vineri, 29 mai 2009

После событий 7 апреля ПКРМ трудно получить «золотой голос» оппозиции

Внимание! Этот блог-пост был опубликован еще 27 мая и думаю остается актуальным, особенно перед вторым раундом голосований перенесенным на 3 июня 2009 г. А ведь сейчас столько спекуляций по поводу того что вот-вот найдется "предатель". Почему мне кажется что его не будет (все мы можем ошибатся, но...) читайте в этом коментарии:

Евразийский Дом
Информационно-Аналитический Портал

http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026

После событий 7 апреля ПКРМ трудно получить «золотой голос» оппозиции

Влад Лупан, Независимый эксперт, политический комментатор, Кишинев

Евразийский Дом: «Почему правящей Партии коммунистов не удалось привлечь на свою сторону часть оппозиции (получить «золотой голос») для избрания своего кандидата Президентом Республики Молдова?»

Очень сложно сегодня говорить о возможности «привлечения» молдавской оппозиции на сторону коммунистов. Вероятность такого сценария очень мала, особенно после выборов 2005 года, когда Коммунистическая партия доказала, что она неспособна ни к демократическому правлению, ни к политическим компромиссам. Четыре года назад несколько партий проголосовали за коммунистов, поставив перед ПКРМ 10 условий для реализации процесса демократизации. Однако эти условия выполнены не были, а партии, согласившиеся пойти на компромисс с ПКРМ, или стали практически филиалами Компартии, или не прошли в парламент после выборов в апреле 2009 г.

После 2005 г. в Республике Молдова была установлена вертикаль власти, что подтвердило подозрения оппозиции о том, что Компартия применяет российскую практику подчинения разных политических партий одной платформе. Установление контроля над силовыми структурами, а также финансовая и пропагандистская «война», которую развязала Компартия Молдовы после 2005 г. против тех партий, которые не вошли в ее коалицию, довела страну до ситуации, когда общество сильно поляризовалось до выборов в 2009 г.

Пытки, устроенные полицией над арестованными участниками демонстрации 7 апреля, а также угроза в адрес лидеров оппозиции, которых обвиняют в попытке организации путча, тюремным заключением в 25 лет – все это доказывает, что Компартия не готова идти ни на демократизацию, ни на политические уступки.

--------------------------------
Продолжение на портале:
"Евразийский Дом"
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=2026

Или жмите Read More далее и читайте все->:

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После пыток тех, кто проголосовал за либеральные партии на выборах 5 апреля, любая из трех партий, которая бы проголосовала за коммунистического кандидата, потеряла бы свой электорат, как это произошло с партиями, которые пошли на коалицию с Компартией после выборов 2005 г. Когда три либеральные партии говорят о серьезных фальсификациях на последних парламентских выборах, для них также встает вопрос о легитимности этих выборов и их результатов.

Еще в 2005 г. я спрашивал одного из организаторов тех переговоров: «Каковы гарантии того, что Компартия выполнит условия по демократизации, так как выход из такой коалиции будет проблематичным?». Поведение коммунистов показало, что они рассчитывали именно на такой среднесрочный сценарий. Условия не были выполнены, что послужило еще одним сигналом того, что и переговоры в 2009 г. между ПКРМ и оппозицией не будут результативными для последней.

Картина не будет полной, если не упомянуть того факта, что Компартия попыталась подкупить, а затем и запугать некоторых либеральных парламентариев. Сейчас эти парламентарии говорят о том, что после 28 мая они объявят данные о давлении на детей некоторых депутатов. В сложившейся моральной и соответственно политической ситуации в стране такой подход Компартии контрпродуктивен.

Ситуация сплотила ряды либералов, и они защитили своих партийных товарищей. В одном из случаев, предположительно, одного из либеральных депутатов и его семью коллеги вывезли за пределы Молдовы. Это является показателем того, что либералы не видят другого выхода из ситуации, а также осознают, что при жестком и бескомпромиссном подходе со стороны Компартии их единственный выход – сплотить ряды и добиваться досрочных выборов.

Евразийский Дом: «Возможен ли компромисс 28 мая между коммунистами и оппозицией? Или все-таки вероятен вариант досрочных выборов?»

Компартия попытается перетянуть одну из либеральных фракций на свою сторону 28 мая. Предположительно, должность президента могла быть предметом торга между ПКРМ и этой фракцией. При этом понятно, что лидер коммунистов Владимир Воронин намерен уменьшить прерогативы будущего президента, сделав его незначительной фигурой. Таким образом, позиция президента не является важной, а для такой партии либералов лучшей альтернативой является ее слияние с другой либеральной партией. Компартия своим поведением может подвигнуть к такому слиянию и усилить либеральный электорат перед досрочными выборами.

Таким образом, компромисс, скорее всего, невозможен, так как коммунисты не оставили либералам лазейки, чистого морального политического выхода, который был бы приемлем для либеральных выборщиков.

Также остается открытым вопрос гарантий, отсутствие конкретного и работающего механизма таковых. Без гарантий не может быть договора ни 28 мая, ни после. Так как 28 мая компромисс, скорее всего, не будет достигнут, такой механизм мог бы быть создан в ситуации досрочных выборов, вероятно, с помощью Европейского Союза. ЕС мог бы посодействовать выходу из сложившейся ситуации, отправив специального посредника высокого ранга для ведения переговоров после 28 мая.

Евразийский Дом: «В случае досрочных выборов, чьи шансы – оппозиции или коммунистов – перспективнее?»

Здесь важными являются несколько факторов:

1. Компартия не будет рисковать второй раз, фальсифицируя результаты досрочных выборов. Соответственно, результаты ПКРМ могут быть, вплоть до десятка процентов, ниже.

2. С другой стороны, коммунисты успешно используют пропагандистскую машину – медиа-холдинг, в который входит в том числе и Молдавское национальное телевидение со 100%-ным покрытием территории страны и большим доверием. Такая ситуация может частично компенсировать потери ПКРМ.

3. С другой стороны, все больше людей получают информацию из других источников информации. Процентное соотношение людей, которые верят в то, что Компартия виновата в беспорядках 7 апреля, растет довольно быстро. Это опять может снизить процент популярности коммунистов.

4. Экономический кризис, вероятно, ударит по стране уже в июне 2009 г. Люди вспомнят осенние заявления премьер-министра о том, что в Молдове кризиса нет и не будет. Ответственность за отсутствие антикризисной программы ляжет на Компартию. С другой стороны, Компартия попытается переложить вину на Запад и на либералов, a последних обвинят в том, что они блокируют политические решения в условиях экономического краха. В то же время, вероятнее всего, Компартия утвердит новый состав правительства, прежде чем будет распущен парламент. Эта ситуация все-таки может изменить процентное соотношение в пользу либералов.

5. Компартия попытается использовать государственные финансовые ресурсы для своей кампании. Это даст ей определенное, хотя и небольшое, преимущество.

6. Есть еще один фактор – явка на выборах. Предыдущий опыт показывает, что добиться высокой явки на выборах летом очень проблематично. Возможно, встанет вопрос о проведении досрочных выборов осенью, хотя это и противоречит закону. Чем больше времени пройдет до новых выборов, тем больше либералы успеют распространить информацию о событиях 7 апреля, даже при сильной медиа-пропаганде коммунистов.

С другой стороны, в Молдове досрочные выборы могут быть проведены только один раз в год. Если новые выборы не будут признаны из-за неявки избирателей или по другим причинам, существует опасность что коммунистический Президент Владимир Воронин останется без парламента в течение полугода. Однако этот сценарий неприемлем ни для кого, даже для Компартии, так как тогда отношения с европейскими структурами испортятся окончательно. В принципе, маловероятно, что такое развитие ситуации будет одобрено Европой или США.

Можно привести еще несколько факторов, а также сценариев развития ситуации, в зависимости от вовлеченности Европейского Союза или России в дела Молдовы. Тем не менее, серьезно возрастает вероятность того, что в случае проведения повторных выборов в парламент коммунисты и оппозиционные партии разделят голоса избирателей поровну.

Влад ЛУПАН ранее занимал должность Директора Управления НАТО в Министерстве иностранных дел Республики Молдова, был официальным переговорщиком в приднестровском урегулировании, участвовал в трех Миссиях ОБСЕ (Грузия/Ю.Осетия, Албания, Хорватия)

27 мая 2009 г
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joi, 21 mai 2009

Ahead of EU-Russia summit - tit-for-tat comments on Moldova by Russian Presidenetial advisor Prihodko

Ahead of EU-Russia summit - comments on Moldova by Russian Presidential advisor Prihodko - messages show tit-for-tat, sphere of influence, scaring EU, distracting attention

How Russia is achieving its goals?

1. By supporting the Communist party in Moldova that showed sufficient devotion to Kremlin. Link that to the spheres of influence speeches by Lavrov and in times of Eastern Partnership, as well as discussion with Polish foreign minister. Are Moldovan communists convenient in terms of maintaining tense relations with Romania, one of the EU country, as well as maintaining the necessary situation in Transnistria, as well as in its relations with Ukraine - the answer is a clear yes, in my opinion.

2. By distracting the attention from Moldova's affairs to Romania. That's Russian perception, well fed by the Moldovan Communist party, that Moldova is under threat from Romania. Exaggerating the Romanian statement makes things easier in exaggerated approach to negotiations - one raises the level of requests and basically knows there will be a some form of excuse for Romanian president's statements - very good for Russia, EU thus recognising its "guilt", as Kremlin usually interprets such promises.

3. Relations with EU and the sphere of influence is still in place - Russia conditions the discussion of Moldovan (via Romanian topic) affairs against EU suggestions to discuss Georgia-Russia relations. Trade-off politics that I mentioned as main Russian foreign policy, on whatever topic.

Distracting the attention from real Moldovan problems, somehow warning against any intervention in Moldova - Russian sphere of influence, conditioning the discussion of the questions regarding the area, etc, supporting negative implications on regional and international level - that's what Russia does well.

EU and its soft power? I think I don't have to wait the results of this Khabarovsk summit to predict.

Vlad Lupan

P.S. Click on Read more to see the news in Russian with Prihodko's statements:
РИА Новости. Главные новости часа.
Рубрика: Политика
Сюжет: Саммит Россия - ЕС в Хабаровске
Россия на саммите РФ-ЕС обсудит поддержку Западом политики Саакашвили
20/05/200918:44

МОСКВА, 20 мая - РИА Новости. Россия на предстоящем 21-22 мая в Хабаровске саммите Россия-ЕС намерена обсудить проблему поддержки со стороны Запада политики президента Грузии Михаила Саакашвили и вопрос ответственности Евросоюза за внешнюю политику его отдельных стран, которые нарушают единые стандарты, сообщил в среду журналистам помощник президента РФ Сергей Приходько.


По его словам, представители ЕС предложили поднять на саммите тему ситуации на Кавказе и обсудить отношения России и Грузии. Российская сторона не против обсудить эти вопросы, сказал Приходько.


"У нас есть что у них спросить: во что материализуется длительная безоглядная поддержка товарища Саакашвили? Что они по этому вопросу думают? Тем более что оппозиционное движение в Грузии отчетливо продемонстрировало степень невосприятия его политики, как внутренней, так и внешней", - сказал он.


Грузинские войска в ночь на 8 августа 2008 года развязали боевые действия в Южной Осетии. Цхинвали был практически разрушен, погибли мирные жители, миротворцы. Россия была вынуждена ответить Грузии силой, а затем признала независимость Южной Осетии и другой бывшей грузинской автономии - Абхазии. Тбилиси объявил Абхазию и Южную Осетию оккупированными территориями и разорвал дипотношения с Россией. Сейчас российские пограничники, согласно двусторонним договоренностям с каждой из республик, приступают к охране их границ с Грузией.


По словам Приходько, на саммите при обсуждении международных вопросов планируется обменяться мнениями о конфликтах в Европе, в том числе по вопросам кипрского урегулирования и косовской проблеме. Кроме того, по его данным, в этом блоке вопросов планируется обсудить проблемы, связанные с Молдавией и Приднестровьем.


"У нас тоже есть вопросы к нашим коллегам", - сказал он.


Помощник президента РФ напомнил о недавних событиях в Кишиневе, когда после однозначного признания международными наблюдателями легитимности прошедших там выборов, "Румыния по сути целенаправленно, не стесняясь, подливая масло в огонь, спровоцировала выступления молодежных групп и движений, которые вылились в погромы".


"Мы спрашивали и будем спрашивать партнеров из Евросоюза, несут ли они ответственность за то, что их отдельные члены делают, ставя под вопрос послевоенное мироустройство и границы", - сказал помощник главы государства.


Приходько пояснил, что российская сторона имеет право поднимать этот вопрос точно так же, как Запад - проблему отношений России с Грузией.


"Нам не нравится очень, что против одного из государств СНГ, с которым у нас дружеские отношения, (велась подобная политика)... они так, стыдливо потупив очи, смотрели, как румынские спецслужбы, используя различные методы, стимулировали эти различные безобразия", - сказал помощник президента РФ.


"Готов ли нести Евросоюз ответственность за внешнюю политику, или только будут спрашивать нас про Иран, про другие проблемы? А здесь, в Европе, они готовы с такими же стандартами относиться к недопустимым действиям?", - сказал он.


Приходько подчеркнул, что российская сторона не нацелена на конфронтацию, но хотела бы серьезно обсудить эти вопросы.
http://www.rian.ru/politics/20090520/171728749.html

Ярослава Романчук - МЕЖДУ КОЛБАСОЙ И СВОБОДОЙ?

Блог: Ярослава Романчука май 2009

МЕЖДУ КОЛБАСОЙ И СВОБОДОЙ.

В ПОИСКАХ БАЛАНСА ИСТИНЫ


Если между колбасой и свободой народ
выбирает колбасу, он не получает ни того, ни другого.
М. Жванецкий


Либерализм – это когда интересы каждого человека выше,
чем интересы бюрократии – вот, что такое либерализм.
И я термин «разгул либерализма» не пойму никогда.
Если мы жизнь, здоровье, благосостояние людей
ни во что не ставим - вот это катастрофа.
...
Борис Немцов, ноябрь 2007г.


...Колбаса и свобода: рождение матрицы

Дилемма «колбаса – свобода» родилась в советской тоталитарной системе...

...инструментов массового зомбирования населения с одной стороны и дискредитации аксеологического Запада (т. е. его ценностей) с другой. Его использовали для демонстрации преимуществ социалистической системы, ее пресловутой духовности, высокой нравственности, солидарности и гуманизма.

Ссылкы на начало этой статьи можете найти на блоге Ярослава Романчука здесь (а если дочитаете мой блог-пост то найдете ссылку на полную статью):

Блог Ярослава Романчука. Между колбасой и свободой. В поисках баланса истины

20 мая 2009 ОтКлик
TUT.BY

"Если между колбасой и свободой народ выбирает колбасу, он не получает ни того, ни другого". Читать дальше


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Аннотация Влада Лупан, то есть... мой комментарий:)
Наследство СССР или либерализм, основные потребности или ценности свободы. Насколько мы свободны? Насколько СCСР сделал нас несвободными еще на многие годы после своего распада? Может быть это зависит от ценностей которые мы разделяем или всетаки от тех ценностей которые нам "влили" в наши головы? Сколько людей применяют критическое мышелние - в пропорциональном отношении к числу населения? Как могут люди которые не видели других ценностей сравнить свободу с примарными инстинктами к выживанию и довольству, или всетаки свобода это один из таких инстинктов и мошет быть свобода дает каждому шанс выжить и процветать?

Этот блог-пост/статья Ярослава Романчука, очень интересен во времена когда и в Республике Молдова мы становимся свидетелями так называемой диллемы сегоднешнего политческого кризиса в Республике Молдова или диллемы между свободой и ценностями с одной стороны и призывами к так-называемой "стабильности" которю здесь, у нас, проповедует Коммунистическая партия Молдовы. Но ведь не зря эту "стабильность" один из политических комментаторов Молдовы назвал за глаза (уж извините) "СТАБИЛИЗЕЦ"?

Я рекомендую вам прочесть этот блог-пост Ярослава Романчука о Беларусской интерпретации диллемы котоую он очень хорошо охарактеризовал как "колбаса-свобода" - вот только почему же эта диллема становится все более видимой в Молдове, а ведь может быть и не только? Шестого апреля я уже назвал после-выборную ситуацию у нас - беларуссизацией Молдовы...

Конечно же, мнение автора может не совпадать с мнением "редакции", и.т.д. и.т.п. ;) хотя...
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Ну что-ж, вот и добрались до прямой ссылки на всю статью Я. Романчука:
http://21.by/u.php?u=http://news.tut.by/otklik/137661.html

vineri, 15 mai 2009

Synthesized vision over the Transnistrian issue

The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation

Institute for Public Policy


Synthesized vision over the Transnistrian issue


14 April 2009

In this document the events that took place during 27 November 2008 – 14 April 2009 are analyzed.

From the beginning it has to be mentioned that the events that took place during this period of time run counter to cornerstone principles of the “Package Deal” on the grounds of which, from the fall of 2006, the Republic of Moldova leadership intended to solve the problem of the Transnistrian conflict.

On 5 December 2008, in Helsinki, took place the XVI-th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council. Andrei Stratan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova in his statement reiterated the appeal to all involved actors for an active participation in discussions on replacement of the military contingent from the Security Zone with a multinational civil mission under international mandate. Andrei Stratan restated the Republic of Moldova stand on complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all military forces and ammunitions of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in compliance with the obligations undertaken in the framework of the OSCE Summits, thus, setting up the necessary foundation for the ratification by the Republic of Moldova of the Adapted CFE Treaty.

Due to the stance of the Russian Federation it was impossible to adopt either the Ministerial Declaration, or a Declaration on Moldova for the sixth consecutive year.

1. Problem of holding elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova in the eastern region of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria) and participation of the Republic of Moldova citizens with permanent residence in Transnistria, in 5 April 2009 elections.


Eugen Shtirbu, Chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC), on 3 December 2008 declared that in Transnistia would be opened 500 polling stations for holding elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova (5 April 2009). It is necessary to mention that the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on 2 December 2007 and elections of the President of the Russian Federation on 2 March 2008 took place in Transnistria as on the territory of Russia.

In fact, the Tiraspol administration did not allow opening of any polling stations on the territory of Transnistria. Vladimir Iastrebceak, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria, on 11 December 2008, declared that the Republic of Moldova could establish polling stations in Transnistria only as an electoral district abroad. For that official institutions of Moldova had to address to the Transnistrian MFA and CEC as if to institutions of another state. Thus, it would have meant that the Republic of Moldova had recognized that Transnistria was a subject separate from the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, on 5 April 2009 citizens of the Republic of Moldova de facto were deprived of the right to participate in the elections for the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. On the election day the Transnistrian militia did everything in order to impede the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, residing in localities from Transnistria to go to the polling stations established in localities under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova.

Another difficult issue in relations between Chişinău and Tiraspol is Corjevo village. Chişinău considers it a settlement under the Chişinău jurisdiction. Accordingly, it means that on 5 April, in Corjevo were due the elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, Corjevo village is the native village of President Vladimir Voronin.

In its turn, the Tiraspol administration considers Corjevo a “mini-quarter” of Dubăsari town and part of the territory of the “tmr”. Thus, Tiraspol considers that in Corjevo cannot be hold any elections to the “Parliament of the neighbor state”. Finally, the Tiraspol administration did not allow holding of elections in Corjevo village and did everything possible to make the citizens of the Republic of Moldova residing in Transnistria feel humiliated, frustrated and deprived of the possibility to take part in the elections on the 5th of April 2009.

These events have demonstrated that the Tiraspol administration continues to have a tough position in relations with the Republic of Moldova and that negotiations of Vladimir Voronin with Kremlin have not brought any positive change.

2. Negotiations process

The events that took place in the examined time frame clearly contravene to the logic of the “package deal”, through which the Republic of Moldova leadership intended to obtain the settlement of the Transnistrian problem, from the beginning of the fall of 2006. We remind that the “package deal” is based on the following fundamental elements:

1. Settlement of the Transnistrian problem had to be achieved without a modification of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, based on the Law on fundamental regulations of the special legal status of settlements on the Left Bank of the River Nistru (Transnistria), adopted on 22 July 2005 by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova;

2. Settlement of the Transnistrian problem had to be achieved in the framework of Chişinău – Kremlin dialogue, without involvement and request of opinion of the Transnistrian administration;

3. Republic of Moldova had to recognize the property rights over economic assets in Transnistria, previously illegally privatized by Russian public and private capital only after a political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

First of all, Moscow refused to negotiate with the Republic of Moldova leadership on settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and brought Chişinău back to the negotiation table with Igor Smirnov. Thus, Vladimir Voronin was forced to come back to direct contacts with Igor Smirnov, on terms dictated by the latter.

Vladimir Voronin – Igor Smirnov meeting

The meeting on 24 December 2008, took place in Tiraspol and unfolded in accordance with a scenario prepared by Igor Smirnov’s team. First part of the meeting took place in an open format, in the presence of about 50 mass-media representatives. Igor Smirnov took this opportunity for launching a propagandistic attack on the Republic of Moldova and particularly on Vladnimir Voronin. Already in a traditional manner Igor Smirnov accused the Republic of Moldova of “nonobservance of previously agreed arrangements” and asked Vladimir Voronin to express his attitude towards the draft “Treaty on friendship and cooperation between TMR and RM”, handed over to Vladimir Voronin during 11 April 2008 meeting. Igor Smirnov refused to answer Vladimir Voronin’s question about the readiness of Transnistria to come back to the negotiations process in the “5+2” format, declaring that this format is a consultative one and that real negotiations should take place “between TMR and Moldova”.

The second part of the meeting took place with closed doors. After the two came to the press Vladimir Voronin declared that “the very fact of the meeting is a performance in itself”. Within the same meeting on 24 December 2008 Vladimir Voronin handed over to Igor Smirnov the fundamental proposals for the demilitarization of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, as well as a draft Law on Transnistria autonomy.

Igor Smirnov, in his turn, handed over to Vladimir Voronin official results of 17 September 2006 “referendum” and the package of documents, where it has been developed key elements of how to apply the principle of non use of force in the framework of Moldovan-Transnistrian settlement. Therefore, the stands of “parties” fixed in these draft documents were traditionally incompatible.

The only issue on which the sides had a common ground was their intention to meet again in March 2009. This common position of both leaders could have been interpreted as a proof that Vladimir Voronin still hoped achieving a progress in the problem of Transnistrian conflict, as a result of the expected meeting in the „2+1” format (Dmitrii Medvedev + Igor Smirnov – Vladimir Voronin). Probably, due to the same reason the CPRM group in the Parliament did not adopt the decision on fixing the parliamentary elections day on 5 March 2009, contrary to many politicians’ expectations.

On 16 February 2009, during a press briefing Alexandr Malearciuk, „deputy foreign minister” of Transnistria presented the Transnistrian position on the documents handed over to Igor Smirnov by Vladimir Voronin on 24 December 2008. Tiraspol bluntly rejected the draft Law of the Republic of Moldova on the status of Transnistria and the Joint Political Declaration. Arguments put forward had a traditional nature – the Republic of Moldova ignores the “will of Transnistrian people, expressed in 17 September 2006 referendum”; the Republic of Moldova tries to impose unilateral decisions, ignoring TMR as an equal part of the settlement process etc.

„2+1” format meeting

From the perspective of 18 March 2009 meeting Vladimir Voronin gave an interview to the Russian newspaper „Kommersant”. From the interview can be drawn the following conclusions:

- Vladimir Voronin considers the expected Moscow meeting as “consultations on steps to be undertaken in order to resume the negotiations”.

- Vladimir Voronin wants to hear from Russia the assessment of the Law of 22 July 2005 on the special legal status of the Transnistrian region, which “until now has not been officially stated neither by Russia, nor by Transnistria”.

- Voronin declares that he has nothing to propose for signing during the tripartite meeting.

- Vladimir Voronin compares the “Eastern Partnership” Program initiated by EU with a sort of CIS-2 which resembles to a cordon (belt) around Russia.

- Talking about the desirable for the CPRM result of 5 April elections, Vladimir Voronin declares that CPRM strives, in an ideal situation, for a constitutional majority, because “from the Transnistrian conflict settlement perspective it will be necessary to introduce serious amendments to the fundamental law”.

From this interview a number of conclusions can be drawn. First of all, it is to be mentioned that the Republic of Moldova expects an “assessment of the Law on the status of Transnistria” at least from 22 June 2007 when Vladimir Voronin had a meeting Vladimir Putin. During that meeting, which lasted three hours Vladimir Voronin had a possibility to present in details all elements of the “package deal”. Lack of any feedback from Kremlin is a clear answer of Kremlin – Moscow does not accept the “package deal”. Moreover, also after 22 June 2007 the Russian MFA on several occasions made official declarations, from which it was clear that Russia insisted on “observance of all previously signed arrangements”. First of all, it refers to the Memorandum on normalization of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, signed on 8 May 1997, in Moscow. However, in the Memorandum there are a number of provisions which imply that the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict should be achieved by creating a confederative “common state” of two equal in rights parties – the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria. Additionally, the firm rejection by Transnistria on 16 February 2009 of the documents drafted by the Moldovan side was, for sure, coordinated with the Russian Federation.

This means that Vladimr Voronin’s affirmation that he expects an assessment from Russia of the Law on fundamental regulations of the legal status of settlements from the Left Bank of the River Nistru, adopted on 22 June 2005 is in clear contradiction with the position of Russia, which is absolutely categorical and incompatible with the Republic of Moldova sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The “Eastern Partnership” Program assessment by Vladimir Voronin is, probably, part of a number of declarations of this political figure determined by immediate circumstances. In prospect of the Moscow visit and 5 April elections Vladimir Voronin wanted to position himself for the Kremlin adminsitration as a pro-Russian politician. The Republic of Moldova chairmanship of CIS, assumed after the CIS November 2008 Chişinău Summit is part of the same scenario.

Here can be pointed out that just due to the involvement of EU, the EU Border Assistance Mission was set up. It has had a deep impact on the situation in the Transnistrian region. On 4 June 2005 within a working meeting of Vladimir Voronin with the Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko was signed a joint letter addressed to the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, calling for EU support in control of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Beginning of the EU Border Assistance Mission activities on 3 March 2006 was interpreted by the Russian Federation as an “economic blockade” etc. Inclusively, for the prevention of a “humanitarian catastrophe” to Transnistria were sent convoys with “humanitarian aid” etc. These actions in partnership with EU were undertaken by Vladimir Voronin when he positioned himself as a pro-European leader. On the other hand, on the eve of 5 April 2009 elections retention of power by the CPRM, in Vladimir Voronin’s opinion, needed a display of rapprochement with Russia.

Vladimir Voronin’s statement that “from the Transnistrian conflict settlement perspective it will be necessary to introduce serious amendments to the fundamental law” is in evident contradiction with key elements of the “package deal”. Indeed the “package deal” envisaged a separation of competences between Chişinău and Tiraspol more characteristic to a federative state rather than a unitary one (de facto federalization of the Republic of Moldova). Yet, the “package deal” does not contain the notion “federation” (de jure federalization). Therefore, the “package deal” did not envisaged amendment of the Constitution. Moreover, Article 142 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova provides that “Provisions regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the State may be revised only by referendum based on a majority vote of registered voting citizens”. It means that an eventual federalization of the Republic of Moldova can be carried out only through a referendum, even if such a modification would be voted by the Parliament.

There is only one vulnerable point left, fixed in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova i.e. prohibition of foreign military presence on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. It could be assumed that talking about a “serious modification” of the Constitution Vladimir Voronin meant abrogation of point 2 of Article 11 – “The Republic of Moldova will not admit stationing of any foreign military troops”. Abrogation of this point formally does not affect the status of permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova and implicitly does not need its approbation through a referendum. At the same time, this modification of the Constitution will allow permanent presence of the Russian Federation troops on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, as envisaged by the Kozak Memorandum.

18 March 2009 meeting, in a tripartite format resulted in signing of a Joint Declaration meaning that, as long as in his interview of 27 February Vladimir Voronin denied that there had been any draft document for signing, it was imposed by the Russian Federation. The content of this document is fully in accordance with the Russian Federation stand. The Republic of Moldova and Transnistria as “parties” declare their intention to continue direct contacts in order to reinvigorate the negotiations process; declare that they will set up conditions for an earliest resumption of activities in the „5+2” format, possibly in the first half of 2009 etc. In point 4 of the same Declaration “the parties mention the stabilizing role of the present peacekeeping operation in the region and proceed from the advisability of transforming it into a peace guaranteeing operation under the aegis of the OSCE following a Transdniestrian settlement”.

This Declaration entirely runs counter the cornerstone principles of the “package deal” and brings no progress to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Point 4 of the Declaration one more time confirms the legitimacy of the existing peacekeeping format, thus, confirming the legitimacy of the Transnistrian regime paramilitary troops. This Declaration categorically contradicts the position of the Republic of Moldova, stated by Mr. Andrei Stratan during the XVI-th OSCE Ministerial Council. Probably, this approach is part of the Chişinău policy to shape its position depending of the geographical location where it is expressed. Vladimir Vononin’s commitment, in his capacity of President of the Republic of Moldova to transform the same format of the peacekeeping operation with the same Transnistrian paramilitary troops into a “peace-guaranteeing” operation as a result of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict raises question marks about the legal form of the supposed settlement. It is certain that continuous presence of the Transnistrian paramilitary troops after the settlement of the conflict is incompatible with the notion of reintegrated state (even if federative).

After the 18 March “2+1” meeting there was announced another meeting between Igor Smirnov and Vladmir Voronin, planned for 25 March. However, on the eve, on 24 March, Igor Smirnov announced that EU Special Representative in Moldova Kalman Mizsei, USA Ambassador in Moldova Asif Chaudhry and Czech Ambassador in Moldova Petr Kypr were declared persona non grata in Transnistria.

On this background the meeting between Igor Smirnov and Vladimir Voronin, scheduled for 25 March 2009 was cancelled by the Moldovan side.

3. Energy security of the Republic of Moldova

On 23 December 2008 Cuciurgan Heat and Power Plant (CHP), as a subunit of the Russian “Inter RAO ES” Company concluded a contract on delivery of electric power to the Republic of Moldova with “Energocom” Joint-Stock Company, from 1 January 2009 to 31 March 2010. The volume of contacted power (250 million kWt x hour) covers the entire consumption of the Republic of Moldova, which meant that the Republic of Moldova discontinued electric power supply from Ukraine.

On its turn, on 25 December 2008, State-Owned Company „Ukrinterenergo” offered “Energocom” Company to buy in 2009 electric power at a price of 52 USD per 1 Mwt x hour, comparing to 56 USD offered by the Cucuirgan CHP. Yet, Chişinăul has not cancelled the contract with the Cucuirgan CHP. As a result of this policy the Republic of Moldova discontinued power supply from Ukraine and has become dependant on power supply form Transnistria. In the conditions of the 2009 gas crisis Cuciurgani CHP had no gas. Subsequently, in order to produce electric power in volumes contracted by customers Cuciurgan CHP was forced to switch over to coal and fuel oil. However, in the situation when Ukraine banned export of fuel oil on the background of the conflict with „GAZPROM”, Cuciurgan CHP had no safe functioning perspectives.

On 24 December 2008 a meeting between Igor Smirnov and Deputy Chairman of „GAZPROM” Management Committee Valerii Golubev took place. During the meeting it was declared that in the first half of 2009 it was foreseen a structural reorganization of „Moldova-Gaz” and separation of „Tiraspoltransgaz-Transnitria” into a separate unit. Similarly, it was announced that in 2009 the Transnistrian debt to „GAZPROM” would mount to 2 billion USD. Tiraspol refuses to discuss the problem of transferring the debt for the Russian gas consumed in Transnistria from „Moldovagaz” to the Transnistrian administration.

4. Conclusions

The steps undertaken by the Republic of Moldova leadership in the analyzed time frame (27 November 2008 – 14 April 2009) have not resulted in consolidation of the Republic of Moldova position in the problem of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict;

The Russian Federation and Tiraspol attitudes prove a complete and unambiguous rejection of the “package deal” based on which, from the fall of 2006, the Republic of Moldova leadership intended to solve the problem of the Transnistrian conflict;

The Joint Declaration signed on 18 March 2009 in Moscow is a serious concession of the Republic of Moldova leadership concerning the principles of implementation of the peacekeeping operation and is in clear contradiction with the previously announced position of the Republic of Moldova.;

The situation in the energy field is a clear and serious threat to the Republic of Moldova national security. The agreements signed in this field are not transparent and what can be concluded from available information – do not have an economic support. It is not clear how the problem of the Transnistrian debt to “GAZPROM” is going to be solved (about 2 billion USD).

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Dr. Arcadie Barbaroşie, Executive Director, Institute for Public Policy

Oazu Nantoi, Program Director, Institute for Public Policy

Dr. Igor Boţan, Executive Director, Association for Participatory Democracy

Dr. Anatol Gremalschi, Program Director, Institute for Public Policy

Vlad Lupan, Independent Expert

Dr. Viorel Cibotaru, Executive Director, European Institute for Political Studies of Moldova

Eugen Revenco, Moldovan-Lithuanian Foundation “European Integration Studies Center”

Dumitru Mînzărari, Researcher on foreign policy and security issues IDIS „Viitorul”

Radu Vrabie, Program coordinator, Foreign Policy Association (APE).

Linia verde pentru victimele torturii - AMNESTY

Linia verde 83-58-08 activă în continuare pentru victimele torturii şi maltratărilor
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MOLDOVA
14 mai 2009

Pentru toate persoanele din Republica Moldova care au avut de suferit în urma acţiunilor forţelor de ordine în legătură cu protestele de la începutul lunii aprilie 2009, în special cei care au fost supuşi maltratărilor şi torturii: în cadrul oficiului organizaţiei internaţionale de apărare a drepturilor omului Amnesty International Moldova a fost creată şi continuă să funcţioneze o linie verde de colectare şi documentare a acestor cazuri - 83-58-08.

Mai multe organizaţii non-guvernamentale de apărare a drepturilor omului, inclusiv organisme internaţionale au înregistrat multiple încălcări ale drepturilor omului în Republica Moldova pe parcursul şi după protestele de la începutul lunii aprilie.

Pentru societatea civilă din Republica Moldova a devenit evidentă necesitatea unei asistenţe complexe pentru victimele abuzurilor comise de organele de ordine din RM. În acest sens, noi îi îndemnăm pe toţi să ne contacteze şi să beneficieze de ajutor şi servicii ale profesioniştilor în domeniu.

Vă îndemnăm să ne contactaţi la oficiul organizaţiei internaţionale de apărare a drepturilor omului Amnesty International Moldova, la numărul de telefon 83-58-08 şi să ne comunicaţi despre cazul Dumneavoastră.

Noi vă vom face legătura cu profesionişti care vă vor acorda ajutorul necesar, cum ar fi un avocat care să vă reprezinte în instanţă, medici care vă vor acorda asistenţa medicală şi de reabilitare.
Noi îndemnăm persoanele din Republica Moldova să fie activi în apărarea propriilor drepturi. Să ştiţi că puteţi conta pe ajutorul şi asistenţa profesioniştilor în domeniu - avocaţi, apărători ai drepturilor omului, medici şi alţii, aşa ca abuzurile şi încălcările să nu rămînă nepedepsite:

Lipsa de răspundere în faţa legii (impunitatea) naşte fărădelege.

Transmiteţi acest mesaj tuturor celor care au nevoie de sprijin şi ajutor profesionist, cunoscuţilor şi prietenilor Dumneavoastră. Este foarte important ca acei care au comis fărădelegi să fie traşi la răspundere, cei care au avut de suferit să fie restabiliţi în drepturi, iar daunele care le-au fost aduse să fie reparate.

duminică, 10 mai 2009

Europe vs Great War for the Defence of Fatherland (USSR)

I posted previously on the fact that in my opinion it is incorrect to say that the Moldovan communists are not-that-communists, particularly due to their economic policies. I also gave an interview a few weeks ago to Radio Free Europe, Romanian service, suggesting that economic benefits for the ruling party, and hence their economic policies, do not interefere with their ideological program - personal financial gains did not impede them to continue speaking and promoting the idea of struggle of classes, although in a more modern way. One should understand the Moldovan communists are smarter than that, and that its not USSR time anymore.

Thus, comparing the communist party of the USSR with the current communist party of Moldova has to take into account the need to ajust the ideology to its internal strenght and foreign actors. One can not comapre the behaviour of a communist party that came to power through violence and terror becaming strong enough to hold the whole 15 soviet republics in USSR, with a communist party that was temporarily prohibited in Moldova and had to enter the political race again in the middle of 90s'.

The Moldovan communist adaptability might be rather imposed by the current situation. What could they do if they feel strong enough? Lets see the parralels of the USSR and Moldovan communist behaviour after April 7 elections.

- Voluntary arrest and torture of people in Moldova. Wasn'it widely spread in USSR of 20s up to 50s? They "stabilised" their system, clearing up the "other thinking" people and after that maintained their next step of control.

- Intimidate its own people after Moldovan elections. Is it not what USSR communists have done? The country was big and diffcult to control. Moldova is not.

- Intimidating free civil society dealing with democratisation in Moldova. That one, the free civil society focusing on democratisation, did not exist in USSR times for obvious reasons. It could not. The USSR was "the most democratic country in the world" anyway, as the communists stated. Now, after 7 April, the Moldovan communists started to deal with the Moldovan free civil society - fiscal inspections first, what would follow later? Moldovan communists do not close them down, but they paralise them - they are smater than their USSR ancestors.

- Finally, someone muted the following to me - allegedly on April 7, 2009, the National Security Council, chaired by the President Voronin (also Chairman of the Communist Party), with the members of the NSC, decided to prohibit the political parties in Moldova. They voted, but not included this item on the minutes. True or not? See the USSR - one country = one party. And also see what a good number of Moldovan elderly populace stated - over 50% of the country: they stated they only want one party. A fruitful ground for such a decision. Its only a matter of lack of strength for the communists and a matter of Europe and its funds - although, of course there is always a smart alternative, as previously suggested the Moldovan communists are smarter than their USSR ancestors: the Moldovan communists have an excellent example - to form several parties that would support the communists, or to ensure the support of the current ones. Isn't it exactly what Mr. Putin has done in Russia? "Multiple parties", which are in fact wings of one megaparty, like in the USSR, just a bit smater than in the old times...

Moldovan communists are not the communists of the USSR. They are smarter than that, but they are no better. Their economic policies are self-focused, they now hold many businesses, but the had enough examples of "free" economic markets with one party control over it. The money did not change the ideology drasticallym, it adapted it.

Europe and Wuropesation of Moldova so much invoked by the communists? Well, its easy to say one thing to keep a neighbour calm, and after ensuring the neighbour is lenient and forgiving, one can do many other things, not that European after all.

See how on May 9, the communist party of Moldova celebrated the Victory in the Great War for the Defend of Fatherland, that is USSR. They did not celebrate the victory in the second world war, although there were people in Moldova who fought on both sides. Propagating the V-Day as the main communist holliday a la Russe, as FreeEurope put it, shows what the reality is. No need to mention that the communist authorities did not go to the celebration of the Europe's day organised by pro-european liberals, nor the communists organised their own Europe's day celerbation.

Will Europe continue turning a blind eye on that belarussisation experiment right on their door steps? Europeans attempted to suggest to three liberal parties to accept the rigged results of the elections and vote for a communist government. The economic crisis will hit Moldova hard without a Government, they say. That is exactly what Mr. Voronin, the chair of the communists and incumbent Moldovan president sais. Liberals on the other hand have only one choice - not to vote vor the communists. Their voters gave their were tortured and any vote vor the communist party will be a political suicide for any of the three liberals - the voters will abandon them. Their voters also believed the liberals to be the REAL pro-Europeans. A liberal vote for the communists is a vote for that liberal party oblivion. They can't afford that. By now it it looks like Europe left the people of Moldova alone.

In fact there is only one way out of political and then crises - to ensure a joint set of actions to return to normality. After wide-sread torture and heavy misdeeds of the security forces, an EU Rule fo Law Mission to Moldova is in order. The political crisis will not be overcome by voting for the communists - the dialogue will only happen if public media in Moldova will become free, the justice will not be infleuneced by the communis party. These are normal things in any European country. So that is why we expect them to be supported in Moldova. The civil society launched a roadmap out of crisis. Democratic parties selected the ideas out of roadmap and supported them. Its Europe's turn now.

Meanwhile watch the communsts celerbating the Victory day, a la Russe, on the doorsteps of Europe. We live here everyday, at least half of us did not vote for such a future, another good part is already in Europe. Disregard this and you will disregard the reality. There is indeed a moral responsibility ours, of people who beleieve in democracy, of the citiens of Moldova, of political parties - and of Europe!

That's what happened on Europe's day in Chisinau and in communists minds - Victory Day a la Russe 1:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XeUrN6uyWCQ

Victory Day a la Russe 2:
http://www.europalibera.org/video/1619.html