat – Maia a
evitat votantii unionisti, ba chiar le-a propus sa candideze pe Transitria
celor din PL, care sunt pe acelasi segment cu ei si pe care erau suparati. Ii
inteleg, era o ofeta, pe care nu puteai decat sa o refuzi. Dar, voturile lor “pierdute”
vor fi redistribuite conform “coeficientului electoral” si de asta nu poti
fugi, cat de mult nu te-ai ascunde.
f.
Ca Nastase
e avocatul Topilor, iar in toata povestea cu AirMoldova e pacat sa fii avocatul
unor persoane, care au beneficiat de ditamai 7 milioane de dolari, intorsi prin
Curtea Europeana a Drepturilor Omului (urgent toti uita de furtul miliardului,
in exact acest moment). Eu nu am vazut decizia CEDO si nu cunosc detalii, asa
ca, spre deosebire de multi alti colegi, nu ma pronunt pe o decizie a unei
instante, care imi apara drepturile mele, comparativ cu “Justitia” lui Plahotniuc.
Se zice ca datele nu au fost prezentate correct. Nu stiu cum a fost prezentat cazul,
stiu ca CEDO isi face investigatile calitativ. Iar de Guvern nu mai zic - de
partea cealalta sedeau juristii AirMoldova sau Reprezentantul Guvernului la
CEDO, nu??? Sedeau!!! Dar ok, oricum nu ma pronunt, pana nu aflu mai mult, profesional,
nu fara probe.
Asa o sugestie – puneti in rand si comparati. Nu, eu nu caut sa-i curat pe
Maia si Nastase, ci fac o comparatie cu datele demonstrate despre furturi si
spalatorii de bani ale celorlalti. Eu in genere as vota un unionist! Dar… nu o
voi face aici in SUA, deja am explicat de ce mai sus.
Mesajul meu de compasiune catre unionisti
4.
Pentru
cei care nu ma stiu, din 1996 am lucrat in serviciul diplomatic al Republicii Moldova.
Acum sunt fost diplomat. Am fost angajat de catre organizatii internationale in
3 operatiuni de pace, dar am fost si Consilier Prezidential pentru politica
externa in perioada intermatului dlui Presedinte Ghimpu. Am fost in 2010-2011 Vice-Presedinte
PL si membru al Parlamentului pe lista Partidului Liberal, in Comisia pentru
Securitate Nationala, Aparare si Ordine Publica. Oh, da, in toata aceasta
perioada m-am „infruptat” cu 5800lei pe luna „de putere”, in toate aceste
functii, desi ca si angajat international putea primi mai mult. Eram cotat de
presa moldoveneasca drpet unul din cei mai saraci deputati din Republica
Moldova. Am revenit in serviciul diplomatic si am fost ambasadorul Republicii
Moldova la ONU cu peste 3000$/luna la 4 membri de familie. Mai in scurt sunt
anatema „infruptata de putere” asa cum am zis si la alti distribuitori de mituri.
5.
In
ciuda faptului ca minsitrii PL au votat (din navitate, ca sa utilizez o formula
mai moale, dar si din cauza minciunilor proliferate) scoaterea mea din functie la
cererea Presedintelui Dodon, care a cazut in acest sens de acord cu PD in sedinta
comuna a lui Dodon cu A. Candu si P. Filip din februarie 2017, dupa jeluiri
repetate de la Moscova, eu raman in
relatii bune cu membrii PL. Mai mult, consider ca Plahontiuc a intentat,
ca si altora, dosare lui Dorin, ca sa incerce sa-l anihileze.
6.
Insa...
eu regret ca pentru un unionist, legat de PL, care intelege pericolul preluarii
de catre Rusia a controlului asupra Republicii Moldova prin Plahotniuc si Dodon,
nu vad alta optiune decat sa observ tendintele din sondaje, chiar daca multe
sunt manipulate. Tendintele sunt din pacate clare, PL nu trece in Parlament,
iar pe Cirucmscriptia 51 unionistii nu au candidat real eligibil.
7.
ACUM o
fi avand pacatele sale, dar PL nu trebuie sa bata in aceste alegeri in ACUM,
chiar daca liderii ACUM le-au propus PL sa candideze pe Transnistria. Da, a
fost un mesaj, cred eu si a fost inca o lovitura in PL. Dar, imiplace sau nu, trebuie
de trecut de ranchiuna si suprare, daca se doreste un viitor in afara zonei
rusesti de influenta, argument inteles corect pana acum de PL. Batand in ACUM, cei
din PL nu dezbat voturile PD si PSRM, dar nici nu castiga sa treaca in
Parlament. Aceasta vad toti. Mesajul trebuia sa fie altul, separat de atacul
aspra ACUM, chiar daca electoratul potential al PL se suprapune pe cel al ACUM.
Sper ca am fost inteles corect.
Alta poveste - cu “una e sa votezi pentru partid,
dar alta e sa votezi pentru un Candidat pe circumscriptie” – asta se mai
numeste cum sa sprijini „bardac” in parlament
8.
Deci
Plahotniuc cu Dodon introduce modificari la Codul Electoral, impotriva carora
sa pronunta Comisia de la Venezia, care supravegheza utilizarea practicilor
democratice in alegeri. Modificarile erau sa asigure votarea “pentru om” –
adica candidat individual pe circumscrptie. Credeti ca in aceasta Comsie de la Venzia sunt
naivi? Eu am cooperat cu ei, au specialisiti in alegeri cu zeci si zeci de ani
de experienta. Sigur, le ia timp sa vada printre toate „smoke screen” de la noi.
Dar chiar am uitat de ce oare s-au opus?
a.
In
primul rand, cand ai liderii locali din Moldova in buzunar, ei pot merge ca independenti
in Parlament - si toata lumea din sat voteaza pentru lider. Pentru cine credeti
ca lucreaza liderii din sate acum? Tot timpul pentru partidul de la putere! Ca
si primarii. Da, verticalii nostri. Adica acum sunt verticali pentru PD, maine
mai stii. Ei vor fi “independentii” PD. Oamenii investesc…
b.
Ca sa
impingi un proiect de lege in parlament ai nevoie de peste 50 voturi. “Independentii”
lui Plahotniuc, impreruna cu PD sau PSRM vor vota cu un independent din
diaspora? Naiv, nu? Nu, mai rau - votul pentru un proiect de lege scris de
niste persoane, care nu au experienta in domeniu (ei vor deschide consulate,
nu? :), va fi un vot rupt de la opozitie, nu de la Plahotniuc si Dodon.
i.
Asta
era calculul – “independentii” lideri locali vor fi cu PD si PSR, iar cei din
diaspora vor rupe votul de la opozitie, oricare nu ar fi ea!
ii.
Fiecare
“independent” din diaspora, nesustinut de partid, va fi un vot rupt pentru
opozitie necesar pentru limitarea lui plahotniuc et Co. Vedeti mai jos.
c.
Apropos,
stimati candidati, lasati Va rog famillile, lasati joburile bine platitie si
studiile, lasati SUA si Canda, pentru ca mergeti la Chisinau ca sa fiti
prezenti OBLIGATORIU la sedintele parlamentului, ca altfel, din cauza
absentelor va lipsiti de mandate. Si votati, cu un singur vot, de facto pentru
Plaha, cu 300$ pe luna!
Nu cred ca cineva gandeste asa, dar totusi, sa nu
cadem prada sugestiei ca “votul pentru PSRM si ACUM este un vot anti-oligarhic,
deci nu conteaza pentru care din ei votam” sau invers „votul pentru ACUM e ca
si cum votul pentru Dodon” – nu e adevarat
9.
Am
auzit o asa teorie la Chisinau – dupa alegeri Dodon cu ACUM, desi sunt
vrajmasi, trebuie sa-l mature pe PLahotniuc de la guvernare prin vot comun, fara
vre-o coalitie si sa organizeze alegeri curate noi. Dodon si alegeri curate...
Asta dupa utilizarea fake news si a inteferentei ruse in alegeri? Nu cred!
Lupul parul isi schimba, naravul ba!
10.
Simplu
– daca Dodon chiar vrea alegeri anticipate... pai sa nu faca coalitie cu
Plahontiuc si atunci guvernul nu va fi ales si vor fi alegeri anticipate. Dodon
si ACUm oricum nu vor avea dreptul legal sa inlocuiasca CEC, care e legat de PD.
Televiziunile lui Plahotniuc nimeni nu i le va lua, deci el nu are nevoie de
Filip et ministri si resursa administrativa pentru campanie, real e mai bine,
insa se poate descurca si fara! Asta inseamna ca dintr-un asa vot „presupuso-sugerat”
de dupa alegeri se va murdadri ACUM. Ei au mai facut prostii afiliindu-se cu
Dodon anterior, dar orice fel de vot si „non”coalitie cu Dodon ar fi suicid
fara vre-un castig palpabil pentru ACUM. Eu nu as vedea de ce ACUM si-ar
administra singuri o astfe de lovitura suicida. Deci eu nu cred in asa scenariu.
O fi fost oare lansat ca sa-i discrediteze pe cei din ACUM sau din incercare de
exercitiu intelectual? Nu stiu, dar nu cred in asa ceva. Deci, eu stiu cum
votez si cu cine, imi place sau nu.
Ce vrem noi acum? Sa limitam voturile pentru PSRM
si PD!
11.
Nu,
Maia si Nastase nu vor castiga alegerile! Ei pot un singur lucru – sa blocheze crearea
unei majoritati constitutionale, prin care gruparile Dodon si Plahotniuc, sa prezinte
Republica Moldova pe platou Kremlinului, doar ca sa o faca mai sofisicat decat cum
pregatea Voronin pe timpuri. Pentru asta cei de la ACUM, asa cum sunt ei, au
nevoie de voturi. Ceilalti nu trec – sorry! Eu voi iesi la vot, ca sa nu dau
votul prin “redistribuire” lui Dodon si Plahotniuc. Si voi vota un partid si pe
reprezentantul sau in disapora. Astfel, nu-mi irosesc votul. Nu pentru ca sunt
ideali sau buni, ci pentru ca acum eu nu vreau sa pierd votul in favoarea lui Dodon
si Plahotniuc, eu vreau sa-i limitez pe acestia doi. E un vot tactic, nu
strategic. Cel strategic va urma.
12.
Eu,
ca si ceilalti, vreau o clasa politica curata si desteapta in Republica Moldova.
Sper o asemenea clasa sa se formeze in viitor, poate chiar cu asistenta diasporei!
Ia timp ca o cultura a democratiei sa se stabileasca intr-o tara si noi trebuie
sa contribuim la ea, prin vot, prin know how, prin sugestii. Dar la aceste
alegeri eu clar am cu cine vota, la alegerile unde nu vreau sa fiu manipulat sa
votez un talmes balmes de Parlamentn disfunctional, in caosul caruia un personaj
cu bani isi va mai cumpara odata iertarea/clementa si va sedea pe capul nostru
inca 4 ani.
Respectiv, pe 24 februarie voi merge si vota pentru ACUM, cu ceva speranta
moderata pentru viitor. Si, da, astfel voi merge pe un vot de compromis. Dar nu
voi da votul meu prin stricare sau neprezentare pentru Dodoni si Plahotnciuci. Voi
merge fara jeluiala, la vot cu un singur partid si candidatul sau pe
circumscriptie, practic, fara teorii, ca sa le dau cat mai multe locuri in
Parlament, prin care ACUM sa blocheze vre-o majoritate constitutionala din
Parlament dintre „non-coalizatii” P si D in interesul Kremlinului. Nu as vrea
ca, exagerat vorbind, data viitoare diaspora sa se intalneasca cu ministrul de
externe (si) al Republicii Moldova, Serhghei Lavrov, enit in SUA pentru
intalnirea lui cu diaspora „sa” din Moldova. Ah da, am uitat asa pericol nu
exista...
Si sigur nu voi da votul meu unor candidati independenti in circumscriptie,
unii chiar suspect de insistenti sa lase salarile din SUA pentru 4 ani cu 300$ la
Chisinau. Ca doar nu se grabesc sa fie cumparati de Plahotniuc??? Sorry baieti,
nu va stiu si poate votez pentru ACUM sau Alaiba nu din siguranta de 100% in ei,
ci din necesitate. Pacat ca e asa? Da, dar “obositilor” de asa voturi le
amintesc de alegerile si votantii Presedintelui Trump si al Alexandriei Ocasio-Cortez.
Good luck, obositi mai departe, vor fi altii neobositi la minte sa multumeasca disporei
din SUA(!) ca le-ati dat voie sa voteze pentru voi si sa creeze majoritate
constitutionala si sa vanda tara nestingherit.
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